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P-51 Mustang: Development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter
Not just another book on the P-51 Mustang, this detailed and controversial book forms an investigative analysis into the often - and little-known - troubled design and development history of America's premier piston-engined fighter aircraft. Supported by hundreds of rare photos and superb color artwork, author Paul Ludwig weaves a carefully crafted story.
- GenresAviation
288 pages, Hardcover
First published October 27, 2003
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 26, 2017
Paul Ludwig's extensively researched book covers the P-51's design, manufacture, re-engining, and difficult journey to become the most effective long range escort fighter of WWII. I gave this book 5 stars because of the outstanding research.
It is not without its problems. The choice (a legitimate option of course) not to tell this story chronologically has distinct drawbacks. There were many moments where I found myself rereading material because some part of the story was unexpectedly injected out of sequence, pouring cold water on what was otherwise a great dramatically developing thread.
That said, I thoroughly enjoyed the book and now understand why the story is a such good fit in the history of technology. The P-51 was not a military project. NAA was told not to develop a fighter at all, and one of the most powerful generals in the U.S Army did everything he could to derail its success. Rather than a story of dedicated and well-funded project management (like the Manhattan Project) this is more a story of happy accidents and almost heart-breaking set-backs. It is raw technological evolution. In the end, the P-51 was held back until the final year of the war. To get an idea of how big a mistake this delay was, here are a few statistics from the 5 days of missions over Germany that turned the tide and insured the US air superiority:
On 2/20/44 P-51s, 8.7% of the fighter force, downed 26% of the total victories.
On 2/21/44, P-51s, at 10% of the fighter force, downed 42% of the total victories.
On 2/22/44, at 9% of the fighter force, downed 32% of the victories.
On 2/24/44 (after a day's light operations), at 11% of the fighter force, downed 16% of the total victories.
On 2/25/44, at 15% of the fighter force, Mustangs downed 46% of the victories.
Ludwig does a great job of telling the story of the US military's (later-proved naive) assumption that "the bomber will always get through" and how it discouraged fighter development and training in fighter tactics. Major General H.H. Arnold however, who in 1933 wrote that "no known agency can frustrate the accomplishment of a bombardment mission", gradually changed his mind and by 1939 had created both an interest in fighters and a list of manufacturers he felt were qualified to build them -- and a smaller list of those he thought could design them. North American Aviation was on the first list but not the last. In spite of that, NAA's Edgar Schmued, an ace designer acquired from Fokker of America, a pioneer in lightweight fighters, went ahead with a design of what would become the P-51. Schmued and NAA stumbled upon, or intuited, key drag-reduction principles that would not be understood by aviation science until well after the war.
On the "set-back" side of this equation, Brigadier General Oliver Echols, commander of the vast and powerful Materiels Command, was used to his suppliers following orders. NAA was viewed as unqualified to design fighters and he had no intention of allowing the P-51 any chance of success. Although he allowed it to be sold to Britain, he blocked it from consideration from other qualified parties through every agency at his disposal.
The British, however, quickly realized the P-51's potential, removed the Allison engine and tried replacing it with the Rolls Royce Merlin. To their surprise it fit the P-51 perfectly and required only minor mounting adjustments. Outfitted with the same engine used by the Spitfire, many Brits began to consider the P-51 the "fighter of the future." Word began to spread back to the states from men like Lt. Colonel Tommy Hitchcock. It began to become clear that the P-51 could fly to Berlin and back with top speeds over 400 mph and a fuel efficiency better than any other fighter in the air. With great medium to high altitude performance, it became the perfect complement to the lower altitude P-38 Lightning and (to help silence the "not developed here" crowd) the Merlin engine was now being manufactured and improved, in the US, by the Packard company. By early 1942, General Arnold decided that the P-51 should be produced in spite of Echols turning it down.
As demonstrated by the previous statistics, the "Big Week" proved the Mustang's effectiveness once and for all. The P-51, described as only a "tactical weapon" only 4 months before, was finally moved into the strategic role for which it was a perfect fit.
Ludwig's narrative has a few bumps but it is a great story of technological evolution and, although this is the first I've read completely devoted to the Mustang, I'm guessing it ranks well in the fairly large body of Mustang literature. Oh -- and the pictures are great. Don't miss the captions -- they are filled with interesting facts.
It is not without its problems. The choice (a legitimate option of course) not to tell this story chronologically has distinct drawbacks. There were many moments where I found myself rereading material because some part of the story was unexpectedly injected out of sequence, pouring cold water on what was otherwise a great dramatically developing thread.
That said, I thoroughly enjoyed the book and now understand why the story is a such good fit in the history of technology. The P-51 was not a military project. NAA was told not to develop a fighter at all, and one of the most powerful generals in the U.S Army did everything he could to derail its success. Rather than a story of dedicated and well-funded project management (like the Manhattan Project) this is more a story of happy accidents and almost heart-breaking set-backs. It is raw technological evolution. In the end, the P-51 was held back until the final year of the war. To get an idea of how big a mistake this delay was, here are a few statistics from the 5 days of missions over Germany that turned the tide and insured the US air superiority:
On 2/20/44 P-51s, 8.7% of the fighter force, downed 26% of the total victories.
On 2/21/44, P-51s, at 10% of the fighter force, downed 42% of the total victories.
On 2/22/44, at 9% of the fighter force, downed 32% of the victories.
On 2/24/44 (after a day's light operations), at 11% of the fighter force, downed 16% of the total victories.
On 2/25/44, at 15% of the fighter force, Mustangs downed 46% of the victories.
Ludwig does a great job of telling the story of the US military's (later-proved naive) assumption that "the bomber will always get through" and how it discouraged fighter development and training in fighter tactics. Major General H.H. Arnold however, who in 1933 wrote that "no known agency can frustrate the accomplishment of a bombardment mission", gradually changed his mind and by 1939 had created both an interest in fighters and a list of manufacturers he felt were qualified to build them -- and a smaller list of those he thought could design them. North American Aviation was on the first list but not the last. In spite of that, NAA's Edgar Schmued, an ace designer acquired from Fokker of America, a pioneer in lightweight fighters, went ahead with a design of what would become the P-51. Schmued and NAA stumbled upon, or intuited, key drag-reduction principles that would not be understood by aviation science until well after the war.
On the "set-back" side of this equation, Brigadier General Oliver Echols, commander of the vast and powerful Materiels Command, was used to his suppliers following orders. NAA was viewed as unqualified to design fighters and he had no intention of allowing the P-51 any chance of success. Although he allowed it to be sold to Britain, he blocked it from consideration from other qualified parties through every agency at his disposal.
The British, however, quickly realized the P-51's potential, removed the Allison engine and tried replacing it with the Rolls Royce Merlin. To their surprise it fit the P-51 perfectly and required only minor mounting adjustments. Outfitted with the same engine used by the Spitfire, many Brits began to consider the P-51 the "fighter of the future." Word began to spread back to the states from men like Lt. Colonel Tommy Hitchcock. It began to become clear that the P-51 could fly to Berlin and back with top speeds over 400 mph and a fuel efficiency better than any other fighter in the air. With great medium to high altitude performance, it became the perfect complement to the lower altitude P-38 Lightning and (to help silence the "not developed here" crowd) the Merlin engine was now being manufactured and improved, in the US, by the Packard company. By early 1942, General Arnold decided that the P-51 should be produced in spite of Echols turning it down.
As demonstrated by the previous statistics, the "Big Week" proved the Mustang's effectiveness once and for all. The P-51, described as only a "tactical weapon" only 4 months before, was finally moved into the strategic role for which it was a perfect fit.
Ludwig's narrative has a few bumps but it is a great story of technological evolution and, although this is the first I've read completely devoted to the Mustang, I'm guessing it ranks well in the fairly large body of Mustang literature. Oh -- and the pictures are great. Don't miss the captions -- they are filled with interesting facts.
February 12, 2023
Published in 2003, 'Development of the P-51 Mustang Long-Range Escort Fighter' deals in great detail with the famous US combat aircraft. It makes a change to read a book about this aircraft which focusses so much on the development of the type, since most books cover this in the briefest of terms before embarking on repetitive and often apocryphal operational histories. I was taken aback somewhat by the detail of the trials and tribulations that the Mustang had to go through, whilst risking outright cancelation for so much of the time. It is superbly illustrated throughout.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews