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Language and Philosophy Studies in Method
These essays are intended to illustrate various ways in which ideas about language may be used to clarify philosophic problems. They contain careful interpretations and criticisms of theories of language.
280 pages, Hardcover
First published December 1, 1949
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July 8, 2024
A SERIES OF ESSAYS (MOSTLY) USING LINGUISTIC METHODS TO ANALYZE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS
Max Black (1909-1988) was a British-American analytical philosopher; he taught at the Institute of Education in London, then moved to the United States and taught at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and then at Cornell University.
He wrote in the Preface of this 1949 book, “These essays are intended to show how linguistic considerations are relevant to some philosophical problems. Those recommending such an approach still disagree too much about principles and methods for any systematic philosophy of language to have much hope of general acceptance. So I have tried mainly to USE ideas about language so clarify philosophical problems. I hope also to have shown how some influential doctrines about language need improvement.”
He quotes a skeptical statement from C.I. Lewis’s 'Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge,' and comments, “The central tenet of Lewis’ skepticism is that congruity of linguistic behavior is no guarantee of identify of the enjoyed qualities of experience. But what other grounds do we have for ANY knowledge about the contents of another person’s mind?... On Lewis’ view indeed, we ought to be in no position to understand ANY of his own statements… For if his thesis were true, it would be MEANINGLESS to us; therefore we cannot be expected to understand it; therefore we cannot be expected to believe it.” (Pg. 7)
In his essay on “Vagueness,” he suggests, “with the provision of an adequate symbolism the need is removed for regarding vagueness as a defect of language. The ideal standard of precision which those… who use vagueness as a term of reproach… is the standard of scientific precision. But the indeterminacy which is characteristic of vagueness is present also in all scientific measurement… Vagueness is a feature of scientific as of other discourse.” (Pg. 27-28)
He argues, “whether the number of terms in the field of reference is finite or infinite, denial of the existence of a unique boundary between the domains of ‘Lx’ and ‘not-LX’ leads to contradiction. Thus it is impossible to accept [Bertrand] Russell’s suggestion that the fringe itself is ill-defined. Ill-defined can only mean undefined---there is no place for a tertium quid in traditional logic. But an undefined fringe means absence of all specification of boundary between the fields of application of a term and its contradictory---and this is in flagrant contradiction with the facts of the ordinary use of language.” (Pg. 37-38)
In his essay on “Justification of Induction,” he states, “It seems, therefore, that what the critic of induction is mainly doing is proposing a change of terminology. While maintaining the distinctions we NOW make between knowledge, probable hypothesis, and conjecture… he wants to use other labels. When we can ‘know with certainty,’ he prefers to say ‘practically know’ or ‘have a belief which is practically certain’; where we say ‘know by deduction from a priori premises,’ he wants to say ‘really know.’ This leads some writers to say that the critic is merely recommending a ‘change in language.’” (Pg. 78)
He concludes this essay, “And for SOME purposes it may be desired to check the inductive method used in the inference by appeal to FURTHER inductive evidence based upon an examination of a sample of similar inferences. For other purposes, however, it may be satisfactory and proper to draw the correct inference habitually without subjecting the principle of the inference itself to inductive test… We may always reconsider the methods used in inductive procedures, and we may, thereby, serve the desirable end of unifying branches of inductive inquiry previously separated. No matter how refined or searching our methods become… there will be some places in the entire structure where we use a method WITHOUT PRODUCING JUSTIFICATION… But we may always produce further justification if challenged. Every inductive principle can be justified---but not all at the same time.” (Pg. 87-88)
In his essay on “Definition of Truth,” he concludes, “I am not seriously backing a ‘No Truth’ theory against its more orthodox competitors. My own view is that any search for a DIRECT answer to the ‘philosophical problem of truth’ can at best produce a formula that is platitudinous and tautological or arbitrary and paradoxical: and that a more hopeful method for investigating the ‘problem’ is to dispel the confusions of thought which generate it.” (Pg. 108)
The remaining essays in this book are “Russell’s Philosophy of Language”; “Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”; “The Semiotic of Charles Morris”; “Korzybski’s General Semantics,” etc.
This book will be of keen interest to those seriously studying contemporary analytic philosophy.
Max Black (1909-1988) was a British-American analytical philosopher; he taught at the Institute of Education in London, then moved to the United States and taught at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and then at Cornell University.
He wrote in the Preface of this 1949 book, “These essays are intended to show how linguistic considerations are relevant to some philosophical problems. Those recommending such an approach still disagree too much about principles and methods for any systematic philosophy of language to have much hope of general acceptance. So I have tried mainly to USE ideas about language so clarify philosophical problems. I hope also to have shown how some influential doctrines about language need improvement.”
He quotes a skeptical statement from C.I. Lewis’s 'Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge,' and comments, “The central tenet of Lewis’ skepticism is that congruity of linguistic behavior is no guarantee of identify of the enjoyed qualities of experience. But what other grounds do we have for ANY knowledge about the contents of another person’s mind?... On Lewis’ view indeed, we ought to be in no position to understand ANY of his own statements… For if his thesis were true, it would be MEANINGLESS to us; therefore we cannot be expected to understand it; therefore we cannot be expected to believe it.” (Pg. 7)
In his essay on “Vagueness,” he suggests, “with the provision of an adequate symbolism the need is removed for regarding vagueness as a defect of language. The ideal standard of precision which those… who use vagueness as a term of reproach… is the standard of scientific precision. But the indeterminacy which is characteristic of vagueness is present also in all scientific measurement… Vagueness is a feature of scientific as of other discourse.” (Pg. 27-28)
He argues, “whether the number of terms in the field of reference is finite or infinite, denial of the existence of a unique boundary between the domains of ‘Lx’ and ‘not-LX’ leads to contradiction. Thus it is impossible to accept [Bertrand] Russell’s suggestion that the fringe itself is ill-defined. Ill-defined can only mean undefined---there is no place for a tertium quid in traditional logic. But an undefined fringe means absence of all specification of boundary between the fields of application of a term and its contradictory---and this is in flagrant contradiction with the facts of the ordinary use of language.” (Pg. 37-38)
In his essay on “Justification of Induction,” he states, “It seems, therefore, that what the critic of induction is mainly doing is proposing a change of terminology. While maintaining the distinctions we NOW make between knowledge, probable hypothesis, and conjecture… he wants to use other labels. When we can ‘know with certainty,’ he prefers to say ‘practically know’ or ‘have a belief which is practically certain’; where we say ‘know by deduction from a priori premises,’ he wants to say ‘really know.’ This leads some writers to say that the critic is merely recommending a ‘change in language.’” (Pg. 78)
He concludes this essay, “And for SOME purposes it may be desired to check the inductive method used in the inference by appeal to FURTHER inductive evidence based upon an examination of a sample of similar inferences. For other purposes, however, it may be satisfactory and proper to draw the correct inference habitually without subjecting the principle of the inference itself to inductive test… We may always reconsider the methods used in inductive procedures, and we may, thereby, serve the desirable end of unifying branches of inductive inquiry previously separated. No matter how refined or searching our methods become… there will be some places in the entire structure where we use a method WITHOUT PRODUCING JUSTIFICATION… But we may always produce further justification if challenged. Every inductive principle can be justified---but not all at the same time.” (Pg. 87-88)
In his essay on “Definition of Truth,” he concludes, “I am not seriously backing a ‘No Truth’ theory against its more orthodox competitors. My own view is that any search for a DIRECT answer to the ‘philosophical problem of truth’ can at best produce a formula that is platitudinous and tautological or arbitrary and paradoxical: and that a more hopeful method for investigating the ‘problem’ is to dispel the confusions of thought which generate it.” (Pg. 108)
The remaining essays in this book are “Russell’s Philosophy of Language”; “Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”; “The Semiotic of Charles Morris”; “Korzybski’s General Semantics,” etc.
This book will be of keen interest to those seriously studying contemporary analytic philosophy.
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