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Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View
Wittgenstein once said, 'I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view'. However, since he never advocated any one religion many people have wondered just what this religious point of view could be. This book answers this question by clarifying the overall nature(s) of his philosophies (the early and the later) and then by exploring the idea of a religious point of view as an analogy for a philosophy. As a result, the author reveals the concordance between the later Wittgenstein and central aspects of Hebraic thought. Although perhaps this ought not to be surprising (Wittgenstein himself described his thought as 'one hundred per cent Hebraic'), the truth of the matter has been obscured by popular supposition that Wittgenstein was anti-Semitic.
176 pages, Hardcover
First published September 1, 2006
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July 11, 2024
IS HEBRAIC/JUDAIC THOUGHT A USEFUL TOOL TO INTERPRET WITTGENSTEIN’S LATER THOUGHT?
At the time this book was published in 2006, Tim Labron was at Concordia College of Alberta, Canada. He has also written Wittgenstein and Theology and Bultmann Unlocked.
He wrote in the Introduction, “Rather than trying to argue whether or not Wittgenstein and his philosophy can be said to be religious, this study is primarily focused on issues in the philosophy of language, and intended to demonstrate that there is, indeed, an interesting and fruitful analogy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a ‘religious point of view’ which he once described as ‘Hebriac.’” (Pg. 1)
He continued, “In contrast to Shield’s Logic and Sin in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the distinction between Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy will be highlighted. Indeed, it will be shown that Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language, and his conception of the role of philosophy, necessitate a study of Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’ that is dramatically different from Shields’s. Wittgenstein’s philosophy turns from an analysis of an underlying logical syntax that is thought to be the base of language, to the description of the application of language in the form of life. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s later understanding of the seriousness and depth of philosophical confusion is also an important aspect of the ‘therapeutic’ nature of his later philosophy. An understanding of the above aspects of Wittgenstein’s later thought is essential since it is the base from which an analogical comparison will be made with a ‘religious point of view,’ and Hebraic thought in particular.” (Pg. 2-3)
He clarifies, “No attempt is made to show that Wittgenstein is, in fact, religions---let alone a Jewish believer in particular. Moreover, to simply equate his philosophy with religion only leads to confusion. It needs to be made clear which is meant by ‘religious’ and what is meant to ‘philosophical.’ In contrast to equating philosophy and religion, a particular aspect of philosophy and a particular aspect of a religious viewpoint will be discussed on an analogical basis. The key to this analogical comparison is Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language, while Hebraic thought is used to illuminate its unique character. This study will show that Hebraic thought based on the Judaic tradition is an original and valuable means to interpret the analogy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and his ‘religious point of view.’” (Pg. 5-6)
Rejecting Shields’ perspective, he argues, “What connects Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with a ‘religious point of view’ and… Hebraic thought in particular, is their similar divergence from an exclusively scientific world-view, theorizing and excessive explanations.” (Pg. 38-39)
He suggests, “Our actions and reactions---our use of language---must be seen as the mode of meaning, not a consequence of meaning. We need to throw away the ladder given to us through the Greek aspect of thought discussed … and instead learn on the ground. We can then look for a better religious analogy for Wittgenstein’s religious point of view along our meandering streets rather than in distant and foreign ideas.” (Pg. 87)
He states, “when we look at language and religion set in the ‘stream of life,’ then we describe particular practices and clarify the nature of the analogy being made. In particular, Hebraic thought … will be shown to be a specific religious analogy for Wittgenstein’s later thought since they both are distinct from the aspect of Greek thought discussed above, they disregard metaphysics, and similarly base meaning and authority in the concrete applications of language (theology) in the form of life.” (Pg. 92-93)
He admits, “It is important to note that I am not attempting to prove that Wittgenstein’s thought is actually Hebraic. Instead, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy will be compared to a particular strand of Hebraic thought to show an interesting analogy (e.g., they eschew absolute systems and theories in favor of concrete viewpoints) that illuminates the distinct nature of Wittgenstein’s thought.” (Pg. 102)
He observes, “Hebraic thought bears striking similarities to Wittgenstein’s later conception of language in understanding language and theology (the grammar of religion) through our activities in the world. Neither posit a strict system of logic of a foundational realm; instead, there is a certain fluidity that results from looking at our application of language/practices, in contrast to a THEORY of language/theology.” (Pg. 115-116)
He summarizes, “It should be clear now that Hebraic thought offers an illuminating point of contact with Wittgenstein’s thought, particularly as distinguished from Greek thought. The basis of this comparison rests of the mutual understanding of Wittgenstein’s and Hebraic thought on the importance of an applied understanding, where the use of language, and the associated practices, are evidence of the reciprocal relation between language and logic. In other words, meaning is not a static ideal or object that must first be known and then carried to our applications of language. Instead, using language and the practices of the Israelites, for instance, ARE the basis for meaning, for understanding language (the grammar of religion), and for being an Israelite. Wittgenstein’s thought is akin to Hebraic thought, but distinct from Greek thought, on this point: ‘What has to be accepted, the given, is---so one could say---forms of life.” (Pg. 121)
In the final chapter, he concludes, “The similarities between Wittgenstein’s later thought and Hebraic thought was shown through the example of the Israelites and the golden calf. This example took Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy and showed its analogical relation to Hebraic thought. The analogy was based on the serious problems of idols and the ‘treatment’ for idols. In both Wittgenstein’s thought and Hebraic thought, philosophical and religious, idols are to be destroyed since they betray serious confusion. In other words, in the philosophy of language an underlying logical syntax or foundational ideal is a metaphysical construction that may be thought to anchor or explain meaning for language, but is merely a philosophical idol. Once again, Wittgenstein says, ‘our illness is this, to want to explain.’ Similarly, an object or transcendental theory that is thought to explain or hold the meaning of the Israelites’ God is an idol.
“In Wittgenstein’s later thought and within Hebraic thought idols were shown to be serious problems that need ‘treatment.’ Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy was shown to be ‘therapeutic’ for the problem of philosophical idols by demonstrating that ordinary language reveals meaning in the language games. Meaning is not explained through metaphysical connections or by positing foundational realms, but is shown in the form of life. In a similar manner, God is not found or explained by a deduction from metaphysical inquiry, presented as a particular object, or a theoretical abstraction in Hebraic thought. Instead, God is shown through the Israelites’ history and practices, that is, their form of life.” (Pg. 152-153)
Persons interested in Wittgenstein and religion can read—besides Shields’ book---Malcolm’s Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, and Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, & Religious Belief.
At the time this book was published in 2006, Tim Labron was at Concordia College of Alberta, Canada. He has also written Wittgenstein and Theology and Bultmann Unlocked.
He wrote in the Introduction, “Rather than trying to argue whether or not Wittgenstein and his philosophy can be said to be religious, this study is primarily focused on issues in the philosophy of language, and intended to demonstrate that there is, indeed, an interesting and fruitful analogy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a ‘religious point of view’ which he once described as ‘Hebriac.’” (Pg. 1)
He continued, “In contrast to Shield’s Logic and Sin in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the distinction between Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy will be highlighted. Indeed, it will be shown that Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language, and his conception of the role of philosophy, necessitate a study of Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’ that is dramatically different from Shields’s. Wittgenstein’s philosophy turns from an analysis of an underlying logical syntax that is thought to be the base of language, to the description of the application of language in the form of life. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s later understanding of the seriousness and depth of philosophical confusion is also an important aspect of the ‘therapeutic’ nature of his later philosophy. An understanding of the above aspects of Wittgenstein’s later thought is essential since it is the base from which an analogical comparison will be made with a ‘religious point of view,’ and Hebraic thought in particular.” (Pg. 2-3)
He clarifies, “No attempt is made to show that Wittgenstein is, in fact, religions---let alone a Jewish believer in particular. Moreover, to simply equate his philosophy with religion only leads to confusion. It needs to be made clear which is meant by ‘religious’ and what is meant to ‘philosophical.’ In contrast to equating philosophy and religion, a particular aspect of philosophy and a particular aspect of a religious viewpoint will be discussed on an analogical basis. The key to this analogical comparison is Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language, while Hebraic thought is used to illuminate its unique character. This study will show that Hebraic thought based on the Judaic tradition is an original and valuable means to interpret the analogy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and his ‘religious point of view.’” (Pg. 5-6)
Rejecting Shields’ perspective, he argues, “What connects Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with a ‘religious point of view’ and… Hebraic thought in particular, is their similar divergence from an exclusively scientific world-view, theorizing and excessive explanations.” (Pg. 38-39)
He suggests, “Our actions and reactions---our use of language---must be seen as the mode of meaning, not a consequence of meaning. We need to throw away the ladder given to us through the Greek aspect of thought discussed … and instead learn on the ground. We can then look for a better religious analogy for Wittgenstein’s religious point of view along our meandering streets rather than in distant and foreign ideas.” (Pg. 87)
He states, “when we look at language and religion set in the ‘stream of life,’ then we describe particular practices and clarify the nature of the analogy being made. In particular, Hebraic thought … will be shown to be a specific religious analogy for Wittgenstein’s later thought since they both are distinct from the aspect of Greek thought discussed above, they disregard metaphysics, and similarly base meaning and authority in the concrete applications of language (theology) in the form of life.” (Pg. 92-93)
He admits, “It is important to note that I am not attempting to prove that Wittgenstein’s thought is actually Hebraic. Instead, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy will be compared to a particular strand of Hebraic thought to show an interesting analogy (e.g., they eschew absolute systems and theories in favor of concrete viewpoints) that illuminates the distinct nature of Wittgenstein’s thought.” (Pg. 102)
He observes, “Hebraic thought bears striking similarities to Wittgenstein’s later conception of language in understanding language and theology (the grammar of religion) through our activities in the world. Neither posit a strict system of logic of a foundational realm; instead, there is a certain fluidity that results from looking at our application of language/practices, in contrast to a THEORY of language/theology.” (Pg. 115-116)
He summarizes, “It should be clear now that Hebraic thought offers an illuminating point of contact with Wittgenstein’s thought, particularly as distinguished from Greek thought. The basis of this comparison rests of the mutual understanding of Wittgenstein’s and Hebraic thought on the importance of an applied understanding, where the use of language, and the associated practices, are evidence of the reciprocal relation between language and logic. In other words, meaning is not a static ideal or object that must first be known and then carried to our applications of language. Instead, using language and the practices of the Israelites, for instance, ARE the basis for meaning, for understanding language (the grammar of religion), and for being an Israelite. Wittgenstein’s thought is akin to Hebraic thought, but distinct from Greek thought, on this point: ‘What has to be accepted, the given, is---so one could say---forms of life.” (Pg. 121)
In the final chapter, he concludes, “The similarities between Wittgenstein’s later thought and Hebraic thought was shown through the example of the Israelites and the golden calf. This example took Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy and showed its analogical relation to Hebraic thought. The analogy was based on the serious problems of idols and the ‘treatment’ for idols. In both Wittgenstein’s thought and Hebraic thought, philosophical and religious, idols are to be destroyed since they betray serious confusion. In other words, in the philosophy of language an underlying logical syntax or foundational ideal is a metaphysical construction that may be thought to anchor or explain meaning for language, but is merely a philosophical idol. Once again, Wittgenstein says, ‘our illness is this, to want to explain.’ Similarly, an object or transcendental theory that is thought to explain or hold the meaning of the Israelites’ God is an idol.
“In Wittgenstein’s later thought and within Hebraic thought idols were shown to be serious problems that need ‘treatment.’ Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy was shown to be ‘therapeutic’ for the problem of philosophical idols by demonstrating that ordinary language reveals meaning in the language games. Meaning is not explained through metaphysical connections or by positing foundational realms, but is shown in the form of life. In a similar manner, God is not found or explained by a deduction from metaphysical inquiry, presented as a particular object, or a theoretical abstraction in Hebraic thought. Instead, God is shown through the Israelites’ history and practices, that is, their form of life.” (Pg. 152-153)
Persons interested in Wittgenstein and religion can read—besides Shields’ book---Malcolm’s Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, and Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, & Religious Belief.
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