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258 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1961
The truth is that, if different people are to agree in their ethical judgements, it is not enough for them to be fully informed [pace Hume's theory of ethics]. They must all be reasonable, too. (Even this may not be enough: when it comes to controversial questions, they may reasonably differ.) Unfortunately, people are not always reasonable. And this is a sad fact, which philosophers just have to accept. It is absurd and paradoxical of them to suppose that we need to produce a 'reasoned argument' capable of convincing the 'wholly unreasonable', for this would be a self-contradiction [footnote 2 reference].Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics, 165. (Note: The foregoing quotation exactly reproduces the British spelling and punctuation of the original, which, of course, is different in some respects from American English conventions.)
[Footnote 2:] I should have thought it unnecessary to formulate such an obvious truth, had I not found it overlooked, in practice, by eminent philosophers. For instance, I recall a conversation with Bertrand Russell in which he remarked, as an objection to the present account of ethics, that it would not have convinced Hitler. But whoever supposed that it should? We do not prescribe logic as a treatment for lunacy, or expect philosophers to produce panaceas for psychopaths.