Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico

Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

by Beatriz Magaloni

This book provides a theory of the logic of survival of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes in the twentieth century. An autocratic regime hid behind the facade of elections that were held with clockwise precision. Although their outcome was totally predictable, elections were not hollow rituals. The PRI made millions of ordinary citizens vest their interests in the survival of the autocratic regime. Voters could not simply throw the “rascals out of office” because their choices were constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compelled them to support the autocrats. The book also explores the factors that led to the demise of the PRI. The theory sheds light on the logic of “electoral autocracies,” among the most common type of autocracy today, and the factors that lead to the transformation of autocratic elections into democratic ones. This book is the only systematic treatment in the literature today dealing with this form of autocracy.

Genres: Political Science, Politics

314 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 2006

Reviews

[Rebecca · Rating 3 out of 5]

Read it for grad school

[Dylan Groves · Rating 4 out of 5]

lots of ideas

[XXX · Rating 2 out of 5]

The topic for the book is very interesting & well-motivated (why would an autocratic regime like the PRI in Mexico bother holding elections) & the main thesis (show of strength/popularity) + other supplementary ones (e.g. opposition finds it hard to coordinate both because PAN/PRD have opposite political views and because many 'moderate' voters won't believe accusations of fraud) seem reasonable.

Still, the book suffers quite a bit from an enforced academic style which pushes it to develop and defend overly simplistic theories. For instance, are all voters either "moderate" (will not believe accusations of fraud) or "radical" (always believe the PRI is committing fraud)? Much of the book uses economic-style utility maximization models but these largely seem stylistic. The utility functions are simply lists of priorities for the actors and the resulting analysis is qualitative (e.g. no optimization performed, no general equilibrium discussed...). Agents try to achieve their priorities and minimize the things that hurt them. Duh?

A lot of the empirical results are interesting in terms of correlation but, again, aren't super well-motivated. e.g. probits on voter choice when none of the variables are plausibly exogenous (here meaning do not suffer from omitted variable bias).

BM seems really smart & knowledgeable. I would have liked to see her write a qualitative work using her insights to build a more fleshed-out picture.

[Diego · Rating 4 out of 5]

Beatriz Magaloni presente una serie de modelos de ciclos político-económicos como los de Nordhaus y Alesina para estudiar los patrones en las votaciones en regímenes autocraticos. En particular para el caso del PRI en México durante el siglo XX.

Presenta un recuento de las estrategias del PRI y sus opositores en las competencias electorales y modelas sus interacciones empleando teoría de juegos para analizar de forma estratégica su comportamiento a lo largo de distintas elecciones.

El libro es interesante y es útil como un recuento de la experiencia autocratica en México, es un buen punto de entrada para pensar en como se comportara el PRI en su retorno al poder y bajo que condiciones puede o no mantenerlo.

[Fabi]

Read for a class on authoritarianism. Cool book. Magaloni uses formal modeling and game theory to support her argument that the PRI was able to stay in power for 72 years because of combination of delivering economic growth, clientelism and its overwhelming electoral victories.

[Alan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Excellent insights into the 71-year hold on power of Mexico's PRI. Focuses largely on voter incentives and the party's mechanisms for using these to ensure cross-class and intra-party cooperation