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Phenomenology and the Theological Turn: The French Debate
Phenomenology and the "Theological Turn" brings together the debate over Janicaud's critique of the "theological turn" represented by the works of Emmanuel Levinas, Paul RicÅ? ur, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-François Courtine, Jean-Louis Chrétien, and Michel Henry.
- GenresPhilosophyTheology
252 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2001
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October 7, 2015
Worth it purely for Janicaud's devastating critique of the theological turn in phenomenology, to which the other essays in the volume are not responses, but merely illustrative examples of the theological tendency. The so-called theological turn in phenomenology was a betrayal of phenomenology precisely because it had nothing whatsoever to do with openness to theological phenomena simply and as such, but instead was merely an attempt to pass off as philosophy as much Christian theology as the market would bear. Phenomenology was chosen for this task, it would seem, purely for its currency in French intellectual life and its plasticity.
February 11, 2019
As Dominique Janicaud notes, Aristotle had already delineated the theme of 'onto-theology' by making the distinction "between a science of being [être], such as it is given in general, and a science of the Highest Being, the noetic illumination of the divine" (50). The science of things concerning being (τό öν) and the science of things concerning the divine constitute onto-theo-logy. The theme of onto-theology, as Janicaud further notes, "has so intimately penetrated reflection on the history of metaphysics that it seems quite legitimate to turn this magic wand back on contemporary writings whose 'postmetaphysical' character is often more proclaimed than proved" (50). Thus Janicaud offers his criticisms on each of the following contemporary philosophers who made, according to Janicaud, the "theological turn": Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien, and Michel Henry. Janicaud's criticisms of each of these contemporary French philosophers of religion comprise the first half of the book; and the essays by each of them, except Levinas and with Ricoeur's added, comprise the second half of the book that opens with the introductory essay by Jean-François Courtine. Thus the book has the multiple authors with Janicaud as the main contributing author.
Janicaud's criticism is mainly about the methods that all these authors claim to employ, namely, the phenomenological method as proposed and practiced by Huserl as a rigorous science, while at the same time abandoning it in order to speak of that which lies beyond phenomena: the things of the divine . Janicaud's protest is essentially that they do not adhere to the methodological delimitation Husserl put forth in order to be faithful to "the principle of all principles:" to inquire into the things themselves (zu die Sachen selbst) as they present themselves in their appearance. Husserl thus wrote in speaking of "the principle of pure 'intuition' or evidence" as follows: "accept[ing] nothing ... but what we find actually given (and, at first, quite immediately) in the field of the ego cogito which has been opened up to us by epoché, and ... accordingly ... assert[ing] nothing we ourselves do not 'see'" (Cartesian Meditations § 10, 24)) Rigorously applying this principle, Husserl insisted that "[the transcendence of God] must remain excluded from the new field of study we have to create, insofar as this field must be a field of pure consciousness" (Ideas I § 58, 134; as quoted on page 68 with altered translation). As if to echo Husserl, Heidegger too delimited his field of the "fundamental ontology" as he said in his 1926-27 lecture:
I do not necessarily disagree with Janicaud: that the theological phenomenology (including the theological ethics of Levinas, if I can put it that way) is not the phenomenology that Husserl practiced; and that Husserl's principle to be faithful to the given as it appears to consciousness must be abandoned, if one is to describe what does not appear: God, soul, the face, etc. Janicaud's protest is largely on methodology and nothing else. In speaking of Levinas, he thus says: "Certainly, explicitly, the price is the abandonment of the phenomenological method, a farewell to the Husserlian ambition of rigor" (39). But why must we be faithful to phenomenology as practiced by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre? Why should meaningful experience be confined to the field of consciousness (as in Husserl) or to the question of being's disclosure and withdrawal (as in Heidegger)? I don't think Janicaud would necessarily object to this revolt, except to say that if we are to move beyond the given, we should not call ourselves phenomenologists and invoke Husserl's name in our endeavors--as Marion, Levinas, and others do. But, more importantly, what is at stake here in transgressing phenomenology? Perhaps I am not versed enough in phenomenology to appreciate the implication of such a transgression. But I must hearken back to Levinas's adage written (in "God and Philosophy") in response to Derrida's famous essay on him, "Violence and Metaphysics:" that "not to philosophize is not to philosophize still." There is the necessity to say more than philosophy can say. There is more to it than what appears, what gives itself as a phenomenon. There is more to it than philosophy. After all, did not Kant already practiced such a thought of transgression when he (de)limited phenomena to the sensibility of time and space, leaving the room for ethics and faith? Ethical injunctions do not appear like phenomena; nor can it be derived from the latter. What I ought to do and what I may hope exceed what I can know. Even though there was no place for God in Kant's first Critique, it was rationally justified, as it was necessary, to postulate God's existence. Likewise, if meaningful experience is a valid subject matter for philosophy, philosophy cannot limit itself only to what appears to consciousness or to the domain of being, as if all meanings in life are confined to the meaning-giving act of consciousness or to being's move (geste e'être). Is human being no more than a shepherd of being? Is philosophy's self imposed limit or reduction rational, as Lacoste notes (in his The Appearing of God, 105)? Such a limit appears to be purely a methodologically drived necessity, a decision made by methodological constraints. In short, Janicaud's skillful and magnificent protests can be accepted only if we remain faithfully within the phenomenological method. But was Heidegger himself faithful to the phenomenological method when he proclaimed in 1973 that he was doing the "phenomenology of the unapparent," as Janicaud notes (28ff.); and when he no longer associated his project with Huserl's after his 'turn'? Janicaud would be the first to say 'no' and seems to acknowledge the inevitability of transgressing phenomenology when he makes the following startling announcement: "Without Heidegger's Kehre, there would be no theological turn" (31). Janicaud is correct to the extent that this is true of methodology. Heidegger's 'turn' necessitated the transgression from the phenomenological method. Janicaud's pronouncement bears out to be true chronologically. Levinas's "theological turn" began as early as 1951 when he published "Is Ontology Fundamental?"; and Heidegger's 'turn' began with the 1929 lecture "What is Metaphysics?" However, Levinas critique of Heidegger in that essay is mainly directed to Being and Time (1927). It would be a mistake to suggest that Heidegger's turn ushered into the "theological turn" in Levinas, Henry, Marion, and Chrétien as if they were simply following the prominent trend of thought at the time. My hunch is that it was their theological conviction that gave them the audacity to make the theological turn; and phenomenology offered the philosophical tools to articulate that which does not appear as phenomenon. Heidegger's turn did not cause him to make a "theological turn" himself. He remained true to his Sache to the end and remained atheistic to the end.
Heidegger's 'turn' too is largely methodological. Phenomenology is not possible, if being in disclosing beings does not itself appear, if the essence of being is to withdraw from appearing. The truth of being is a matter for thought, not for phenomenology. Marion too eventually came to the conclusion that whether he was upholding the phenomenological method in his own works was not important, as Janicaud notes. In any event, as Ricoeur noted somethere, the history of phenomenology is a history of Husserl's disciples' betrayal of the master, starting from Heidegger himself. Furthermore, is the history of betrayal confined only to phenomenology? How about Aristotle betraying Plato, Hegel with respect to Kant, etc. Philosophy seems to be as idiosyncratic as the personality of each thinker who claims to do philosophy by pretending to speak the universal language. No one can replicate Husserl, Heidegger, or Derrida; as anyone can replicate a mathematical theorem. The same is true of any other philosophers. Every thought is unique.
We must move beyond methodological considerations. Can philosophical theology proceed without questioning freedom? In other words, can it proceed without critiquing conatus essendi? Being's move in Heidegger, Ereignis, sending, letting be, seem to operate precisely in the manner of the metaphysical conatus essendi. Despite its adventures, being in its fate returns to itself, like Ulysses whose adventures are taken only on his way home (as Levinas notes, TI 27). It is necessary that the fundamental presuppositions of phenomenology must be questioned, if theology is to be faithful to its subject matter. We should not be ashamed of breaking with phenomenology or philosophy insofar as philosophy remains ignorant of creation, redemption, and recapitulation.
Janicaud's criticism is mainly about the methods that all these authors claim to employ, namely, the phenomenological method as proposed and practiced by Huserl as a rigorous science, while at the same time abandoning it in order to speak of that which lies beyond phenomena: the things of the divine . Janicaud's protest is essentially that they do not adhere to the methodological delimitation Husserl put forth in order to be faithful to "the principle of all principles:" to inquire into the things themselves (zu die Sachen selbst) as they present themselves in their appearance. Husserl thus wrote in speaking of "the principle of pure 'intuition' or evidence" as follows: "accept[ing] nothing ... but what we find actually given (and, at first, quite immediately) in the field of the ego cogito which has been opened up to us by epoché, and ... accordingly ... assert[ing] nothing we ourselves do not 'see'" (Cartesian Meditations § 10, 24)) Rigorously applying this principle, Husserl insisted that "[the transcendence of God] must remain excluded from the new field of study we have to create, insofar as this field must be a field of pure consciousness" (Ideas I § 58, 134; as quoted on page 68 with altered translation). As if to echo Husserl, Heidegger too delimited his field of the "fundamental ontology" as he said in his 1926-27 lecture:
God is not really disclosed except by self-revelation, but philosophy lacks the necessary organ to listen to that revelation. Philosophy is gott-los [godless], which is not to say that there is no God, but that the matter is not clear, neither side has scored" (Gesamtusgabe (GA) 23:77 Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant).The similar demarcation occurs in his 1927 Tübingen lecture published in 1970, "Phenomenology and Theology" (Pathmarks, 39-62), which Janicaud discussed extensively at the end of his essay. Given these self-imposed delimitations both by Husserl and Heidegger, Janicaud protests against the efforts by his contemporary philosophers mentioned above to attempt to articulate in philosophical language the things of the divine. It seems to me that Janicaud's complaint is properly placed; and that the theological turn in France seems to abandon phenomenological method and its principle despite the claims to the contrary. Can Husserl's "principle of all principles" be upheld, if one seeks to do philosophical theology? Marion, for one, will vigorously protest Janicaud's pronouncement that he, Marion, has betrayed phenomenology. Levinas too will do the same in the lesser degree, as he recognizes the necessity of having to move beyond phenomenology--which he does not distinguish, as Janicaud notes, from ontology--in order to faithfully "describe" that which does not appear, the face that speaks rather than showing itself. Janicaud's language is persuasive and flamboyant. His critique of Levinas is the best I had ever read. For example, he writes:
... the direct dispossessing aplomb of alterity supposes a nonphenomenological, metaphysical desire; it comes from 'a land not of our birth' [TI 33-34]. It supposes a metaphysico-theological montage, prior to philosophical writing. The dice are loaded and choices made; faith rises majestically in the background. The reader, confronted by the blade of the absolute, finds him- or herself in the position of a catechumen who has no other choice than to penetrate the holy words and lofty dogmas (27).
I do not necessarily disagree with Janicaud: that the theological phenomenology (including the theological ethics of Levinas, if I can put it that way) is not the phenomenology that Husserl practiced; and that Husserl's principle to be faithful to the given as it appears to consciousness must be abandoned, if one is to describe what does not appear: God, soul, the face, etc. Janicaud's protest is largely on methodology and nothing else. In speaking of Levinas, he thus says: "Certainly, explicitly, the price is the abandonment of the phenomenological method, a farewell to the Husserlian ambition of rigor" (39). But why must we be faithful to phenomenology as practiced by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre? Why should meaningful experience be confined to the field of consciousness (as in Husserl) or to the question of being's disclosure and withdrawal (as in Heidegger)? I don't think Janicaud would necessarily object to this revolt, except to say that if we are to move beyond the given, we should not call ourselves phenomenologists and invoke Husserl's name in our endeavors--as Marion, Levinas, and others do. But, more importantly, what is at stake here in transgressing phenomenology? Perhaps I am not versed enough in phenomenology to appreciate the implication of such a transgression. But I must hearken back to Levinas's adage written (in "God and Philosophy") in response to Derrida's famous essay on him, "Violence and Metaphysics:" that "not to philosophize is not to philosophize still." There is the necessity to say more than philosophy can say. There is more to it than what appears, what gives itself as a phenomenon. There is more to it than philosophy. After all, did not Kant already practiced such a thought of transgression when he (de)limited phenomena to the sensibility of time and space, leaving the room for ethics and faith? Ethical injunctions do not appear like phenomena; nor can it be derived from the latter. What I ought to do and what I may hope exceed what I can know. Even though there was no place for God in Kant's first Critique, it was rationally justified, as it was necessary, to postulate God's existence. Likewise, if meaningful experience is a valid subject matter for philosophy, philosophy cannot limit itself only to what appears to consciousness or to the domain of being, as if all meanings in life are confined to the meaning-giving act of consciousness or to being's move (geste e'être). Is human being no more than a shepherd of being? Is philosophy's self imposed limit or reduction rational, as Lacoste notes (in his The Appearing of God, 105)? Such a limit appears to be purely a methodologically drived necessity, a decision made by methodological constraints. In short, Janicaud's skillful and magnificent protests can be accepted only if we remain faithfully within the phenomenological method. But was Heidegger himself faithful to the phenomenological method when he proclaimed in 1973 that he was doing the "phenomenology of the unapparent," as Janicaud notes (28ff.); and when he no longer associated his project with Huserl's after his 'turn'? Janicaud would be the first to say 'no' and seems to acknowledge the inevitability of transgressing phenomenology when he makes the following startling announcement: "Without Heidegger's Kehre, there would be no theological turn" (31). Janicaud is correct to the extent that this is true of methodology. Heidegger's 'turn' necessitated the transgression from the phenomenological method. Janicaud's pronouncement bears out to be true chronologically. Levinas's "theological turn" began as early as 1951 when he published "Is Ontology Fundamental?"; and Heidegger's 'turn' began with the 1929 lecture "What is Metaphysics?" However, Levinas critique of Heidegger in that essay is mainly directed to Being and Time (1927). It would be a mistake to suggest that Heidegger's turn ushered into the "theological turn" in Levinas, Henry, Marion, and Chrétien as if they were simply following the prominent trend of thought at the time. My hunch is that it was their theological conviction that gave them the audacity to make the theological turn; and phenomenology offered the philosophical tools to articulate that which does not appear as phenomenon. Heidegger's turn did not cause him to make a "theological turn" himself. He remained true to his Sache to the end and remained atheistic to the end.
Heidegger's 'turn' too is largely methodological. Phenomenology is not possible, if being in disclosing beings does not itself appear, if the essence of being is to withdraw from appearing. The truth of being is a matter for thought, not for phenomenology. Marion too eventually came to the conclusion that whether he was upholding the phenomenological method in his own works was not important, as Janicaud notes. In any event, as Ricoeur noted somethere, the history of phenomenology is a history of Husserl's disciples' betrayal of the master, starting from Heidegger himself. Furthermore, is the history of betrayal confined only to phenomenology? How about Aristotle betraying Plato, Hegel with respect to Kant, etc. Philosophy seems to be as idiosyncratic as the personality of each thinker who claims to do philosophy by pretending to speak the universal language. No one can replicate Husserl, Heidegger, or Derrida; as anyone can replicate a mathematical theorem. The same is true of any other philosophers. Every thought is unique.
We must move beyond methodological considerations. Can philosophical theology proceed without questioning freedom? In other words, can it proceed without critiquing conatus essendi? Being's move in Heidegger, Ereignis, sending, letting be, seem to operate precisely in the manner of the metaphysical conatus essendi. Despite its adventures, being in its fate returns to itself, like Ulysses whose adventures are taken only on his way home (as Levinas notes, TI 27). It is necessary that the fundamental presuppositions of phenomenology must be questioned, if theology is to be faithful to its subject matter. We should not be ashamed of breaking with phenomenology or philosophy insofar as philosophy remains ignorant of creation, redemption, and recapitulation.
March 2, 2008
If for Ricoeur paper alone, this is an amazing collection; but everything in it is worth reading several times.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews