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Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings
This book contains the political writing of T. H. Green and selections from those of his ethical writings which bear on his political philosophy. Green's best known work, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, is included in full, as are the essay on freedom and the lecture 'Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract'. There are also extracts from Green's lectures on the English Revolution and from the Prolegomena to Ethics, and a number of previously unpublished essays and notes. All the texts have been corrected against Green's manuscripts, held in Balliol College. The editors have provided a list of variants, full notes and an introductory essay on the importance of Green's form of revitalised liberalism. The volume will be a valuable sourcebook for students of Green's thought and the history of nineteenth-century liberalism.
- GenresPhilosophy
396 pages, Paperback
First published February 28, 1986
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About the author
Thomas Hill Green
109 books9 followersThomas Hill Green was an English philosopher, political radical and temperance reformer, and a member of the British idealism movement. Like all the British idealists, Green was influenced by the metaphysical historicism of G.W.F. Hegel. He was one of the thinkers behind the philosophy of social liberalism.
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June 4, 2024
THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHER’S THOUGHTS ABOUT THE STATE
Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) was an English Idealist philosopher, political radical (“social liberalism”) and temperance reformer. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 97-page edition.]
He states, “Will, not force, is the basis of the state…. For the desire for freedom in the individual is no real desire unless he is one of a society which recognizes it… And without an authority embodied in civil institutions he would not have the elementary idea of right which enables him to question the authority. But the theory of contract expresses, in a confused way, the truth that only through the common recognition of a common good, and its embodiment in institutions, is morality possible. Thus morality and political subjection have a common source.” (Pg. 3)
He asserts, “There is no such thing as a will which a man is not conscious of as belonging to himself, no such thing as an act of will which he is not conscious of issuing from himself. To ask whether he has power over it, or whether some other power then he determines it, is like asking whether he is other than himself. Thus the question whether a man, having power to act according to his will, or being free to act, has also power over his will, or is free to will, has just the same impropriety that Locke points out in the question whether the will is free.” (Pg. 9)
He continues, “reason and will, even as they exist in men, are one in the sense that they are alike expressions of one self-regulating principle. In God, or rather in the ideal human person as he really exists in God, they are actually one; i.e., self-satisfaction is forever sought and found in the realization of a completely articulated or thoroughly filled idea of the perfection of the human person. In the historical man---in the men that have been and are coming to be---they TEND to unite. In the experience of mankind, and again in the experience of the individual as determined by the experience of mankind, both the idea of a possible perfection of man, the idea of which reason is the faculty, and the impulse after self-satisfaction which belongs to the will, undergo modifications which render their reconciliation in the individual (and it is only in individuals that they can be reconciled, because it is only in them that they exist) more attainable.” (Pg. 14)
He notes, “The highest moral goodness we found was an attribute of character, insofar as it issued in acts done for the sake of their goodness, not for the sake of any pleasure or any satisfaction of desire which they bring to the agent. But it is impossible that an action should be done for the sake of its goodness, unless it have been previously contemplated as good for some other reason than that which consists in its being done for the sake of its goodness. It must have been done, or conceived as possible to be done, or have been accounted good, irrespectively of the being done from this which we ultimately come to regard as the highest motive.” (Pg. 16)
He observes, “‘Natural rights,’ so far as there are such things, are themselves relative to the moral end to which perfect law is relative. A law is not good because it enforces ‘natural rights,’ but because it contributes to the realization of a certain end. We only discover what rights are natural by considering what powers must be secured to a man in order to the attainment of this end. These powers a perfect law will secure to their full extent. Thus the consideration of what rights are ‘natural’ … and the consideration what laws are justifiable form one and the same process, each presupposing a conception of the moral vocation of man.” (Pg. 20)
He argues, “Any sectary or revolutionary may plead that he has the ‘sovereign people’ on his side. If he fails, it is not certain that he has them not on his side; for it may be that, though he has the majority of the society on his side, yet the society has allowed the growth within it of a power which prevents it from giving effect to its will. On the other hand, if the revolution succeeds, it is not certain that it had the majority on its side when it began, though the majority may have come to acquiesce in its result. In short, on Locke’s principle that any particular government derives its authority from an act of the society, and society by a like act may recall the authority, how can we ever be entitled to say that such an act has been exercised?” (Pg. 33)
He comments, “To ask why I am to submit to the power of the state, is to ask why I am to allow my life to be regulated by that complex of institutions without which I literally should not have a live to call my own, nor should be able to ask for a justification of what I am called on to do. For that I may have a life which I can call my own, I must not be conscious of myself and of ends which I present to myself as mine; I must be able to reckon on a certain freedom of action and acquisition for the attainment of those ends, and this can only be secured through common recognition of this freedom on the part of each other by members of a society, as being for a common good.” (Pg. 50)
More controversially, he contends, “it does not necessarily follow that the duty of befriending the slave is necessarily paramount to the duty of obeying the law which forbids his being befriended: and if it is possible for the latter duty to be paramount, it will follow on the principle that there is no right to violate a duty, that under certain conditions the right of helping the slave may be cancelled by the duty of obeying the prohibitory law. If would be so if the violation of law in the interest of the slave were liable to result in general anarchy…of the disappearance of the conditions under which any civil combination is possible; for such a destruction of the state would mean a general loss of freedom, a general substitution of force for mutual goodwill in men’s dealings with each other, that would outweigh the evil of any slavery under such limitations and regulations as an organized state imposes on it.” (Pg. 62)
He suggests, “The notion that the state should, if it could, adjust the amount of punishment which it inflicts on a crime to the moral wickedness of the crime, rests on a false view of the relation of the state to morality. It implies that it is the business of the state to punish wickedness, as such. But it has not such business. It cannot undertake to punish wickedness, as such, without vitiating the disinterestedness of the effort to escape wickedness, and thus checking the growth of a true goodness of the heart in the attempt to promote a goodness which is merely on the surface.” (Pg. 77)
He concludes, “there is no direct reference in punishment by the state… to moral good or evil. The state … does not look to the moral guilt of the criminal whom it punishes, or to the promotion of moral good by means of his punishment in him or others. It looks not to virtue and vice but to rights and wrongs…. Thus punishment of crime is preventative in its object… But in order effectually to attain its preventive object and to attain it justly, it should be reformatory.” (Pg. 80)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying the history of political philosophy.
Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) was an English Idealist philosopher, political radical (“social liberalism”) and temperance reformer. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 97-page edition.]
He states, “Will, not force, is the basis of the state…. For the desire for freedom in the individual is no real desire unless he is one of a society which recognizes it… And without an authority embodied in civil institutions he would not have the elementary idea of right which enables him to question the authority. But the theory of contract expresses, in a confused way, the truth that only through the common recognition of a common good, and its embodiment in institutions, is morality possible. Thus morality and political subjection have a common source.” (Pg. 3)
He asserts, “There is no such thing as a will which a man is not conscious of as belonging to himself, no such thing as an act of will which he is not conscious of issuing from himself. To ask whether he has power over it, or whether some other power then he determines it, is like asking whether he is other than himself. Thus the question whether a man, having power to act according to his will, or being free to act, has also power over his will, or is free to will, has just the same impropriety that Locke points out in the question whether the will is free.” (Pg. 9)
He continues, “reason and will, even as they exist in men, are one in the sense that they are alike expressions of one self-regulating principle. In God, or rather in the ideal human person as he really exists in God, they are actually one; i.e., self-satisfaction is forever sought and found in the realization of a completely articulated or thoroughly filled idea of the perfection of the human person. In the historical man---in the men that have been and are coming to be---they TEND to unite. In the experience of mankind, and again in the experience of the individual as determined by the experience of mankind, both the idea of a possible perfection of man, the idea of which reason is the faculty, and the impulse after self-satisfaction which belongs to the will, undergo modifications which render their reconciliation in the individual (and it is only in individuals that they can be reconciled, because it is only in them that they exist) more attainable.” (Pg. 14)
He notes, “The highest moral goodness we found was an attribute of character, insofar as it issued in acts done for the sake of their goodness, not for the sake of any pleasure or any satisfaction of desire which they bring to the agent. But it is impossible that an action should be done for the sake of its goodness, unless it have been previously contemplated as good for some other reason than that which consists in its being done for the sake of its goodness. It must have been done, or conceived as possible to be done, or have been accounted good, irrespectively of the being done from this which we ultimately come to regard as the highest motive.” (Pg. 16)
He observes, “‘Natural rights,’ so far as there are such things, are themselves relative to the moral end to which perfect law is relative. A law is not good because it enforces ‘natural rights,’ but because it contributes to the realization of a certain end. We only discover what rights are natural by considering what powers must be secured to a man in order to the attainment of this end. These powers a perfect law will secure to their full extent. Thus the consideration of what rights are ‘natural’ … and the consideration what laws are justifiable form one and the same process, each presupposing a conception of the moral vocation of man.” (Pg. 20)
He argues, “Any sectary or revolutionary may plead that he has the ‘sovereign people’ on his side. If he fails, it is not certain that he has them not on his side; for it may be that, though he has the majority of the society on his side, yet the society has allowed the growth within it of a power which prevents it from giving effect to its will. On the other hand, if the revolution succeeds, it is not certain that it had the majority on its side when it began, though the majority may have come to acquiesce in its result. In short, on Locke’s principle that any particular government derives its authority from an act of the society, and society by a like act may recall the authority, how can we ever be entitled to say that such an act has been exercised?” (Pg. 33)
He comments, “To ask why I am to submit to the power of the state, is to ask why I am to allow my life to be regulated by that complex of institutions without which I literally should not have a live to call my own, nor should be able to ask for a justification of what I am called on to do. For that I may have a life which I can call my own, I must not be conscious of myself and of ends which I present to myself as mine; I must be able to reckon on a certain freedom of action and acquisition for the attainment of those ends, and this can only be secured through common recognition of this freedom on the part of each other by members of a society, as being for a common good.” (Pg. 50)
More controversially, he contends, “it does not necessarily follow that the duty of befriending the slave is necessarily paramount to the duty of obeying the law which forbids his being befriended: and if it is possible for the latter duty to be paramount, it will follow on the principle that there is no right to violate a duty, that under certain conditions the right of helping the slave may be cancelled by the duty of obeying the prohibitory law. If would be so if the violation of law in the interest of the slave were liable to result in general anarchy…of the disappearance of the conditions under which any civil combination is possible; for such a destruction of the state would mean a general loss of freedom, a general substitution of force for mutual goodwill in men’s dealings with each other, that would outweigh the evil of any slavery under such limitations and regulations as an organized state imposes on it.” (Pg. 62)
He suggests, “The notion that the state should, if it could, adjust the amount of punishment which it inflicts on a crime to the moral wickedness of the crime, rests on a false view of the relation of the state to morality. It implies that it is the business of the state to punish wickedness, as such. But it has not such business. It cannot undertake to punish wickedness, as such, without vitiating the disinterestedness of the effort to escape wickedness, and thus checking the growth of a true goodness of the heart in the attempt to promote a goodness which is merely on the surface.” (Pg. 77)
He concludes, “there is no direct reference in punishment by the state… to moral good or evil. The state … does not look to the moral guilt of the criminal whom it punishes, or to the promotion of moral good by means of his punishment in him or others. It looks not to virtue and vice but to rights and wrongs…. Thus punishment of crime is preventative in its object… But in order effectually to attain its preventive object and to attain it justly, it should be reformatory.” (Pg. 80)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying the history of political philosophy.
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