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American Negotiating Behavior: Wheeler-Dealers, Legal Eagles, Bullies, and Preachers
This landmark study offers a rich and detailed portrait of the negotiating practices of American officials. It assesses the multiple influences cultural, institutional, historical, and political that shape how American policymakers and diplomats approach negotiations with foreign counterparts and highlights behavioral patterns that transcend the actions of individual negotiators and administrations.
Informed by discussions and interviews with more than fifty seasoned foreign and American negotiators, Richard H. Solomon and Nigel Quinney argue that four distinctive mind-sets have combined to shape U.S. negotiating practice: a businessperson s pragmatic quest for concrete results, a lawyer s attention to detail, a superpower s inclination to dictate terms, and a moralizer s sense of mission. The authors examine how Americans employ time, language, enticements, and pressure tactics at the negotiating table, and how they use (or neglect) the media, back channel communications, and hospitality outside the formal negotiating arena. They also explore the intense interagency rivalries and congressional second-guessing that limit U.S. negotiators freedom to maneuver.
A chapter by the eminent historian Robert Schulzinger charts the evolving relationship between U.S. presidents and their negotiators, and the volume presents a set of eight remarkably candid foreign perspectives on particular aspects of American negotiating behavior. These chapters are written by a distinguished cast of ambassadors and foreign ministers, some from countries allied to the United States, others from rivals or adversaries and all with illuminating stories to tell.
In the concluding chapter, Solomon and Quinney propose a variety of measures to enhance America's negotiating capacities to deal with the new and emerging challenges to effective diplomacy in the 21st century.
Contributors: Gilles Andreani Chan Heng Chee David Hannay Faruk Logoglu Lalit Mansingh Yuri Nazarkin Robert Schulzinger Koji Watanabe John Wood
357 pages, Hardcover
First published March 1, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
September 21, 2020
I found this to be a hugely informative book, though I’m taking a star off for lack of readability. It reads exactly like what it is — a textbook written by and for policymakers — meaning large swaths of bone-dry prose. Also, the first half of the book quotes extensively from the second half (in which a group of diplomats from various countries share their experiences and tips) so that the second half feels like more of a repetitive slog than it needed to. The book was published in 2009 by the United States Institute of Peace as part of a series on cross-cultural negotiation; “Chinese,” “French,” “Russian” and other negotiating behaviors have their own dedicated volumes from around the same period. The Iraq War then fresh in everyone’s minds, much of the book is understandably preoccupied with explaining the odd pairing of moralistic condescension and aggressive unilateralism that characterized a lot of the Cheney administration’s [sic] comportment in that time.
To that end, the French veteran Gilles Andreani sums up America’s orientation toward global affairs in this way:
“Negotiation is not, in the United States, what it is for most people in other parts of the world—that is, a sensible thing to do to obtain something from another country. Rather, it is a privilege to be bestowed on deserving foreigners, as an exception to the normal course of affairs for Americans, which is to decide by themselves on issues of interest to them, including international ones.”
Sound familiar?
The diplomats who cooperated with Solomon and Quinney on this project take great pains to be objective in describing American negotiators’ strengths and weaknesses. The strengths: a culture of pragmatism and professionalism (certain political appointees aside), a reputation for plain and honest dealings (less common than you might think among diplomats as a species), a sense of urgency which can occasionally break age-old stalemates, and a grueling interagency process that can be used as leverage (“this is the best offer Congress/DoD/State/POTUS/etc. will let me give you”). The weaknesses: a grueling interagency process that can make the American side’s position too brittle, less-than-intricate knowledge of other countries’ cultures/histories/geographies, an institutional memory that is wiped clean every 4-8 years, and a manufactured sense of urgency that can be self-defeating — for instance, in the months leading up to a president’s departure from office. America’s superpower status also means that it tends to bully and castigate its friends just as much if not more than its adversaries, and has few qualms about squandering its diplomatic capital in pursuit of short-term tactical advantages (e.g. the ability to send troops into Iraq through Turkey rather than some other route).
I think it’s safe to say America’s strengths as enumerated in this book have been seriously undermined, and its weaknesses brought into sharper relief, by the current administration’s vindictive, bluster-filled approach to making foreign policy. Still, it is probably worth knowing that many of the most infuriating decisions from Trump, Pompeo, et al. are extreme varieties of longstanding tendencies in American diplomacy that won’t simply die out once the current band of ogres is got rid of. I can easily imagine an updated edition of the book including a German or French or Canadian coda to Koji Watanabe’s embittered reflections on how thoughtlessly his American counterparts treated Japan’s interests and concerns over his three decades of service. Even the best-intentioned superpowers suffer from an endless obsession with their own arcane political and bureaucratic hierarchies of needs, and are spoiled by the luxuries of great power and wealth, without which they might have had to develop a more evolved sense of empathy.
To that end, the French veteran Gilles Andreani sums up America’s orientation toward global affairs in this way:
“Negotiation is not, in the United States, what it is for most people in other parts of the world—that is, a sensible thing to do to obtain something from another country. Rather, it is a privilege to be bestowed on deserving foreigners, as an exception to the normal course of affairs for Americans, which is to decide by themselves on issues of interest to them, including international ones.”
Sound familiar?
The diplomats who cooperated with Solomon and Quinney on this project take great pains to be objective in describing American negotiators’ strengths and weaknesses. The strengths: a culture of pragmatism and professionalism (certain political appointees aside), a reputation for plain and honest dealings (less common than you might think among diplomats as a species), a sense of urgency which can occasionally break age-old stalemates, and a grueling interagency process that can be used as leverage (“this is the best offer Congress/DoD/State/POTUS/etc. will let me give you”). The weaknesses: a grueling interagency process that can make the American side’s position too brittle, less-than-intricate knowledge of other countries’ cultures/histories/geographies, an institutional memory that is wiped clean every 4-8 years, and a manufactured sense of urgency that can be self-defeating — for instance, in the months leading up to a president’s departure from office. America’s superpower status also means that it tends to bully and castigate its friends just as much if not more than its adversaries, and has few qualms about squandering its diplomatic capital in pursuit of short-term tactical advantages (e.g. the ability to send troops into Iraq through Turkey rather than some other route).
I think it’s safe to say America’s strengths as enumerated in this book have been seriously undermined, and its weaknesses brought into sharper relief, by the current administration’s vindictive, bluster-filled approach to making foreign policy. Still, it is probably worth knowing that many of the most infuriating decisions from Trump, Pompeo, et al. are extreme varieties of longstanding tendencies in American diplomacy that won’t simply die out once the current band of ogres is got rid of. I can easily imagine an updated edition of the book including a German or French or Canadian coda to Koji Watanabe’s embittered reflections on how thoughtlessly his American counterparts treated Japan’s interests and concerns over his three decades of service. Even the best-intentioned superpowers suffer from an endless obsession with their own arcane political and bureaucratic hierarchies of needs, and are spoiled by the luxuries of great power and wealth, without which they might have had to develop a more evolved sense of empathy.
August 30, 2015
I recommend this book only for the aspiring US government negotiator, or the foreign government official who may find themselves across the negotiating table from the United States.
This book is a thorough overview of American governmental negotiating behavior, and only governmental negotiating behavior. The tone of he book is fairly academic, and reads like a textbook, rather than an engaging narrative, which limits its appeal.
The best part of this book was the section on foreign perspectives of negotiating with the United States. These narratives, generally short and engaging, provided the book with a series of fun case studies, and bumps my rating from 3 to 4 stars.
There are few books out there on US government negotiating strategies and styles, so faces limited competition, but if you are looking for how-to's on private sector negotiation, then I suggest looking elsewhere.
This book is a thorough overview of American governmental negotiating behavior, and only governmental negotiating behavior. The tone of he book is fairly academic, and reads like a textbook, rather than an engaging narrative, which limits its appeal.
The best part of this book was the section on foreign perspectives of negotiating with the United States. These narratives, generally short and engaging, provided the book with a series of fun case studies, and bumps my rating from 3 to 4 stars.
There are few books out there on US government negotiating strategies and styles, so faces limited competition, but if you are looking for how-to's on private sector negotiation, then I suggest looking elsewhere.
April 30, 2013
If this book has a weakness, it's that the title sums up the contents. The first third of the book lays out the four roles or stances that American diplomats embody when negotiating, which are all double-edged swords and sometimes at odds. The second third of the book talks about the history of US negotiation behavior, and is probably the most engaging part of the book. The last third contains chapters by foreign diplomats, detailing their own views on American negotiation style. Some of this is redundant, because the information is distilled in first third of the book, but the historical and cultural facets unique to each negotiating relationship make the section worthwhile.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews