Epistemic Justification: Should It Be Viewed As a Meta-epistemic Process

by Robert Lewis Henry

The issue of knowledge in the field of philosophy (formally referred to as epistemology) is a broad subject of interest. In the course of studying this vast topic, one is inevitably forced to investigate the process of knowing the validity of truth statements that we make. This validity is supported by what is often defined as justification, or in the case of epistemology, epistemic justification. Furthermore, the process of epistemic justification, as it is treated within the discipline of philosophy, functions as an epistemic phenomenon that is consequently analyzed as such. However, in this book I contend that this is not the case, and rather it should be viewed as a meta-epistemic phenomenon, consequently relieving tension between its competing theories and lending coherence to the subject of justification.

61 pages, Paperback

First published April 24, 2006

Reviews

[Algernon Gedgrave]

Although it is a technical work, weaving in and out of the theories of Foundationalism and Coherentism, this title does an excellent job in not only making epistemological theories readable, but clarifying several points.

The first point it clarifies is the tension between the two primary epistemically justifying theories: Foundationalism and Coherentism.

Another point is its proficiency in presenting a coherent model of the issues in epistemic justification and presenting the problems and their solutions intelligibly. For, many works on the topic tend to 'muddy' the waters, but this manages the exact opposite.

All in all, its conclusion that epistemic justification should be viewed as a metaepistemic process, helps, indeed, relieve tension concerning these competing theories.