This is a hard-going phenomenology of the cinema, grounded in the so-called existential phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, or in semiotic phenomenology. The big philosophical move by Ponty is in embodying Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, where the Ego is conceived as a non-bodied conscious entity, endowed with intentionality, or freely-directed perception. Ponty concurs with all of this, but grounds consciousness in a body-in-the-world.
Sobchack finds this conception of being-and-seeing-in-the-world very useful when applied to cinema, which is what she does in this book.
Before she moves on to do so, though, Sobchack undergoes a careful elucidation of these ideas, comparing Ponty’s phenomenology with Husserl’s, Lacan’s theory of being, Young’s phenomenology of gender, and other theories she deems relevant. Thus, this is not a loosely argued exposition of a phenomenology of cinema, but a heavy and highly technical one.
This book is significantly more dense than most theories of film, which usually have a lot more film criticism mixed in. Nonetheless, I find Sobchack’s work very important to the history of film theory and worth plowing through.
The dynamics of the “film’s body” is in my view her most important contribution. In a material conception of cinema, it is the case that the camera, the screen and projector yield a complex mechanical and technical system that enmeshes the spectator - and as Sobchack eloquently points out - the film itself, in a web of perceptions and expressions. The cinema has a “body” that perceives and is perceived like ours, but I must say that in terms of aesthetics, the images produced by the camera are generally “non-bodied”. It seems to me that we experience cinema aesthetically as something more like Husserl’s transcendental ego as opposed to what Ponty formulates. But again, Sobchack is right in reminding us of the origins or the material sources of that image, which is “embodied”.