Free Choice in Saint Maximus the Confessor

by Joseph P. Farrell

"This book likely served as the foundation for Farrell's longer work, God, History and Dialectic. Farrell gives an extended analysis upon St Maximus the Confessor's defense of two wills in Christ. In doing so, he carefully examines neo-Platonic philosophy, particularly its equation of distinction = opposition, and the influence it had on later Origenist, Monothelete, and Augustinian theologies."

Genres: Christianity, Theology

252 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1989

About the author

Joseph P. Farrell is a recognized scholar whose credentials include a Doctor of Patristics degree from the University of Oxford. His literary contribution is a veritable résumé unto itself covering such fields as Nazi Germany, Sacred Literature, physics, finances, the Giza pyramids, and music theory. His latest book is Genes, Giants, Monsters, and Men: The Surviving Elites of the Cosmic War and Their Hidden Agenda. Earlier books include:

The Giza Death Star (2001)
The Giza Death Star Deployed (2003)
Reich of the Black Sun (2004)
The Giza Death Star Destroyed (2005)
The SS Brotherhood of the Bell (2006)
The Cosmic War (2007)
Secrets of the Unified Field (2008)
The Nazi International (2008)
The Philosophers' Stone (2009)
Babylon's Banksters (2010)
Roswell and the Reich (2010)
LBJ and the Conspiracy to Kill Kennedy (2010)
Genes, Giants, Monsters, and Men (2011)

Reviews

[Jacob Aitken]

This book likely served as the foundation for Farrell's longer work, God, History and Dialectic. Farrell gives an extended analysis upon St Maximus the Confessor's defense of two wills in Christ. In doing so, he carefully examines neo-Platonic philosophy, particularly its equation of distinction = opposition, and the influence it had on later Origenist, Monothelete, and Augustinian theologies.

Neo-Platonism
Neo-Platonism defined simplicity as the One--the one transcending all things. Admittedly, this section of the book is dizzying (google search Farrell's introduction to Photios for the same material for free) and not all parts are clear to the untrained reader; however, it is important to note Plotinus's emphasis that dialectic = opposition and the inability to make distinctions of the One.

Origenism:
Origen took Plotinus but modified it. Origen had to posit a pre-fall anterior to Creation (and likely an eternality to creation) as well as the possibility of a fall in the Eschaton. To be fair to Origen, though, he does make insights on willing and choosing, insights St Maximus will use while refuting the Origenist system. Maximus has to show how their can be real choices in the Eschaton simultaneously with the inability to Fall in the eschaton.

An overview of St Maximus' position:
For St Maximus the one Logos is the many logoi (rational principles of the Logos). This is similar to St Gregory Palamas's uncreated energies. The Logoi are not reducible to the one Logos, but the Logos is present in the logoi. The Logoi are like the radii of a circle (the Logos) yet extending beyond the circle. Divine prototypes or prederminations. When man chooses, he is "around" the space of the Logos (keep the circular imagery in mind). He can choose these logoi or reject them. Further, the logoi are instrumental in man's deification.

Christology:
Will is natural, not hypostatic. There is one divine will in the Trinity; two wills in Christ (per the two natures). This means what is natural is not always compelled, for example, the Trinity is not compelled to create (a refutation of the Origenist conclusion).

In a stroke of genius, St Maximus (or Dr Farrell, at times it is hard to see who is actually speaking) rejects Absolute Divine Simplicity while affirming a sort of Simplicity: Symbolic Divine Simplicity. Simplicity is real, but it is not defintional. It is not the One of Plotinus; therefore, one can posit distinctions within the Godhead (for Plotinus, the Simplicity functioned as a great "=" sign; therefore, any one attribute literally equaled another attribute). Simplicity is to demonstrate the divine essence in each of the hypostases, but it is not a definition of the essence itself.

Free Choice:
St Maximus must therefore give a non-dialectical definition of free choice. How is will natural yet not determined? How can there be free will in heaven, yet not the possibility of a fall? St Maximus responds by making a distinction between "will" and the "mode of willing." Per the latter, in heaven the believer really does will the good (or good objects; unclear whether there will be a plurality of objects to be willed in heaven, doesn't matter for the point, though). However, the mode of willing is different: the believer doesn't waver psychologically between a good versus an uncertain good. The latter is gone in heaven.

Likewise, will has its own hypostatic mode, yet it is a quality of nature. As for the famous Gethesamane argument, Christ deliberates, it is true, but St Maximus removes the possibility of opposition between Christ's human wills. Christ's will wishes to avoid death, which is natural, yet it is the Person of the Logos that gives this will its unique tropos.

A Critique of Augustinianism:
Dr Farrell ends his book with a critique of Augustinianism in general, and Calvinism in particular. One is encouraged to google his introduction to St Photios's Mystagogy for a fuller summary. A few points, though:
1. If God is simple and One, then the world is many.
2. If simple = one = good, and granted that the world is many, then the world is evil (1).
3. If God is simple, one, and good, then multiplicity with regard to choice is evil (1, 2).

Obviously, Dr Farrell goes on to reject the above Augustinian construal and offers a Palamite response.
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