Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis (Econometric Society Monographs, Series Number 18)

Econometric Society Monographs

by Alvin E. Roth, Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor

Winner of the Operations Research Society of America Lanchester Award, Two-Sided Matching provides a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching such as between firms and workers in labor markets, and between buyers and sellers in auctions. The book begins with a discussion of empirical results concerning behavior in such markets, and then proceeds to analyze a variety of related models. Among the discrete and continuous models considered are those with complete or incomplete information, money or barter, single or multiple workers, and simple or complex preferences. The book examines the stability of outcomes, the modification of incentives to agents under different organizational rules, and the constraints imposed on market organization by the incentives. Using this wide range of related models and matching situations helps clarify which conclusions are robust and which depend on particular modeling assumptions.
--back cover

Genres: Economics, Technical

280 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1990

About the author

Alvin Elliot Roth (born December 18, 1951) is an American academician personality, he is the Craig and Susan McCaw professor of economics at Stanford University and the Gund professor of economics and business administration emeritus at Harvard University.

Roth has made significant contributions to the fields of game theory, market design and experimental economics, and is known for his emphasis on applying economic theory to solutions for "real-world" problems.

In 2012, he won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences jointly with Lloyd Shapley "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design".

Reviews

[Brittany]

I loved reading this book. It kept me on the edge of my seat. Fantastic discussion of two-sided matching.

[Helen DeWitt]

Could helpfully have made use of information design. Extremely enlightening but oddly chilling: treats 2-sided marriage markets (where man and woman are free to remain single) as on a par (wrt freedom of participants) with 3-sided matchings, man, woman, child. I think we can agree the world would look rather different if children had any choice at all in the parents with whom they were matched, or, for that matter, freedom to have none rather than any of those from a pool of possibilities.

[Robert Giambo]

Only if you like advanced math.