A PRESENTATION OF THE “OTHER SIDE” (I.E., DEFENDING HEIDEGGER’S CONDUCT)
The Introduction to this 1988 book states, “can we separate Heidegger’s thought from his politics? The more that is written about Heidegger… the more difficult it becomes to escape the conclusion that there is indeed an essential connection between Heidegger’s embrace of National Socialism and his philosophical thinking… this must also mean that we cannot relegate the considerations that led Heidegger to be so receptive to National Socialism to a past so thoroughly contaminated by Auschwitz as to deserve only condemnation, not thoughtful reflection… it remains important to question his thought in the light of both his misguided attempt to enter the world of politics and his later attempt to retreat altogether from the political arena into a sublime realm of thought.” (Pg. xviii-xix)
It continues, “Heidegger did not remain completely silent. Twice he was to address the horror of the Holocaust in the course of four lectures that were first given … on 1 December 1949… Consider this remark from the third Bremen lecture… (‘The Danger’), the only one of the four Heidegger chose to leave unpublished: ‘Hundreds of thousands die en masse. Do they die? They perish. They are cut down. Do they die? They become items of the material available for the manufacture of corpses… Do they die? Hardly noticed, they are liquidated in extermination camps. And even apart from that, in China millions now perish.’ … Heidegger, too, understands the extermination camps as factories of death.” (Pg. xxix)
It goes on, “…the detachment Heidegger himself connected with that technological age which, so he came to think, revealed its inhuman essence in National Socialism, allowed him to include the following remark in the second Bremen lecture: ‘Agriculture is now a motorized food industry: in its essence it is the same thing as the manufacture of corpses in gas chambers, the same as blockades and the reduction of a region to hunger, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.” (Pg. xxx)
In Heidegger’s essay, “The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts” he stated: “My first official action was, on the second day of my rectorate, to prohibit the posting of the ‘Jewish notice’ [i.e., prohibiting Jewish teachers] in any of the rooms belonging to the university. The notice had already been posted in all German universities.” (Pg. 23) He goes on, “My joining of the Party remained simply a matter of form insofar as the Party leadership had no intention of consulting me in discussions of questions pertaining to the university, culture, and education. During the entire time of my rectorate, I never participated in any deliberation or discussion, let alone in the decision-making, of the Party leadership and of the various Party organs. The university remained suspect, but at the same time it was used for purposes of cultural propaganda.” (Pg. 25)
An essay by a sympathizer said, “People often wonder why Heidegger never… defended himself… Heidegger was frequently reproached for this. He was urged and beseeched to take a stand against insinuations that his supporters knew were completely unfounded… Still Heidegger did not manage to say a word in an atmosphere so hostile to him. For a long time, therefore, he seemed to be agreeing that he had been in the wrong. He was convinced, however, that only a fool would go into this battlefield, a battlefield where one would always arrive too late.” (Pg. 68)
An essayist criticizes Victor Farias’s book 'Heidegger and Nazism': “His attempt … to connect Martin Heidegger to the head of the Storm Troopers… is downright fantastical… Farias’ contribution lies in his collection of new sources and their positivistic treatment... However, he quickly reaches the limits of his abilities when he begins to interpret and especially in places where the connection between political practice and Heidegger’s thinking should have been clarified.” (Pg. 137-138)
Jacques Derrida says in an essay, “even if Heidegger’s political engagement in 1933 … could be understood… what would remain a wounding of thinking … is Heidegger’s silence after the war with regard to Auschwitz and many other topics… Let us assume Heidegger had not only said about 1933 ‘I have made a very stupid mistake’ but also ‘Auschwitz is the absolute horror; it is what I fundamentally condemn.’ … What would have happened then? He would probably have immediately received an absolution… Heidegger would have finished the affair…” (Pg. 147)
This book will be “must reading” for anyone interested in this subject. (For additional “critical” views in addition to Farias, see 'Heidegger's Silence and Heidegger and the Nazis.')