Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism

by Kenneth R. Westphal

This book is the first detailed study of Kant's method of 'transcendental reflection' and its use in the Critique of Pure Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to justify Kant's transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience. Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant's analysis, shows that if we take Kant's project seriously in its own terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but (unqualified) realism regarding physical objects. Westphal attends to neglected topics - Kant's analyses of the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold, the 'lifelessness of matter', fallibilism, the semantics of cognitive reference, four externalist aspects of Kant's views, and the importance of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations for the Critique of Pure Reason - that illuminate Kant's enterprise in new and valuable ways. His book will appeal to all who are interested in Kant's theoretical philosophy.

Genres: Philosophy

310 pages, Hardcover

First published December 1, 2004

About the author

Kenneth R. Westphal is Professor of Philosophy at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul. His research focuses on the character and scope of rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains, both moral and theoretical. His books include several volumes on Kant.

Reviews

[Josh · Rating 4 out of 5]

A decent read with a great deal of focus on Transcendental Affinity, a concept which, in my experience, has lacked thorough treatments in modern Kant scholarship.

[Aung Sett Kyaw Min · Rating 4 out of 5]

To those familiar with the standard Kantian apparatus of mental torture that goes by the epithet 'transcendental idealism' the title of the book is bound to raise a couple of eyebrows. "Kant the transcendental realist"?? What good is transcendental philosophy severed from transcendental idealism which it is supposed to prove? Doesn't Kant explicitly dismiss the prospect of a mind-independent (i.e. objective and material) condition of possibility of self-conscious cognizance as nonsensical? And finally, how can we prevent transcendental realism from collapsing into transcendent realism of the kind Kant condemns in the first Critique? If you are one of those skeptics, then you are in for a rude awakening. Kenneth Westphal masterfully and surgically brings out the side of Kant that Kant himself had to disavow in order to make it appear that transcendental idealism is the only game in town (spoiler alert: it isn't), and in doing so beats Kant at his own game.

Now, the key to the unravelling of Kantian transcendental idealism is the seemingly innocuous doctrine in the 1st critique diagnosed by Westphal as the 'transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold' in the A edition Transcendental Deduction. This doctrine which on the surface appears to be just another transcendental argument that purports to establish the conditions of possibility of self conscious human experience is actually a xenomorph outsider ready to burst through the ribcage of idealism. Why? As it turns out, the so called principle of affinity is an apriori, material and objective condition that must be satisfied on the side of the object (i.e. sensory manifold) in order for various transcendental syntheses to function and allow for the mind impose order and unity on the sensory content. Without there being some degree of regularity or associability among the matter of sensation, thus ensuring a minimum level of sameness and difference, our sythentic understanding cannot even generate general empirical concepts, or the categories for that matter and hence no experience would be possible. But why does this principle spell a certain doom for transcendental idealism? Because the latter is commited to the thesis that the mind in an apriori fashion imposes the form of experience while the matter of sensation pours in from the outside. But the transcendental affinity specifies that for any world there must already be certain regularities or recognizable similarities and differences in the matter of sensation IF the world in question is to contain sentient subjects who enjoy self conscious experience. What is fascinating for anybody conversant in Kant is that the said condition of possibility of experience is an apriori condition even though it is not generated or to borrow Westphal's phrase 'injected' by the mind into the world, concerning simply with the de facto orderliness of nature. In this way, transcendental realism emerges from the corpse of transcendental idealism.

What must nature or the in-itself be like in order for something like discursive subjectivity or the more-than-natural to arise? Kenneth Westphal's answer, which is also Kant's disavowed answer is that there must be some minimal degree of regularity already in the matter of sensation. If you are looking for an exciting secondary literature in Kant that actually makes you feel like you are learning something new about what is living and dead in Kant's legacy, you shouldn't skip out on this excellent study.