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Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate (Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy and History of Science)
Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a longtime problem for the philosopher of how to explain the simultaneous and widespread presence of both agreement and disagreement in science. Laudan critiques the logical empiricists and the post-positivists as he stresses the need for centrality and values and the interdependence of values, methods, and facts as prerequisites to solving the problems of consensus and dissent in science.
- GenresPhilosophyScience
165 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1984
About the author
Larry Laudan
21 books13 followersLarry Laudan was an American philosopher of science and epistemologist. He strongly criticized the traditions of positivism, realism, and relativism, and he defended a view of science as a privileged and progressive institution against popular challenges.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
July 27, 2016
It appears that the publication of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions created a sceptical crisis in the epistemology of science, a crisis which still hasn't been resolved. Kuhn's radical work suggested that the existence of paradigm shifts in science goes against the cumulative picture of scientific knowledge where practitioners simply add to our knowledge of nature by correctly employing what we unreflectively call the scientific method. The problem with the cumulative picture, according to Kuhn, is that this picture fails to account both for the persistent theoretical disagreement among rational individuals, as well as for the experimental success of theories that have been abandoned or deemed incorrect. Kuhn's path-breaking work opened up a series of interesting questions about the nature of scientific rationality and the conditions of theory change, but it also had its darker side: the idea of paradigm shifts implies that certain questions and theoretical projects are simply abandoned. Moreover, the persistent disagreement among scientists hints at the lack of external standards of theory evaluation, and, therefore, implies that science may very well be an irrational activity governed by unpatterned historical and sociological forces. This radical conclusion has led many philosophers and sociologists of science to embrace a, quite often, sophisticated cognitive relativism. Such distressing developments have not really been well understood or even noticed by non-philosophers of science and scientists who generally remain committed to pre-Kuhnian ideals.
While Laudan is sympathetic to the incorporation of historical and sociological data in the philosophy of science, he remains unconvinced by its recent relativist turn. Admittedly, Laudan argues, the realists and positivists cannot account for theoretical disputes, but relativists also fail to account for widespread consensus on a variety of issues among scientists. In order to explain this asymmetry, Laudan initially proposes a hierarchical model of facts, theory and axiology. Facts correspond to the actual data or findings; theory corresponds to the various theoretical approaches; lastly, axiology has to do with the values that, to a great extend, govern inquiry. Let me give a concrete example here. To a Cartesian facts may be things like ideas and mental substances, corpuscles of various sizes, interplanetary vortices and animal spirits. His theoretical work will suggest that intuitionist and deductivist approaches are the only ways to account for such facts. Lastly, the Cartesian's axiology maintains that the goal of inquiry is indubitable truth, or something of this sort. Laudan argues that this hierarchical picture can help us understand how disagreements are resolved by moving up one step in the ladder. Whenever scientists disagree on the facts it may be because they have adopted different methodological rules. In turn, divergences in methodological rules may be resolved by appeals to underlying values.
The above model of scientific rationality can be quite useful, though it evidently breaks down when one attempts to resolve disagreements at the axiological level. At this point, Laudan proposes a reticulated model of scientific rationality where disagreements at every level may be resolved by a set of critical tools that spawns from theoretical, factual, and axiological concerns. For example, utopian goals like the invention of a perpetual motion machine or traveling faster than the speed of light simply do not mesh well with our current scientific understanding. Being conservative on such issues is not a sign of fundamentalism, but a means of rational evaluation. Another example where rational discourse is available arises from apparent inconsistencies between practice and theory. For instance, a scientist may appeal to unobservable entities at the factual level, while condemning them at the axiological level; such an inconsistency is apt to rational criticism. Finally, axiological issues like the truth of realism may very well be disputed by evoking the history of science and questioning the doctrine's underlying assumptions. In fact, the last chapter of this book consists of Laudan's adequate defence of pragmatism/instrumentalism by employing his own, reticulated model.
While Laudan is sympathetic to the incorporation of historical and sociological data in the philosophy of science, he remains unconvinced by its recent relativist turn. Admittedly, Laudan argues, the realists and positivists cannot account for theoretical disputes, but relativists also fail to account for widespread consensus on a variety of issues among scientists. In order to explain this asymmetry, Laudan initially proposes a hierarchical model of facts, theory and axiology. Facts correspond to the actual data or findings; theory corresponds to the various theoretical approaches; lastly, axiology has to do with the values that, to a great extend, govern inquiry. Let me give a concrete example here. To a Cartesian facts may be things like ideas and mental substances, corpuscles of various sizes, interplanetary vortices and animal spirits. His theoretical work will suggest that intuitionist and deductivist approaches are the only ways to account for such facts. Lastly, the Cartesian's axiology maintains that the goal of inquiry is indubitable truth, or something of this sort. Laudan argues that this hierarchical picture can help us understand how disagreements are resolved by moving up one step in the ladder. Whenever scientists disagree on the facts it may be because they have adopted different methodological rules. In turn, divergences in methodological rules may be resolved by appeals to underlying values.
The above model of scientific rationality can be quite useful, though it evidently breaks down when one attempts to resolve disagreements at the axiological level. At this point, Laudan proposes a reticulated model of scientific rationality where disagreements at every level may be resolved by a set of critical tools that spawns from theoretical, factual, and axiological concerns. For example, utopian goals like the invention of a perpetual motion machine or traveling faster than the speed of light simply do not mesh well with our current scientific understanding. Being conservative on such issues is not a sign of fundamentalism, but a means of rational evaluation. Another example where rational discourse is available arises from apparent inconsistencies between practice and theory. For instance, a scientist may appeal to unobservable entities at the factual level, while condemning them at the axiological level; such an inconsistency is apt to rational criticism. Finally, axiological issues like the truth of realism may very well be disputed by evoking the history of science and questioning the doctrine's underlying assumptions. In fact, the last chapter of this book consists of Laudan's adequate defence of pragmatism/instrumentalism by employing his own, reticulated model.
December 26, 2025
This is an exercise in academic philosophy of science. It discusses questions about the way scientists adopt new theories, theory change or theory choice. The book is relatively short and consists of 5 chapters plus some short introduction and epilogue. Much of the book is concerned with the question of whether theory choice is rationally motivated or ultimately relative only to accidental historical properties of scientists. The fifth chapter concerns the question of whether as scientific realists argue theory choice is not only rationally motivated but leads to theories that are closer to the truth in a robust sense, one whose chief theoretical terms refer.
Laudan challenges the relativist conception of theory change by reframing the understanding of what is to be explained. Having done so he critiques the relativists. In the fifth chapter he proports to apply the same insights to the claims of the realists to show their deficiencies.
Laudan's framing is to point to the complicated nature of general agreement and disagreement in science. Scientists generally achieve good agreement about matters of fact, but often while maintaining deep theoretical disagreements and even disagreements about the nature and aims of science in general. The fissures and changes during the adoption of new theories bring these insistent disagreements to the fore and create a contrast with previous agreement.
Laudan diagnoses the origin of modern controversies on theory change as arising from the traditional understanding of science, what he calls the hierarchical model of justification. Matters of fact are settled by the higher level of methodology of science (a disagreement is settled by experiments, studies, or what have you) and methodological disagreements are settled by the higher levels of the cognitive values and goals of science. This model leaves the origin of values of science and how they might change rationally mysterious and how to rationally debate them impossible to specify. It also implies that differences in values allow for or even necessitate disagreements about matters of facts.
In answer to this Laudan offers his Reticulated Model of Scientific Rationality. Instead of the linear model of influence with values influencing method and method influencing matters of fact instead there is interaction between all levels with each other. Recognition of new matters of fact will call into question methods and values of science. In particular recognition of the patterns of previous successful science will give reason to change how and why science is done.
Laudan identifies one procedure in particular for how scientific debate across the hierarchy can occur. He thinks that if a set of cognitive values are shown to be futile or utopian they will be abandoned or relaxed. In general Laudan lays a heavy stress on the pragmatics of science.
In this way by arguing through various kinds of arguments made by those he identifies as relativists Laudan argues against their conclusions. Showing that disagreement about the values of science does not require disagreeing about methods or matters of fact. For example chemists on either side of the debate of the Daltonian innovations in chemistry in the 19th century can each be aware of how well or badly confirmed their rival theories are even as they disagree about ends chemistry should pursue.
In the fifth chapter he concludes in a similar way. Scientific realists inappropriately assume that agreements about matters of fact and confirmation imply agreement about theoretical terms and goals of science and so that agreement in science implies arriving at greater approximate truth as a goal of science. In fact it can be shown that this sort of agreement is not attained or attainable by exemplary instances of science and so the values that imply it should be recognized as futile and so rejected or put in abeyance until it can be properly reformed.
In fact though much of the fifth chapter focuses on the question of whether and how theoretical terms in scientific theories do or might refer. Questions such as whether a theory that refers to the non-existent electromagnetic aether, such as Maxwell's electromagnetism, can be said to have its main theoretical terms refer. Laudan is critical of attempts to say they do, and likewise that approximate truth in general leads to pragmatic success. However all this seems orthogonal if not in opposition to his reticulated model of scientific rationality.
Earlier he had argued that scientists with differing cognitive goals, values and standards can agree on the pragmatic and empirical confirmation of their rivals theories. If so it can only be because agree on what the confirmations refer to, in which case making terms occur across theories is certainly possible contrary to much of the argument in the fifth chapter. For example scientists who adopted special relativity had no problem seeing that all the evidence for the electromagnetic properties of the aether such as the evidenced value of the permitivity of free space applied to the electromagnetic field in their aetherless theory. The scholars Laudan labels as relativists like Kuhn agree with him that theoretical terms do not refer across theories and reasonably as far as I can see conclude that therefore likewise it is difficult or impossible to compare things like empirical confirmation across theories.
I would characterize the positions in this way. Those Laudan labels relativists insist on strict standards and criterion for allowing assessment of things like reference but also things like confirmation between theories. The scientific realists often allow themselves loose if not vague, circular or otherwise deficient standards for both reference and things like confirmation when comparing between theories. Finally Laudan suggests we should be strict when evaluating whether terms refer, but loose when assessing.
I would have been interested to see Laudan apply his reticulated model to debates about reference, senses in which old theories are revealed as limiting cases of new theories and other such intertheoretic relations in scientific examples. I suspect it would have revealed interesting deficiencies in the realists account and space for other possible interpretations without the simple blanket condemnation of such concepts that the chapter engages in.
One more example, in chapter 5 Laudan makes much hay with the contrast between the theory of continental drift and plate tectonics and earlier geological theory. For him earlier geological theory is an exemplar of successful science (a theory that makes observationally verified predictions) that can not be considered even approximately true (since the continents posited as immobile move). However the movement of the continents is an observable phenomenon, with many possible instances of observation, how could a theory that failed to predict that (that in fact predicted the opposite), be successful? Presumably by references to concepts like time intervals for observation, salience of the true and false statements and so on. However it seems as though those sorts of nuances could as easily be applied to a notion of approximate truth and show how a non-drifting theory of geology might indeed be approximately true. Some of those nuances would challenge precepts that scientific realists invoke, but I suspect they would also challenge the anti-realist also. The book gives a lot to think about and despite Laudan's rather univocal take on the prospects of his two targets (scientific relativism and realism), he ends on an open and uncertain note.
The written style is very easy to read and clear, despite my concerns with the argument here and there. It is a great introduction to a specific set of debates in academic philosophy of science. Reading this it is easy to understand why Laudan's work remained central and influential for decades afterward.
Laudan challenges the relativist conception of theory change by reframing the understanding of what is to be explained. Having done so he critiques the relativists. In the fifth chapter he proports to apply the same insights to the claims of the realists to show their deficiencies.
Laudan's framing is to point to the complicated nature of general agreement and disagreement in science. Scientists generally achieve good agreement about matters of fact, but often while maintaining deep theoretical disagreements and even disagreements about the nature and aims of science in general. The fissures and changes during the adoption of new theories bring these insistent disagreements to the fore and create a contrast with previous agreement.
Laudan diagnoses the origin of modern controversies on theory change as arising from the traditional understanding of science, what he calls the hierarchical model of justification. Matters of fact are settled by the higher level of methodology of science (a disagreement is settled by experiments, studies, or what have you) and methodological disagreements are settled by the higher levels of the cognitive values and goals of science. This model leaves the origin of values of science and how they might change rationally mysterious and how to rationally debate them impossible to specify. It also implies that differences in values allow for or even necessitate disagreements about matters of facts.
In answer to this Laudan offers his Reticulated Model of Scientific Rationality. Instead of the linear model of influence with values influencing method and method influencing matters of fact instead there is interaction between all levels with each other. Recognition of new matters of fact will call into question methods and values of science. In particular recognition of the patterns of previous successful science will give reason to change how and why science is done.
Laudan identifies one procedure in particular for how scientific debate across the hierarchy can occur. He thinks that if a set of cognitive values are shown to be futile or utopian they will be abandoned or relaxed. In general Laudan lays a heavy stress on the pragmatics of science.
In this way by arguing through various kinds of arguments made by those he identifies as relativists Laudan argues against their conclusions. Showing that disagreement about the values of science does not require disagreeing about methods or matters of fact. For example chemists on either side of the debate of the Daltonian innovations in chemistry in the 19th century can each be aware of how well or badly confirmed their rival theories are even as they disagree about ends chemistry should pursue.
In the fifth chapter he concludes in a similar way. Scientific realists inappropriately assume that agreements about matters of fact and confirmation imply agreement about theoretical terms and goals of science and so that agreement in science implies arriving at greater approximate truth as a goal of science. In fact it can be shown that this sort of agreement is not attained or attainable by exemplary instances of science and so the values that imply it should be recognized as futile and so rejected or put in abeyance until it can be properly reformed.
In fact though much of the fifth chapter focuses on the question of whether and how theoretical terms in scientific theories do or might refer. Questions such as whether a theory that refers to the non-existent electromagnetic aether, such as Maxwell's electromagnetism, can be said to have its main theoretical terms refer. Laudan is critical of attempts to say they do, and likewise that approximate truth in general leads to pragmatic success. However all this seems orthogonal if not in opposition to his reticulated model of scientific rationality.
Earlier he had argued that scientists with differing cognitive goals, values and standards can agree on the pragmatic and empirical confirmation of their rivals theories. If so it can only be because agree on what the confirmations refer to, in which case making terms occur across theories is certainly possible contrary to much of the argument in the fifth chapter. For example scientists who adopted special relativity had no problem seeing that all the evidence for the electromagnetic properties of the aether such as the evidenced value of the permitivity of free space applied to the electromagnetic field in their aetherless theory. The scholars Laudan labels as relativists like Kuhn agree with him that theoretical terms do not refer across theories and reasonably as far as I can see conclude that therefore likewise it is difficult or impossible to compare things like empirical confirmation across theories.
I would characterize the positions in this way. Those Laudan labels relativists insist on strict standards and criterion for allowing assessment of things like reference but also things like confirmation between theories. The scientific realists often allow themselves loose if not vague, circular or otherwise deficient standards for both reference and things like confirmation when comparing between theories. Finally Laudan suggests we should be strict when evaluating whether terms refer, but loose when assessing.
I would have been interested to see Laudan apply his reticulated model to debates about reference, senses in which old theories are revealed as limiting cases of new theories and other such intertheoretic relations in scientific examples. I suspect it would have revealed interesting deficiencies in the realists account and space for other possible interpretations without the simple blanket condemnation of such concepts that the chapter engages in.
One more example, in chapter 5 Laudan makes much hay with the contrast between the theory of continental drift and plate tectonics and earlier geological theory. For him earlier geological theory is an exemplar of successful science (a theory that makes observationally verified predictions) that can not be considered even approximately true (since the continents posited as immobile move). However the movement of the continents is an observable phenomenon, with many possible instances of observation, how could a theory that failed to predict that (that in fact predicted the opposite), be successful? Presumably by references to concepts like time intervals for observation, salience of the true and false statements and so on. However it seems as though those sorts of nuances could as easily be applied to a notion of approximate truth and show how a non-drifting theory of geology might indeed be approximately true. Some of those nuances would challenge precepts that scientific realists invoke, but I suspect they would also challenge the anti-realist also. The book gives a lot to think about and despite Laudan's rather univocal take on the prospects of his two targets (scientific relativism and realism), he ends on an open and uncertain note.
The written style is very easy to read and clear, despite my concerns with the argument here and there. It is a great introduction to a specific set of debates in academic philosophy of science. Reading this it is easy to understand why Laudan's work remained central and influential for decades afterward.
July 12, 2016
Puntuale e dettagliato. E' preferibile leggerlo accoppiato all'opera "La Struttura delle Rivoluzioni Scientifiche" di Kuhn, visto che buona parte del saggio si sviluppa prendendo le tesi kuhniane come appiglio per sviluppare la propria teoria e criticare quella dell'avversario.
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January 24, 2022Este libro es imprescindible para cualquier persona que se piense que la filosofía de la ciencia empieza y acaba con Kuhn, que es bastante gente fuera del mundo de la filosofía analítica. No solo por la crítica que le hace a la propia filosofía de Kuhn en lo que tiene de relativista, sino por la propuesta en positivo con la que se sobrepone tanto al cientificismo del positivismo como a los distintos enfoques holistas tipo Kuhn que no dan buena cuenta de la racionalidad científica. Además, es un libro corto, claro y con secciones de argumentación rigurosa y hábil. Gran ensayo.
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