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Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Volume 2
First published in 1890, "Stroud" is a long-established dictionary of the English language as it has been interpreted in the courts and in statutory material. It should be an indispensable tool for the practitioner, and a source of reference for the researcher. Fully updated since the fifth edition and in a more manageable three-volume format, it defines virtually every legal term or expression, even the most obscure and archaic. Definitions have been cross-referred to cases, with many longer entries reorganized or sub-divided for more efficient research. This text is also available on CD-ROM for quick and easy reference.
Hardcover
First published October 19, 2000
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September 19, 2008
THE SPECIALIST JUDICIAL DICTIONARY EXAMINED:
A very good starting point for any legal research will be to look at specific words or phrases when you consider writing an Opinion but find yourself stuck. Obviously, both Halsbury and Current Law are favourites, too, but I feel Stroud has the comprehensive approach which many not have tried in the past.
First Published in 1890, Stroud has established itself as the main ‘legal’ dictionary which covers case law and statutory material. Almost every legal term or expression has been defined and in Greenberg’s third supplement, he delves deeper into the intricacies of the European Union. Of much greater help and assistance to the researcher are that definitions are cross-referred to case law and the sixth edition itself was re-organised or sub-divided to help the researcher.
2003 UPDATE.
Greenberg updated the Dictionary to June 1st, 2003 when I reviewed this work, and he continues to include European, Parliamentary and academic material. The ‘Table of Abbreviations’ remains one of the most detailed I have ever seen and is of great help for the more abstruse abbreviations which one can come up against. He starts the Supplement with recent decisions he feels are of particular significance or importance. He begins with Human Rights and examines R v A (No 2) and section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Other areas include: • cross-contextual influence of statutory definitions • construction of expressions which change meaning over time • ordinary versus technical meanings • purposive construction • calculation of periods of time • the creation of doubt by the avoidance of doubt • criminal statutes and the presumption in favour of the citizen • modernisation of language • enactment implementing an international obligation • criminal versus civil proceedings • communication technology
OLD FASHIONED ENGLISH
Stroud’s editor, Greenberg, rightly highlights the trend to avoid archaic or obsolete language in legislation. Lord Falconer, as a Home Officer Minister, is quoted: ‘It is the view of Parliamentary Counsel that ‘clearly’ is a clearer word than ‘manifestly’…Our commitment to treat ‘clearly’ the same as ‘manifestly’ is unswerving’. This new approach has much to commend itself to those active legal wordsmiths who wish to see the move away from terms which have moved out of colloquial use.
SPECIFIC WORDS LIKE ‘ANY’ AND ‘IN PARTICULAR’.
Specific words are given full and careful treatment. The word ‘any’ is described as ‘may be the most difficult word to use or construe in a legal document.’ Greenberg identifies the big difficulty is that different people will use the word ‘any’ in very different ways. He also examines the use of the phrase ‘any confession’ in Re Proulx: R v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, Ex p. Proulx [2001], stating that the Divisional Court declined to read ‘any confession’ as ‘any conceivable confession’.
Following on from the definition of ‘any’, we come to the phrase ‘in particular’ and the decision of the House of Lords in R. v City of Westminster Housing Benefit Review Board, Ex p. Mehanne [2001] where their Lordships rejected a suggestion that a statutory instrument which required a local authority to reduce a person’s rent by such amount as it considered appropriate “having regard in particular to the cost of suitable alternative accommodation2 excluded consideration of factors other than the one particularised. I found much of this discussion most helpful when considering the issue of construction.
PEPPER v HART REVISITED:
Another useful commentary appeared with a discussion of the effect of the decision in Pepper v Hart. Greenberg says the case ‘did not produce the major change of climate in statutory interpretation which some early commentators predicted’. This will be of some relief to academics and students although there have been a number or recent decisions which illustrate more freedom when it comes to recourse to Parliamentary materials.
We will all also be relieved to know that the term ‘economic loss’ on page 43 of the supplement does not mean ‘pure economic loss’, although the author then goes on to examine definitions of the ‘European Court’ and a ‘European Institution’ and gives a useful reference to ‘European Community Competition Law’. There are two specific definitions given of the term ‘undertaking’ – both in the context of European Community law – and some useful references are made to Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali (C.N.S.D) v EC Commission [2000].
WORKERS.
Many pupil barristers will be relieved to know that Edmonds v Lawson [2000] is well covered, even though pupils are not ‘workers’ for the purposes of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. Paper boys (aged 15) are also not ‘workers’, so they are not entitled to paid holidays. It is this attention to detail which is such a support if it is a particular word which the lawyer is stuck over. I liked the definition of ‘workstation’ which decides that a cubicle is not a “workstation” for the purposes of regulations implementing the Workplace Directive.
BONA FIDE.
One of the longest definitions in the supplement covers the phrase ‘bona fide’. Once some of the general points are considered, a series of relatively recent cases are listed to give what is term ‘a general flavour’ of the courts’ attitude to bona fides’ during the twentieth century.
Although we are all told we should not use Latin phraseology, I think it is inevitable that Stroud will be of great assistance for some years to come as we grapple with replacement terminology. It is not so much the modernisation of language but more the need for common sense especially in the field of communication technology which raises a number of challenges for the application of traditional legal concepts and for the interpretation of traditional legal phrases.
Stroud is big competition for publications such as ‘The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’ which grace many chambers. But Stroud is by far the most important tool for the twenty-first century legal researcher.
Any lawyer with a love of English will cherish this dictionary and find it difficult to put down once opened. There is always the fascination that there might be one more word or expression to cover. So be disciplined and you will find much that would, almost certainly, take much longer to locate in Halsbury’s ‘Laws of England’.
It is fair to say that researchers should start with the dictionary – it will save you time, and I wish I have known more about Stroud when I took the Bar examinations and Practical Training Exercises.
PHILLIP TAYLOR MBE LL.B (Hons) PGCE Barrister-at-Law.
Richmond Green Chambers
A very good starting point for any legal research will be to look at specific words or phrases when you consider writing an Opinion but find yourself stuck. Obviously, both Halsbury and Current Law are favourites, too, but I feel Stroud has the comprehensive approach which many not have tried in the past.
First Published in 1890, Stroud has established itself as the main ‘legal’ dictionary which covers case law and statutory material. Almost every legal term or expression has been defined and in Greenberg’s third supplement, he delves deeper into the intricacies of the European Union. Of much greater help and assistance to the researcher are that definitions are cross-referred to case law and the sixth edition itself was re-organised or sub-divided to help the researcher.
2003 UPDATE.
Greenberg updated the Dictionary to June 1st, 2003 when I reviewed this work, and he continues to include European, Parliamentary and academic material. The ‘Table of Abbreviations’ remains one of the most detailed I have ever seen and is of great help for the more abstruse abbreviations which one can come up against. He starts the Supplement with recent decisions he feels are of particular significance or importance. He begins with Human Rights and examines R v A (No 2) and section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Other areas include: • cross-contextual influence of statutory definitions • construction of expressions which change meaning over time • ordinary versus technical meanings • purposive construction • calculation of periods of time • the creation of doubt by the avoidance of doubt • criminal statutes and the presumption in favour of the citizen • modernisation of language • enactment implementing an international obligation • criminal versus civil proceedings • communication technology
OLD FASHIONED ENGLISH
Stroud’s editor, Greenberg, rightly highlights the trend to avoid archaic or obsolete language in legislation. Lord Falconer, as a Home Officer Minister, is quoted: ‘It is the view of Parliamentary Counsel that ‘clearly’ is a clearer word than ‘manifestly’…Our commitment to treat ‘clearly’ the same as ‘manifestly’ is unswerving’. This new approach has much to commend itself to those active legal wordsmiths who wish to see the move away from terms which have moved out of colloquial use.
SPECIFIC WORDS LIKE ‘ANY’ AND ‘IN PARTICULAR’.
Specific words are given full and careful treatment. The word ‘any’ is described as ‘may be the most difficult word to use or construe in a legal document.’ Greenberg identifies the big difficulty is that different people will use the word ‘any’ in very different ways. He also examines the use of the phrase ‘any confession’ in Re Proulx: R v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, Ex p. Proulx [2001], stating that the Divisional Court declined to read ‘any confession’ as ‘any conceivable confession’.
Following on from the definition of ‘any’, we come to the phrase ‘in particular’ and the decision of the House of Lords in R. v City of Westminster Housing Benefit Review Board, Ex p. Mehanne [2001] where their Lordships rejected a suggestion that a statutory instrument which required a local authority to reduce a person’s rent by such amount as it considered appropriate “having regard in particular to the cost of suitable alternative accommodation2 excluded consideration of factors other than the one particularised. I found much of this discussion most helpful when considering the issue of construction.
PEPPER v HART REVISITED:
Another useful commentary appeared with a discussion of the effect of the decision in Pepper v Hart. Greenberg says the case ‘did not produce the major change of climate in statutory interpretation which some early commentators predicted’. This will be of some relief to academics and students although there have been a number or recent decisions which illustrate more freedom when it comes to recourse to Parliamentary materials.
We will all also be relieved to know that the term ‘economic loss’ on page 43 of the supplement does not mean ‘pure economic loss’, although the author then goes on to examine definitions of the ‘European Court’ and a ‘European Institution’ and gives a useful reference to ‘European Community Competition Law’. There are two specific definitions given of the term ‘undertaking’ – both in the context of European Community law – and some useful references are made to Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali (C.N.S.D) v EC Commission [2000].
WORKERS.
Many pupil barristers will be relieved to know that Edmonds v Lawson [2000] is well covered, even though pupils are not ‘workers’ for the purposes of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. Paper boys (aged 15) are also not ‘workers’, so they are not entitled to paid holidays. It is this attention to detail which is such a support if it is a particular word which the lawyer is stuck over. I liked the definition of ‘workstation’ which decides that a cubicle is not a “workstation” for the purposes of regulations implementing the Workplace Directive.
BONA FIDE.
One of the longest definitions in the supplement covers the phrase ‘bona fide’. Once some of the general points are considered, a series of relatively recent cases are listed to give what is term ‘a general flavour’ of the courts’ attitude to bona fides’ during the twentieth century.
Although we are all told we should not use Latin phraseology, I think it is inevitable that Stroud will be of great assistance for some years to come as we grapple with replacement terminology. It is not so much the modernisation of language but more the need for common sense especially in the field of communication technology which raises a number of challenges for the application of traditional legal concepts and for the interpretation of traditional legal phrases.
Stroud is big competition for publications such as ‘The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’ which grace many chambers. But Stroud is by far the most important tool for the twenty-first century legal researcher.
Any lawyer with a love of English will cherish this dictionary and find it difficult to put down once opened. There is always the fascination that there might be one more word or expression to cover. So be disciplined and you will find much that would, almost certainly, take much longer to locate in Halsbury’s ‘Laws of England’.
It is fair to say that researchers should start with the dictionary – it will save you time, and I wish I have known more about Stroud when I took the Bar examinations and Practical Training Exercises.
PHILLIP TAYLOR MBE LL.B (Hons) PGCE Barrister-at-Law.
Richmond Green Chambers
Displaying 1 of 1 review