Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia

by Devin T. Hagerty

This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional—and possibly nuclear—war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.

152 pages, Hardcover

Published July 10, 2019

Reviews

[Jan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is capturing the nuclear tension and state of affairs between India and Pakistan. Whilst taking into account contradictionary and alike scientific opinions it conceptualizes and discusses the influence of nuclear weapons on the stability between the two countries in a scientific manner.