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Fremde Heere Ost
Die ab April 1942 unter Leitung von Reinhard Gehlen operierende Generalstabsabteilung Fremde Heere Ost bildete den Mittelpunkt von Hitlers militärischer Feindaufklärung an der Ostfront. Die Abteilung arbeitete professionell und operativ-taktisch zuverlässig. Auf strategischer Ebene wies ihre Arbeit jedoch deutliche Defizite Die Leistungsfähigkeit der sowjetischen Rüstungsindustrie, die militärpolitischen Absichten und konkrete Offensivplanungen der Roten Armee blieben ihr zumeist verborgen. Bei Kriegsende diente Gehlen Akten und Mitarbeiter von Fremde Heere Ost den US-Amerikanern an. Mit ihrer Unterstützung konnte er in der jungen Bundesrepublik einen neuen Auslandsgeheimdienst aufbauen, aus dem später der Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) hervorging.Mit seinem Buch legt der Militärhistoriker Magnus Pahl erstmals einen Gesamtüberblick über Struktur, Personal und Wirkungsweise der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost vor.
Hardcover
First published November 15, 2015
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January 21, 2022
Although there are times when this work does read like a doctoral thesis translated from the German, this appears to be an astute analysis of why German army intelligence consistently came up "small" against the Soviet Union. To Pahl, the issues are really quite basic; a lack of institutional respect for the mission, a lack of resources, bad organization (the separation between intelligence analysis and intelligence acquisition), and the reality that "Foreign Armies East" was never intended to be a tool of strategic import (even assuming the Nazi higher leadership was prepared to take the reports seriously).
Besides that, much of this story is wrapped up with the character of Reinhard Gehlen, who was brought in as a "broom" after the failures of 1941 and who then worked intensely to overcome the liabilities holding back intelligence work in the German army; up to and including dueling with the SS establishment until the very end of the war. The problem with Gehlen is that he appears to have gone into "internal immigration" early, and devoted his best efforts into surviving the war, guessing right in terms of betting on American interest: Pahl is certainly not that impressed with Gehlen's analysis in regards to the final Soviet offensive in the east. Besides that, the way that Gehlen seemed to go to seed in the last decade or so of his active career (having become head of the Federal Republic of Germany's intelligence service), makes one question how much competence the man had all along.
Also, I'd observe that this work is probably going to be inter-library loan fodder for most readers, due to the cover cost. Finally, my rating is more like 3.5; can't bring myself to give out that last half star.
Besides that, much of this story is wrapped up with the character of Reinhard Gehlen, who was brought in as a "broom" after the failures of 1941 and who then worked intensely to overcome the liabilities holding back intelligence work in the German army; up to and including dueling with the SS establishment until the very end of the war. The problem with Gehlen is that he appears to have gone into "internal immigration" early, and devoted his best efforts into surviving the war, guessing right in terms of betting on American interest: Pahl is certainly not that impressed with Gehlen's analysis in regards to the final Soviet offensive in the east. Besides that, the way that Gehlen seemed to go to seed in the last decade or so of his active career (having become head of the Federal Republic of Germany's intelligence service), makes one question how much competence the man had all along.
Also, I'd observe that this work is probably going to be inter-library loan fodder for most readers, due to the cover cost. Finally, my rating is more like 3.5; can't bring myself to give out that last half star.
Displaying 1 of 1 review