The crucial question for today's Jewish world, Menachem Kellner argues, is not whether Jews will have Jewish grandchildren, but how many different sorts of mutually exclusive Judaisms those grandchildren will face. Kellner's short, brisk, and accessible book examines how the split that threatens the Jewish future can be avoided. The first six chapters of this strongly argued book analyse what religious faith means in classical Judaism and will be of interest to anyone seeking lucid insights into the nature of Judaism. The final chapter builds upon the conclusions of the first six in order to argue for a new way of construing the relationship of Orthodoxy to non-Orthodox Jews and institutions. Kellner argues that the Orthodox practice of framing the debate with non-Orthodox movements in terms of dogmatic fidelity contrasted with heresy is not the traditional Jewish approach, and that the debate could well be framed in other ways, ways that would allow all Jews to work together towards a less polarized Jewish future. Undoubtedly, Must a Jew Believe Anything? has the potential to make a difference to how Orthodoxy understands itself and its relationship to other Jewish movements in the modern world. For the second edition, the author has added a substantial Afterword, reviewing his thinking on the subject and addressing the reactions to the original edition.
Good, important book -- philosophically sophisticated and well-argued, defending the claim that prior to Maimonides (and esp to Saadia) Judaism was not a religion much interested in articulating or defending an explicit set of doctrines/dogmas ... and using that insight to offer advice on how Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews might better get along today ...
This book is essentially a commentary on the "Thirteen Principles of Faith" discussed by Rambam (aka Maimonides, Moshe ben Maimon). Rambam asserts that any disbeliever in these principles is "a sectarian . . . one is required to hate him and to destroy him." Later commentators generally accepted the majority of the principles as normative Jewish theology, but gutted or narrowed the "hate and destroy" language (as did Rambam himself in later writings, as Kellner points out).
Kellner usefully quotes Rambam's "Thirteen Principles" discussion in his book, and tries to explain Rambam's logic. He doesn't really explain the logic behind each principle very convincingly; to do so would require a longer book with more quotes. I think I would understand Rambam better (and thus understand Kellner's discussion of Rambam better) if Kellner had done so.
But Kellner does explain in a general way why Rambam believed that failure to know of the principles was so harmful. First, Rambam relied on a vague passage in Habbakuk about the righteous "living by their faith" to support his view that incorrect views deprived one of "life" in the world to come. Second, Rambam interpreted a passage on the Talmud about the world to come (a passage which refers to the righteous "enjoying the radiance of the divine presence") as meaning that they "enjoy what they know of the Creator". It followed (according to Kellner's interpretation of Rambam) that people without philosophical knowledge had no share in the world to come - and thus that one who did not know of these principles had no life after death. (Kellner is fair-minded enough to note that other works of Rambam appear to adopt a more traditional interpretation of the afterlife). Third, Rambam believes that philosophical knowledge is what separates us from lower animals; thus, one without philosophical knowledge is in some sense not fully human.
And given Rambam's emphasis on knowledge, Kellner asserts that Rambam demands actual philosophical inquiry into, and understanding of, his principles, rather than simple "belief."
I think I understand why Rambam thought that holders of incorrect views were excluded from the world to come; however, it is not clear to me from Kellner's analysis why these errors were sufficiently noxious to justify stigmatizing errant Jews as "sectarians" during their lifetime. (Nor is it clear to me whether my lack of understanding is my fault, Kellner's, or Rambam's!)
Kellner goes on to assert that the "Thirteen Principles" should not be considered halachically binding, since their philosophical foundations (e.g. that well-founded "knowledge" rather than mere belief is required for salvation) were not accepted by earlier tradition, by later Jews, or even in all of Rambam's works. Thus, Jews who fail to accept these principles should not be stigmatized as "heretics" based on Rambam's works.
Kellner does not, however, believe that belief is completely irrelevant to determining who belongs inside the Jewish community; he does not believe there is a simple "bright line" test (though he would clearly exclude Jews for Jesus).
This book turned out to be way more academic than I thought it would be, but I really, really liked it. Kellner sets out to thoroughly demonstrate that Maimonides did not mean what you thought he meant when he set out the Thirteen Principles as dogmas, and was not only introducing a massive innovation to Judaism (something I already vaguely knew) but also that the theological/philisophical underpinning of that innovation was shockingly exclusive and has been near-universally ignored. I also indirectly learned quite a bit about contemporary Orthodox viewpoints, which was definitely an area I was under-educated on before.
While Kellner's case is convincing, it isn't totally bulletproof, and I imagine that some of the critics he answered in his Afterword are still not satisfied. However, as a Liberal Jew very interested in the mitzvot, I did appreciate the way he phrased his conclusion, and his explanation and dismissal of the incredibly patronising language the Orthodox currently use to try and avoid blatantly branding all non-Orthodox Jews 'heretics'.