In our time, Ted Toadvine observes, the philosophical question of nature is almost entirely forgotten—obscured in part by a myopic focus on solving "environmental problems" without asking how these problems are framed. But an "environmental crisis," existing as it does in the human world of value and significance, is at heart a philosophical crisis. In this book, Toadvine demonstrates how Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has a special power to address such a crisis—a philosophical power far better suited to the questions than other modern approaches, with their over-reliance on assumptions drawn from the natural sciences. The book examines key moments in the development of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature while roughly following the historical sequence of his major works. Toadvine begins by setting out an ontology of nature proposed in Merleau-Ponty’s first book, The Structure of Behavior. He takes up the theme of the expressive role of reflection in Phenomenology of Perception, as it negotiates the area between nature’s own "self-unfolding" and human subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of "intertwining" and his account of space provide a transition to Toadvine’s study of the philosopher’s later work—in which the concept of "chiasm," the crossing or intertwining of sense and the sensible, forms the key to Merleau-Ponty’s mature ontology—and ultimately to the relationship between humans and nature.
071011: after reading definitions to words i never use- dehiscence, ipseity- i was better able to read this. this is metaphysics. i do not know how much i ever get from work on or by m-p, but with the conclusion fresh in mind i feel an urge to suggest theme: basically, or basically as i can get, this meditation on results of applying m-p's thoughts on nature, on embodied mind, on the consequently intertwined sense and sensibility of thought and being, reaffirms certain core assertions of m-p's phenomenology as derived from husserl, such as ultimate impossibility of complete phenomenological reduction, and further implications of being a body, a mind, resident and constituted by nature... or something like that.
even when i do not understand m-p completely, i derive an inspiring inescapable barrage of thought-bombs. i get something out of it. i liked the distinction of the in-itself-for-us in capturing the alterity and familiarity of our immediately experience world, a world that is, that surpasses descartes' methodological skepticism. for more logical examination of this work? i would need to read it again, preferably with a prof philosopher.
dehiscence- the release of materials by the splitting open of an organ or tissue.
Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature (2009) proposes a critical approach to nature, offering a methodological bridge between the natural world and our own. Toadvine demonstrates how Merleau-Ponty’s thought reconceptualises our place and role in nature in ways that can work against this tragic disconnection. Eco-phenomenology thus holds promise in fulfilling this task of reconnection. Toadvine finds in Merleau-Ponty an attempt to articulate meaning’s embeddedness within nature in a way that avoids positing a metaphysical discontinuity between the two, while also resisting the countervailing temptation to reduce one to the other.
Toadvine is careful not to ascribe a language of animism to the natural world and instead demonstrates how Merleau-Ponty sought to reveal idealism’s blind spot in relation to the perceived world. Toadvine situates his case against animism by challenging David Abram’s The Spell of the Sensuous (1996), which advances a holistic ecology emphasising our dependence on, and interconnectedness with, the natural world.
Toadvine's study of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy speaks to the heart of our ecological situation and the need for a philosophical method informed by ecology. Toadvine makes a strong case for a philosophy which remains perceptive to natural phenomena.