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Federalism and Local Politics in Russia
This book examines federalism and regional and local politics in Russia. Many commentators have alluded to the unique nature of Russia's dual transition and its difficult task of simultaneously reforming its economy and polity. But there is in fact a third transition under way in Russia that is of no less importance, the need to reconfigure central-local relations and to create a stable and viable form of federalism. Federal states are much more difficult to set up than unitary ones, and forging a new federal system at the same time as privatising the economy and trying to radically overhaul the political system has clearly made Russia's transition triply difficult. The book discusses how Vladimir Putin has re-asserted the power of the centre in Russia, and tightened the federal government's control of the regions. It shows how, contrary to his rhetoric about developing Russia as a free and democratic state, authoritarianism has been extended - through his reorganisation of the Federation Council, his usurpation of powers to dismiss regional assemblies and chief executives, and his creation of seven unelected super-governors. The book explores a wide range of issues related to these developments, including a comparative study of Russian federalism and local politics, ethnic federalism, the merging of federal units, regional governors, electoral and party reforms, and regional and local politics. It also includes case studies of local and regional politics in specific regions.
328 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2003
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January 27, 2026
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Книга очень тяжелая, т.к. текст ориентирован на специалистов, а не на обычного читателя которому вдруг захотелось почитать что-то о современной России. Лично я смог осилить лишь половину книги, в которой речь идёт о местном законодательстве, которое заявляло о себе как о частично автономном образовании. Вторая часть посвящена российским выборам в государственную думу, читать о чём довольно скучно в частности ещё и потому, что в России была выстроена сильная президентская власть, благодаря чему и Ельцин и Путин, на законодательном уровне, получили статус царей. Впрочем, власть в регионах так же не была демократической.
Tragically, for Russia, the founding political and economic institutions in the regions, were forged not by newly elected democrats but rather by authoritarian leaders who emerged out of the old Soviet nomenklatura. Russia’s post-communist elites, particularly in the ethnic republics, soon turned to nationalism and separatist demands, rather than democracy, to legitimate their rule. Wielding the sword of ‘sovereignty’ local elites were able to capture control over the major political and economic institutions in the localities. Thus, in a short space of time many of Russia’s republics were headed by authoritarian regimes of one sort or another.
Тем не менее, первая половина книги довольно интересна особенно для тех читателей, кто интересуется возможным сценарием развала нынешней России. До знакомства с этой книгой я думал, что такой сценарий полностью нереалистичный, но как оказалось, основа для «развода» некоторых сегодняшних территорий РФ действительно существует, что очевидно из нижеследующих цитат. Я хочу отметить тут, что я вовсе не утверждаю, что Россия распадётся по причине сегодняшнего военного конфликта с Украиной и отчасти с Западом. Моя мысль в том, что в 90-ые годы некоторые регионы РФ имели довольно независимые от центра законодательства, включая собственные (как я это понял) конституции и, что важно, настроения в этих регионах были довольно сепаратистские. Сегодня это может внести свой вклад либо в настоящую федерализацию, либо, при самом негативном сценарии, в де-факто сепарацию (некоторых) регионов.
Indeed, a number of regions were so incensed by their second-class positions within the federation that they unilaterally elevated their status to that of republics. Thus, for example, in a referendum held in April 1993, 84 per cent of the population of Sverdlovsk Oblast supported the creation of the Urals Republic. And it was not long before further regions followed suit. Thus, for example, regions in European Russia created the Pomor Republic centred in Arkhangelsk, the Central Russian Republic, made up of eleven regions with its capital in Orel, and the Leningrad Republic in St Petersburg. A Southern Urals republic was formed in Chelyabinsk, and a Siberian republic in Irkutsk. And in the Far East, the Maritime Republic was created in Vladivostok. Other regions whilst not going so far as to declare themselves republics, unilaterally elevated their constitutional status. Thus, for example, Voronezh Oblast declared that the region was henceforth, an ‘independent participant in international and foreign-economic relations’. Furthermore it continued, ‘Federal bodies of state power of the Russian Federation may not promulgate legal acts that fall within the jurisdiction of the regional bodies of power’
<…>
Nonetheless, during the conference Tatarstan took the lead in pushing for more autonomy for the ethnic republics insisting that Russian federalism should be ‘treaty based’ rather than ‘constitutional’. In particular, the republics demanded:
1 the right of all of Russia’s people’s to self-determination,
2 recognition of themselves as sovereign states possessing full state (legislative, executive and judicial) power on their territory, except for powers that were voluntarily transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation,
3 the right to enter into direct relations with other states and to exchange diplomatic and consular missions,
4 acknowledgement that federal principles of legislation would enter into force on their territories only after they were ratified by local bodies of power, and
5 recognition of their right to secede from the Russian Federation without any restraint.
Однако вольница продлилась недолго, и уже очень скоро Ельцин показал регионам «кто тут власть». Сделал это Ельцин как подобает всякому русскому царю - силой оружия, а не дипломатией и компромиссами, на чём держатся США и успех США как соединённых штатов.
The 1992 victory of the republics over the federal authorities appeared to come to an end with Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Russian parliament in October 1993 and the adoption of his Presidential Constitution in December 1993. The dramatic assault by Russian troops on the Russian parliament and the arrest of Khasbulatov, and the other leading parliamentarians, followed by Yeltsin’s decrees abolishing the institutions of the local assemblies (soviets), frightened the regions into submission. As Zverev notes, ‘tax returns hitherto withheld by the regions began pouring into Moscow and talk of separate republics in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East temporarily ceased’.
Далее автор замечает, что российская конституция, которая дала Ельцину диктаторские полномочия, не была де-факто принята всем обществом и даже то неустойчивое большинство скорее является результатом фальсификаций, нежели реальным выражением воли российских граждан.
Although the Constitution was supported by 58.4 per cent of the voters nationwide (according to official statistics), it was rejected by a majority of voters in sixteen regions, and in eight of the twenty-one republics. Additionally, in eleven regions and six republics the Constitution failed to be ratified, as turnout was below the required 50 per cent. And the Constitution was boycotted altogether in Chechnya. Surely, as we have noted, an essential attribute of any democratic federation is the voluntary membership of its subjects. But in Russia the Constitution failed to be ratified in forty-two of the eighty-nine subjects. Moreover, the legitimacy of the Constitution was also weakened by doubts over the validity of the officially declared turnout of 54.8 per cent. According to some estimates the actual turnout was well below the required 50 per cent and actually lay somewhere between 38 and 43 per cent.
Не знаю актуально ли на сегодня или нет, но в законодательных актах некоторых регионах содержатся довольно интересные положения. Были ли они убраны при Путине или нет, я не знаю, но важно, что они точно были.
Nonetheless, 19 of the 21 republics (with the exception of Ingushetiya and Kalmykiya) declared their state sovereignty, and by implication the right of secession. Thus, for example, article 1 of the Constitution of Tyva stated that as a sovereign state Tyva is a member of the Russian Federation on the basis of a Federal Treaty and as such Tyva has the right to self-determination and the right to secede from the Russian Federation. Article 61 of Tatarstan’s Constitution declared, ‘The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a Sovereign State, a subject of international law, associated with the Russian federation on the basis of a treaty and the mutual delegation of powers’. Likewise, article 5 of Bashkortostan’s Constitution noted that:
Bashkortostan joined the Russian Federation on a voluntary and equal basis. Relations between the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Russian Federation are determined by the Treaty on the basis of intergovernmental relations between the Russian Federation and Bashkortostan, and other bilateral treaties and agreements.
<…>
In the Constitution of North Osetiya-Alaniya it proclaims that the Republic is a ‘state, voluntarily entering into the composition of the Russian Federation’. Other constitutions stressed that their relations with the Russian Federation were based on the free delegation of their powers to the federation (Buryatiya, Bashkortostan, Sakha).
<…>
Article 1 of Tyva’s Constitution stated that at times of political or state crisis in the republic, the Republic’s Constitution was to take priority over federal laws and all powers were to pass to the parliament (the Supreme Khural), president and government. Similarly, article 1 of Bashkortostan’s Constitution declared that, ‘The Republic of Bashkortostan has supreme authority on its territory, independently defining and conducting domestic and foreign policies, adopting the Bashkortostan Constitution and laws, which have supremacy on the entire territory’. This article went on to state, that the only federal laws that must be enforced in Bashkortostan are those that were ‘voluntarily granted by Bashkortostan to the purview of the Russian Federation’.
Как видим, регионы РФ имели всё же основы для своей собственной независимости и поэтому сказать, что сепарация регионов вообще беспочвенная, явно нельзя.
The book is very difficult because the text is aimed at specialists rather than ordinary readers who suddenly want to read something about modern Russia. Personally, I only managed to get through half of the book, which deals with local legislation that declared itself to be a partially autonomous entity. The second part is devoted to the Russian elections to the State Duma, which is rather boring to read about, particularly because a strong presidential power was established in Russia, thanks to which both Yeltsin and Putin, at the legislative level, received the status of tsars. However, regional authorities were not democratic either.
Tragically, for Russia, the founding political and economic institutions in the regions, were forged not by newly elected democrats but rather by authoritarian leaders who emerged out of the old Soviet nomenklatura. Russia’s post-communist elites, particularly in the ethnic republics, soon turned to nationalism and separatist demands, rather than democracy, to legitimate their rule. Wielding the sword of ‘sovereignty’ local elites were able to capture control over the major political and economic institutions in the localities. Thus, in a short space of time many of Russia’s republics were headed by authoritarian regimes of one sort or another.
Nevertheless, the first half of the book is quite interesting, especially for readers who are interested in the possible scenario of the collapse of present-day Russia. Before reading this book, I thought that such a scenario was completely unrealistic, but as it turns out, the basis for the “divorce” of some of today's territories of the Russian Federation does indeed exist, as is evident from the following quotations. I want to note here that I am not at all claiming that Russia will collapse because of the current military conflict with Ukraine and, to some extent, with the West. My point is that in the 1990s, some regions of the Russian Federation had legislation that was quite independent of the center, including their own (as I understand it) constitutions, and, importantly, the mood in these regions was quite separatist. Today, this could contribute either to genuine federalization or, in the worst-case scenario, to the de facto separation of (some) regions.
Indeed, a number of regions were so incensed by their second-class positions within the federation that they unilaterally elevated their status to that of republics. Thus, for example, in a referendum held in April 1993, 84 per cent of the population of Sverdlovsk Oblast supported the creation of the Urals Republic. And it was not long before further regions followed suit. Thus, for example, regions in European Russia created the Pomor Republic centred in Arkhangelsk, the Central Russian Republic, made up of eleven regions with its capital in Orel, and the Leningrad Republic in St Petersburg. A Southern Urals republic was formed in Chelyabinsk, and a Siberian republic in Irkutsk. And in the Far East, the Maritime Republic was created in Vladivostok. Other regions whilst not going so far as to declare themselves republics, unilaterally elevated their constitutional status. Thus, for example, Voronezh Oblast declared that the region was henceforth, an ‘independent participant in international and foreign-economic relations’. Furthermore it continued, ‘Federal bodies of state power of the Russian Federation may not promulgate legal acts that fall within the jurisdiction of the regional bodies of power’
<…>
Nonetheless, during the conference Tatarstan took the lead in pushing for more autonomy for the ethnic republics insisting that Russian federalism should be ‘treaty based’ rather than ‘constitutional’. In particular, the republics demanded:
1 the right of all of Russia’s people’s to self-determination,
2 recognition of themselves as sovereign states possessing full state (legislative, executive and judicial) power on their territory, except for powers that were voluntarily transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation,
3 the right to enter into direct relations with other states and to exchange diplomatic and consular missions,
4 acknowledgement that federal principles of legislation would enter into force on their territories only after they were ratified by local bodies of power, and
5 recognition of their right to secede from the Russian Federation without any restraint.
However, the freedom did not last long, and very soon, Yeltsin showed the regions “who was in charge.” Yeltsin did this as befits any Russian tsar—by force of arms, rather than diplomacy and compromise, which are the foundations of the United States and its success as a union of states.
The 1992 victory of the republics over the federal authorities appeared to come to an end with Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Russian parliament in October 1993 and the adoption of his Presidential Constitution in December 1993. The dramatic assault by Russian troops on the Russian parliament and the arrest of Khasbulatov, and the other leading parliamentarians, followed by Yeltsin’s decrees abolishing the institutions of the local assemblies (soviets), frightened the regions into submission. As Zverev notes, ‘tax returns hitherto withheld by the regions began pouring into Moscow and talk of separate republics in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East temporarily ceased’.
The author further notes that the Russian constitution, which gave Yeltsin dictatorial powers, was not de facto accepted by the whole society, and even that unstable majority is more likely the result of fraud than a real expression of the will of Russian citizens. Many people are writing about this today, especially among foreign experts, but some of the liberal opposition currently in exile continues to lie, talking about Yeltsin as if he were the beacon of democracy. There has been no sign of democracy in Russia since 1993.
Although the Constitution was supported by 58.4 per cent of the voters nationwide (according to official statistics), it was rejected by a majority of voters in sixteen regions, and in eight of the twenty-one republics. Additionally, in eleven regions and six republics the Constitution failed to be ratified, as turnout was below the required 50 per cent. And the Constitution was boycotted altogether in Chechnya. Surely, as we have noted, an essential attribute of any democratic federation is the voluntary membership of its subjects. But in Russia the Constitution failed to be ratified in forty-two of the eighty-nine subjects. Moreover, the legitimacy of the Constitution was also weakened by doubts over the validity of the officially declared turnout of 54.8 per cent. According to some estimates the actual turnout was well below the required 50 per cent and actually lay somewhere between 38 and 43 per cent.
I don't know if it's relevant today or not, but the legislation of some regions contains some rather interesting provisions. I don't know if they were removed under Putin or not, but the important thing is that they definitely existed.
Nonetheless, 19 of the 21 republics (with the exception of Ingushetiya and Kalmykiya) declared their state sovereignty, and by implication the right of secession. Thus, for example, article 1 of the Constitution of Tyva stated that as a sovereign state Tyva is a member of the Russian Federation on the basis of a Federal Treaty and as such Tyva has the right to self-determination and the right to secede from the Russian Federation. Article 61 of Tatarstan’s Constitution declared, ‘The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a Sovereign State, a subject of international law, associated with the Russian federation on the basis of a treaty and the mutual delegation of powers’. Likewise, article 5 of Bashkortostan’s Constitution noted that:
Bashkortostan joined the Russian Federation on a voluntary and equal basis. Relations between the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Russian Federation are determined by the Treaty on the basis of intergovernmental relations between the Russian Federation and Bashkortostan, and other bilateral treaties and agreements.
<…>
In the Constitution of North Osetiya-Alaniya it proclaims that the Republic is a ‘state, voluntarily entering into the composition of the Russian Federation’. Other constitutions stressed that their relations with the Russian Federation were based on the free delegation of their powers to the federation (Buryatiya, Bashkortostan, Sakha).
<…>
Article 1 of Tyva’s Constitution stated that at times of political or state crisis in the republic, the Republic’s Constitution was to take priority over federal laws and all powers were to pass to the parliament (the Supreme Khural), president and government. Similarly, article 1 of Bashkortostan’s Constitution declared that, ‘The Republic of Bashkortostan has supreme authority on its territory, independently defining and conducting domestic and foreign policies, adopting the Bashkortostan Constitution and laws, which have supremacy on the entire territory’. This article went on to state, that the only federal laws that must be enforced in Bashkortostan are those that were ‘voluntarily granted by Bashkortostan to the purview of the Russian Federation’.
As we can see, the regions of the Russian Federation did have the foundations for their own independence, and therefore, it is clearly impossible to say that the separation of the regions is completely unfounded.
Книга очень тяжелая, т.к. текст ориентирован на специалистов, а не на обычного читателя которому вдруг захотелось почитать что-то о современной России. Лично я смог осилить лишь половину книги, в которой речь идёт о местном законодательстве, которое заявляло о себе как о частично автономном образовании. Вторая часть посвящена российским выборам в государственную думу, читать о чём довольно скучно в частности ещё и потому, что в России была выстроена сильная президентская власть, благодаря чему и Ельцин и Путин, на законодательном уровне, получили статус царей. Впрочем, власть в регионах так же не была демократической.
Tragically, for Russia, the founding political and economic institutions in the regions, were forged not by newly elected democrats but rather by authoritarian leaders who emerged out of the old Soviet nomenklatura. Russia’s post-communist elites, particularly in the ethnic republics, soon turned to nationalism and separatist demands, rather than democracy, to legitimate their rule. Wielding the sword of ‘sovereignty’ local elites were able to capture control over the major political and economic institutions in the localities. Thus, in a short space of time many of Russia’s republics were headed by authoritarian regimes of one sort or another.
Тем не менее, первая половина книги довольно интересна особенно для тех читателей, кто интересуется возможным сценарием развала нынешней России. До знакомства с этой книгой я думал, что такой сценарий полностью нереалистичный, но как оказалось, основа для «развода» некоторых сегодняшних территорий РФ действительно существует, что очевидно из нижеследующих цитат. Я хочу отметить тут, что я вовсе не утверждаю, что Россия распадётся по причине сегодняшнего военного конфликта с Украиной и отчасти с Западом. Моя мысль в том, что в 90-ые годы некоторые регионы РФ имели довольно независимые от центра законодательства, включая собственные (как я это понял) конституции и, что важно, настроения в этих регионах были довольно сепаратистские. Сегодня это может внести свой вклад либо в настоящую федерализацию, либо, при самом негативном сценарии, в де-факто сепарацию (некоторых) регионов.
Indeed, a number of regions were so incensed by their second-class positions within the federation that they unilaterally elevated their status to that of republics. Thus, for example, in a referendum held in April 1993, 84 per cent of the population of Sverdlovsk Oblast supported the creation of the Urals Republic. And it was not long before further regions followed suit. Thus, for example, regions in European Russia created the Pomor Republic centred in Arkhangelsk, the Central Russian Republic, made up of eleven regions with its capital in Orel, and the Leningrad Republic in St Petersburg. A Southern Urals republic was formed in Chelyabinsk, and a Siberian republic in Irkutsk. And in the Far East, the Maritime Republic was created in Vladivostok. Other regions whilst not going so far as to declare themselves republics, unilaterally elevated their constitutional status. Thus, for example, Voronezh Oblast declared that the region was henceforth, an ‘independent participant in international and foreign-economic relations’. Furthermore it continued, ‘Federal bodies of state power of the Russian Federation may not promulgate legal acts that fall within the jurisdiction of the regional bodies of power’
<…>
Nonetheless, during the conference Tatarstan took the lead in pushing for more autonomy for the ethnic republics insisting that Russian federalism should be ‘treaty based’ rather than ‘constitutional’. In particular, the republics demanded:
1 the right of all of Russia’s people’s to self-determination,
2 recognition of themselves as sovereign states possessing full state (legislative, executive and judicial) power on their territory, except for powers that were voluntarily transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation,
3 the right to enter into direct relations with other states and to exchange diplomatic and consular missions,
4 acknowledgement that federal principles of legislation would enter into force on their territories only after they were ratified by local bodies of power, and
5 recognition of their right to secede from the Russian Federation without any restraint.
Однако вольница продлилась недолго, и уже очень скоро Ельцин показал регионам «кто тут власть». Сделал это Ельцин как подобает всякому русскому царю - силой оружия, а не дипломатией и компромиссами, на чём держатся США и успех США как соединённых штатов.
The 1992 victory of the republics over the federal authorities appeared to come to an end with Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Russian parliament in October 1993 and the adoption of his Presidential Constitution in December 1993. The dramatic assault by Russian troops on the Russian parliament and the arrest of Khasbulatov, and the other leading parliamentarians, followed by Yeltsin’s decrees abolishing the institutions of the local assemblies (soviets), frightened the regions into submission. As Zverev notes, ‘tax returns hitherto withheld by the regions began pouring into Moscow and talk of separate republics in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East temporarily ceased’.
Далее автор замечает, что российская конституция, которая дала Ельцину диктаторские полномочия, не была де-факто принята всем обществом и даже то неустойчивое большинство скорее является результатом фальсификаций, нежели реальным выражением воли российских граждан.
Although the Constitution was supported by 58.4 per cent of the voters nationwide (according to official statistics), it was rejected by a majority of voters in sixteen regions, and in eight of the twenty-one republics. Additionally, in eleven regions and six republics the Constitution failed to be ratified, as turnout was below the required 50 per cent. And the Constitution was boycotted altogether in Chechnya. Surely, as we have noted, an essential attribute of any democratic federation is the voluntary membership of its subjects. But in Russia the Constitution failed to be ratified in forty-two of the eighty-nine subjects. Moreover, the legitimacy of the Constitution was also weakened by doubts over the validity of the officially declared turnout of 54.8 per cent. According to some estimates the actual turnout was well below the required 50 per cent and actually lay somewhere between 38 and 43 per cent.
Не знаю актуально ли на сегодня или нет, но в законодательных актах некоторых регионах содержатся довольно интересные положения. Были ли они убраны при Путине или нет, я не знаю, но важно, что они точно были.
Nonetheless, 19 of the 21 republics (with the exception of Ingushetiya and Kalmykiya) declared their state sovereignty, and by implication the right of secession. Thus, for example, article 1 of the Constitution of Tyva stated that as a sovereign state Tyva is a member of the Russian Federation on the basis of a Federal Treaty and as such Tyva has the right to self-determination and the right to secede from the Russian Federation. Article 61 of Tatarstan’s Constitution declared, ‘The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a Sovereign State, a subject of international law, associated with the Russian federation on the basis of a treaty and the mutual delegation of powers’. Likewise, article 5 of Bashkortostan’s Constitution noted that:
Bashkortostan joined the Russian Federation on a voluntary and equal basis. Relations between the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Russian Federation are determined by the Treaty on the basis of intergovernmental relations between the Russian Federation and Bashkortostan, and other bilateral treaties and agreements.
<…>
In the Constitution of North Osetiya-Alaniya it proclaims that the Republic is a ‘state, voluntarily entering into the composition of the Russian Federation’. Other constitutions stressed that their relations with the Russian Federation were based on the free delegation of their powers to the federation (Buryatiya, Bashkortostan, Sakha).
<…>
Article 1 of Tyva’s Constitution stated that at times of political or state crisis in the republic, the Republic’s Constitution was to take priority over federal laws and all powers were to pass to the parliament (the Supreme Khural), president and government. Similarly, article 1 of Bashkortostan’s Constitution declared that, ‘The Republic of Bashkortostan has supreme authority on its territory, independently defining and conducting domestic and foreign policies, adopting the Bashkortostan Constitution and laws, which have supremacy on the entire territory’. This article went on to state, that the only federal laws that must be enforced in Bashkortostan are those that were ‘voluntarily granted by Bashkortostan to the purview of the Russian Federation’.
Как видим, регионы РФ имели всё же основы для своей собственной независимости и поэтому сказать, что сепарация регионов вообще беспочвенная, явно нельзя.
The book is very difficult because the text is aimed at specialists rather than ordinary readers who suddenly want to read something about modern Russia. Personally, I only managed to get through half of the book, which deals with local legislation that declared itself to be a partially autonomous entity. The second part is devoted to the Russian elections to the State Duma, which is rather boring to read about, particularly because a strong presidential power was established in Russia, thanks to which both Yeltsin and Putin, at the legislative level, received the status of tsars. However, regional authorities were not democratic either.
Tragically, for Russia, the founding political and economic institutions in the regions, were forged not by newly elected democrats but rather by authoritarian leaders who emerged out of the old Soviet nomenklatura. Russia’s post-communist elites, particularly in the ethnic republics, soon turned to nationalism and separatist demands, rather than democracy, to legitimate their rule. Wielding the sword of ‘sovereignty’ local elites were able to capture control over the major political and economic institutions in the localities. Thus, in a short space of time many of Russia’s republics were headed by authoritarian regimes of one sort or another.
Nevertheless, the first half of the book is quite interesting, especially for readers who are interested in the possible scenario of the collapse of present-day Russia. Before reading this book, I thought that such a scenario was completely unrealistic, but as it turns out, the basis for the “divorce” of some of today's territories of the Russian Federation does indeed exist, as is evident from the following quotations. I want to note here that I am not at all claiming that Russia will collapse because of the current military conflict with Ukraine and, to some extent, with the West. My point is that in the 1990s, some regions of the Russian Federation had legislation that was quite independent of the center, including their own (as I understand it) constitutions, and, importantly, the mood in these regions was quite separatist. Today, this could contribute either to genuine federalization or, in the worst-case scenario, to the de facto separation of (some) regions.
Indeed, a number of regions were so incensed by their second-class positions within the federation that they unilaterally elevated their status to that of republics. Thus, for example, in a referendum held in April 1993, 84 per cent of the population of Sverdlovsk Oblast supported the creation of the Urals Republic. And it was not long before further regions followed suit. Thus, for example, regions in European Russia created the Pomor Republic centred in Arkhangelsk, the Central Russian Republic, made up of eleven regions with its capital in Orel, and the Leningrad Republic in St Petersburg. A Southern Urals republic was formed in Chelyabinsk, and a Siberian republic in Irkutsk. And in the Far East, the Maritime Republic was created in Vladivostok. Other regions whilst not going so far as to declare themselves republics, unilaterally elevated their constitutional status. Thus, for example, Voronezh Oblast declared that the region was henceforth, an ‘independent participant in international and foreign-economic relations’. Furthermore it continued, ‘Federal bodies of state power of the Russian Federation may not promulgate legal acts that fall within the jurisdiction of the regional bodies of power’
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Nonetheless, during the conference Tatarstan took the lead in pushing for more autonomy for the ethnic republics insisting that Russian federalism should be ‘treaty based’ rather than ‘constitutional’. In particular, the republics demanded:
1 the right of all of Russia’s people’s to self-determination,
2 recognition of themselves as sovereign states possessing full state (legislative, executive and judicial) power on their territory, except for powers that were voluntarily transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation,
3 the right to enter into direct relations with other states and to exchange diplomatic and consular missions,
4 acknowledgement that federal principles of legislation would enter into force on their territories only after they were ratified by local bodies of power, and
5 recognition of their right to secede from the Russian Federation without any restraint.
However, the freedom did not last long, and very soon, Yeltsin showed the regions “who was in charge.” Yeltsin did this as befits any Russian tsar—by force of arms, rather than diplomacy and compromise, which are the foundations of the United States and its success as a union of states.
The 1992 victory of the republics over the federal authorities appeared to come to an end with Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Russian parliament in October 1993 and the adoption of his Presidential Constitution in December 1993. The dramatic assault by Russian troops on the Russian parliament and the arrest of Khasbulatov, and the other leading parliamentarians, followed by Yeltsin’s decrees abolishing the institutions of the local assemblies (soviets), frightened the regions into submission. As Zverev notes, ‘tax returns hitherto withheld by the regions began pouring into Moscow and talk of separate republics in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East temporarily ceased’.
The author further notes that the Russian constitution, which gave Yeltsin dictatorial powers, was not de facto accepted by the whole society, and even that unstable majority is more likely the result of fraud than a real expression of the will of Russian citizens. Many people are writing about this today, especially among foreign experts, but some of the liberal opposition currently in exile continues to lie, talking about Yeltsin as if he were the beacon of democracy. There has been no sign of democracy in Russia since 1993.
Although the Constitution was supported by 58.4 per cent of the voters nationwide (according to official statistics), it was rejected by a majority of voters in sixteen regions, and in eight of the twenty-one republics. Additionally, in eleven regions and six republics the Constitution failed to be ratified, as turnout was below the required 50 per cent. And the Constitution was boycotted altogether in Chechnya. Surely, as we have noted, an essential attribute of any democratic federation is the voluntary membership of its subjects. But in Russia the Constitution failed to be ratified in forty-two of the eighty-nine subjects. Moreover, the legitimacy of the Constitution was also weakened by doubts over the validity of the officially declared turnout of 54.8 per cent. According to some estimates the actual turnout was well below the required 50 per cent and actually lay somewhere between 38 and 43 per cent.
I don't know if it's relevant today or not, but the legislation of some regions contains some rather interesting provisions. I don't know if they were removed under Putin or not, but the important thing is that they definitely existed.
Nonetheless, 19 of the 21 republics (with the exception of Ingushetiya and Kalmykiya) declared their state sovereignty, and by implication the right of secession. Thus, for example, article 1 of the Constitution of Tyva stated that as a sovereign state Tyva is a member of the Russian Federation on the basis of a Federal Treaty and as such Tyva has the right to self-determination and the right to secede from the Russian Federation. Article 61 of Tatarstan’s Constitution declared, ‘The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a Sovereign State, a subject of international law, associated with the Russian federation on the basis of a treaty and the mutual delegation of powers’. Likewise, article 5 of Bashkortostan’s Constitution noted that:
Bashkortostan joined the Russian Federation on a voluntary and equal basis. Relations between the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Russian Federation are determined by the Treaty on the basis of intergovernmental relations between the Russian Federation and Bashkortostan, and other bilateral treaties and agreements.
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In the Constitution of North Osetiya-Alaniya it proclaims that the Republic is a ‘state, voluntarily entering into the composition of the Russian Federation’. Other constitutions stressed that their relations with the Russian Federation were based on the free delegation of their powers to the federation (Buryatiya, Bashkortostan, Sakha).
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Article 1 of Tyva’s Constitution stated that at times of political or state crisis in the republic, the Republic’s Constitution was to take priority over federal laws and all powers were to pass to the parliament (the Supreme Khural), president and government. Similarly, article 1 of Bashkortostan’s Constitution declared that, ‘The Republic of Bashkortostan has supreme authority on its territory, independently defining and conducting domestic and foreign policies, adopting the Bashkortostan Constitution and laws, which have supremacy on the entire territory’. This article went on to state, that the only federal laws that must be enforced in Bashkortostan are those that were ‘voluntarily granted by Bashkortostan to the purview of the Russian Federation’.
As we can see, the regions of the Russian Federation did have the foundations for their own independence, and therefore, it is clearly impossible to say that the separation of the regions is completely unfounded.
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