What do you think?
Rate this book
The Battle for Hunger Hill: The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment at the Joint Readiness Training Center
At the JRTC, soldiers are trained for war in a setting so real you can almost smell the smoke.
- GenresMilitary Fiction
384 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 1997
2 people are currently reading
37 people want to read
About the author
Daniel P. Bolger
21 books31 followersDaniel P. Bolger of Aurora, Illinois is an author, historian, and retired Lieutenant General (promoted 21 May 2010) of the United States Army. He currently holds a special faculty appointment in the Department of History at North Carolina State University, where he teaches military history.
Lt. Gen. Bolger retired in 2013 from the Army. During his 35 years of service, he earned five Bronze Star Medals (one for valor) and the Combat Action Badge. His notable military commands included serving as Commanding General of the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan and Commander of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (2011-2013); Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas (deployed to Baghdad, 2009-2010); the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team in Iraq (2005–06); and U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. He is also the author of books, such as Why We Lost, Americans at War, The Battle for Hunger Hill, and Death Ground.
Lt. Gen. Bolger retired in 2013 from the Army. During his 35 years of service, he earned five Bronze Star Medals (one for valor) and the Combat Action Badge. His notable military commands included serving as Commanding General of the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan and Commander of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (2011-2013); Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas (deployed to Baghdad, 2009-2010); the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team in Iraq (2005–06); and U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. He is also the author of books, such as Why We Lost, Americans at War, The Battle for Hunger Hill, and Death Ground.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
February 25, 2015
I believe this is the last book by Daniel Bolger I'll read, which comes as a disappointing surprise.
His first book, "Dragons At War," was very good. It recounted his battalion's experience at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, when he was a captain leading one of that battalion's companies.
His novel "Feast of Bones" was also excellent, both as an action novel and as a portrayal of a military culture most Americans will never see or know much about.
I expected this book to be like "Dragons At War" scaled up. It is also an account of his unit's trip - actually two trips - to a demanding training center, the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This time Bolger was a lieutenant colonel leading a battalion, several times the size and complexity of the company he led as a captain in the first book.
It does offer a coherent, detailed recounting of those experiences, with interesting and potentially useful notes about the running of a battalion in combat-like training conditions and about some of the counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics that worked for them and others that didn't.
However, the intervening years have done no favors to Bolger's writing style. In "Dragons," he wrote about himself in the third person as he did everyone else, by rank and position rather than name. This time he names names, most often his own, and the way he writes about himself in the third person by name seemed, to me, at first stilted and kind of pompous, then increasingly tedious, and finally weird and unintentionally comical. "Lieutenant Colonel Bolger knew what to do."; " ... Dan Bolger insisted on ..."; "That gave Bolger heart."; and so on. I also had a problem with the at-times-scathing by-name recitals of his subordinates' mistakes. One of the basics of leadership I was taught in the Marine Corps was the principle "praise in public, chastize in private" - once they're past boot camp or OCS, you don't humiliate your people when they blow it. It's counterproductive, and more than that, it's wrong. Maybe the Army doesn't teach leaders that? If they do, he slept through class that day.
More important, his self-portrait is, to me, that of a leader who morally failed his people in a worse way. Bolger was understandably frustrated the first time he took his unit to Ft. Polk because so many of his soldiers were non-deployable for a variety of reasons. I can relate - I was a company commander in the Marine Corps, and I had the same problem at times. People I needed in the field weren't available and it hurt our performance.
He responded by transferring as many of the non-deployable soldiers out of the unit as he could, getting replacements he could take to the field. Also appropriate - I did the same thing to the extent I could.
But, as with the pointless public shaming of subordinates who were probably doing the best they knew how - the best he, as their CO, had trained them to be able to do - when he writes about the soldiers who he moved out because of their personal problems, he says things like "... Thinking about suicide? The excuses mattered little ... As in all units, a few lacked the manhood to measure up," and more in that vein.
One of the biggest problems the military has right now is getting service members who are in crisis to ask for and accept help. A person can become depressed, sometimes suicidal, for a lot of reasons. Among others, it's one of the common aftereffects of PTSD and traumatic brain injuries. But the culture that says if there's no bleeding visible, it's not a legitimate problem, makes it so hard to ask for help that a lot of people go on and kill themselves instead. We're talking about perhaps 20% of the veterans of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that's a lot of people who sacrificed mind and body for their country.
A commanding officer has life-or-death authority over his or her people. That means that CO also has life-or-death responsibility for their well-being. That means you let people know that you'll treat them with respect and dignity, make sure everyone else does the same, and get them the help they need. That's the right thing to do - not mocking them or belittling their "manhood." And beyond just being right, it's also the most effective thing to do - most of the time, once past the crisis, those people will be back and be doing their jobs effectively, and they will be among your most loyal.
And that business about "manhood" - what's the message there to the large and growing number of women in the military doing jobs that are just as hard and dangerous as those the men do? What century is this guy's mind in?
So when I read this, I lost all respect for Bolger as a soldier, as an officer, as a leader, and as a person. And when I have no respect for someone, I can't bring myself to read their books, watch their films, listen to their music, or whatever. Bolger retired as a lieutenant general. I'm sorry he made it to that high a rank - he probably abused and let down a lot of people with the power that gave him - and I'm glad he's retired. We don't need people like him in charge of the young men and women who step forward and offer their lives in service to the country. I wouldn't want him in charge of my son or daughter, that's for sure. I hope his old units are in better hands now.
His first book, "Dragons At War," was very good. It recounted his battalion's experience at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, when he was a captain leading one of that battalion's companies.
His novel "Feast of Bones" was also excellent, both as an action novel and as a portrayal of a military culture most Americans will never see or know much about.
I expected this book to be like "Dragons At War" scaled up. It is also an account of his unit's trip - actually two trips - to a demanding training center, the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This time Bolger was a lieutenant colonel leading a battalion, several times the size and complexity of the company he led as a captain in the first book.
It does offer a coherent, detailed recounting of those experiences, with interesting and potentially useful notes about the running of a battalion in combat-like training conditions and about some of the counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics that worked for them and others that didn't.
However, the intervening years have done no favors to Bolger's writing style. In "Dragons," he wrote about himself in the third person as he did everyone else, by rank and position rather than name. This time he names names, most often his own, and the way he writes about himself in the third person by name seemed, to me, at first stilted and kind of pompous, then increasingly tedious, and finally weird and unintentionally comical. "Lieutenant Colonel Bolger knew what to do."; " ... Dan Bolger insisted on ..."; "That gave Bolger heart."; and so on. I also had a problem with the at-times-scathing by-name recitals of his subordinates' mistakes. One of the basics of leadership I was taught in the Marine Corps was the principle "praise in public, chastize in private" - once they're past boot camp or OCS, you don't humiliate your people when they blow it. It's counterproductive, and more than that, it's wrong. Maybe the Army doesn't teach leaders that? If they do, he slept through class that day.
More important, his self-portrait is, to me, that of a leader who morally failed his people in a worse way. Bolger was understandably frustrated the first time he took his unit to Ft. Polk because so many of his soldiers were non-deployable for a variety of reasons. I can relate - I was a company commander in the Marine Corps, and I had the same problem at times. People I needed in the field weren't available and it hurt our performance.
He responded by transferring as many of the non-deployable soldiers out of the unit as he could, getting replacements he could take to the field. Also appropriate - I did the same thing to the extent I could.
But, as with the pointless public shaming of subordinates who were probably doing the best they knew how - the best he, as their CO, had trained them to be able to do - when he writes about the soldiers who he moved out because of their personal problems, he says things like "... Thinking about suicide? The excuses mattered little ... As in all units, a few lacked the manhood to measure up," and more in that vein.
One of the biggest problems the military has right now is getting service members who are in crisis to ask for and accept help. A person can become depressed, sometimes suicidal, for a lot of reasons. Among others, it's one of the common aftereffects of PTSD and traumatic brain injuries. But the culture that says if there's no bleeding visible, it's not a legitimate problem, makes it so hard to ask for help that a lot of people go on and kill themselves instead. We're talking about perhaps 20% of the veterans of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that's a lot of people who sacrificed mind and body for their country.
A commanding officer has life-or-death authority over his or her people. That means that CO also has life-or-death responsibility for their well-being. That means you let people know that you'll treat them with respect and dignity, make sure everyone else does the same, and get them the help they need. That's the right thing to do - not mocking them or belittling their "manhood." And beyond just being right, it's also the most effective thing to do - most of the time, once past the crisis, those people will be back and be doing their jobs effectively, and they will be among your most loyal.
And that business about "manhood" - what's the message there to the large and growing number of women in the military doing jobs that are just as hard and dangerous as those the men do? What century is this guy's mind in?
So when I read this, I lost all respect for Bolger as a soldier, as an officer, as a leader, and as a person. And when I have no respect for someone, I can't bring myself to read their books, watch their films, listen to their music, or whatever. Bolger retired as a lieutenant general. I'm sorry he made it to that high a rank - he probably abused and let down a lot of people with the power that gave him - and I'm glad he's retired. We don't need people like him in charge of the young men and women who step forward and offer their lives in service to the country. I wouldn't want him in charge of my son or daughter, that's for sure. I hope his old units are in better hands now.
March 18, 2014
Definitely a back to the future book: provides maneuver BN officers with an understanding of Decisive Action before the moniker was created. Excellent description of a training environment that requires simultaneous offense, defense, and stability operations. The only missing element from my experience is Security Force Assistance. This book also looks at organizational learning through individual learning in an organization (the Army) with significant and routine turnover. Much can be learned here.
March 31, 2018
I've liked everything I've read by Bolger.
This book showed a fascinating piece of training for the Army, and told me why I knew the Army could do a good job of fighting a modern guerrilla war. It was also why I was so disappointed with the Rumsfeld-dominated Pentagon in Iraq and Afghanistan-- the lessons learned here were not spread far enough among the service.
This book showed a fascinating piece of training for the Army, and told me why I knew the Army could do a good job of fighting a modern guerrilla war. It was also why I was so disappointed with the Rumsfeld-dominated Pentagon in Iraq and Afghanistan-- the lessons learned here were not spread far enough among the service.
July 23, 2008
Not bad but only for a select crowd. So unless you are an Army officer going to JRTC you can skip this one.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews