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Mechanisms of Perception
1969 HARDCOVER w/DUST JACKET
Hardcover
First published January 1, 1969
About the author
Jean Piaget
276 books696 followersJean Piaget (1896 - 1980) was a Swiss philosopher, natural scientist and developmental theorist, well known for his work studying children, his theory of cognitive development, and his epistemological view called "genetic epistemology." In 1955, he created the International Centre for Genetic Epistemology in Geneva and directed it until his death in 1980. According to Ernst von Glasersfeld, Jean Piaget was "the great pioneer of the constructivist theory of knowing."
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October 25, 2025
PIAGET LOOKS AT VARIOUS ISSUES ABOUT PERCEPTION
Jean Piaget (1896-1980) was a Swiss developmental psychologist known for his epistemological studies with children. His theory of cognitive development and epistemological view are known as "genetic epistemology.”
He wrote in the Foreword to this 1961 book, “This work represents an attempt to synthesize the studies on the development of perception which I started twenty or so years ago, when the Faculté des Sciences de Genève appointed me to the Chair of Experimental Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratory. Most of the studies have already appeared… There are, however, more than fifteen studies which have not been published and which we shall deal with in the course [of the] following pages…
“The need for a synthesis made itself felt primarily for practical reasons: it is forbidding to face forty or fifty separate articles, spread throughout a Review, contributed by different authors and presenting a quantity of not always homogeneous detail. A general survey of the results would facilitate their discussion. In providing this we will, of course, concern ourselves only with major issues, relegating matters of detail concerning techniques and statistical tables to the original publications.”
He states in the Introduction, “studies which we have undertaken … represent an attempt to resolve two general problems to which most specialists in perception … have paid little attention. (I.) The first of these problems is that of the relation between perception and intelligence… Two subsidiary problems of importance are involved. The first is whether notions, as is usually supposed, are abstracted from perception or if they merely make use of the products of perception, incorporating them into more complex systems which then correct and complete them with non-perceptual contributions. The second is to establish the analogies and differences which exist between the functioning of perception and that of intelligence, and between the various resulting structures. The second general problem … is that of the epistemological status of perception compared with that of other forms of knowledge.” (Pg. xv)
He asserts, “It must be understood that the real difference between a healthy psychology and neuro-physiology does not lie in the presence of mentalistic entities in the one and their rejection by the other: it exists, in our opinion, solely in the fact that neuro-physiology is exclusively CAUSAL while psychology is based on IMPLICATION. The reason is that the data of neuro-physiology are concerned within physio-chemical states which can be given purely causal explanations, while states of consciousness and mental behavior cannot be given causal explanations, but constitute only systems of significations or of significant actions which are inter-related by ‘implications’ in the broad sense of the term. A healthy psychology consists, in this case, in the replacement of the imprecise and incomplete implications of consciousness by logico-mathematical implications which constitute a coherent body of knowledge and which are adequate representations of experience.” (Pg. xxiii)
He outlines, “The illusions referred to as primary correspond to most of the optico-geometric illusions… The aim of this chapter is to try to reduce all these perceptual illusions, or deformations, to a single law by reducing each of them to certain constant relations which entail an over-estimation of the greater of two compared segments and an under-estimation of the smaller.” (Pg. 3)
He explains, “We have christened the law ‘the law of relative centrations,’ rather than simply ‘of centrations,’ in order to indicate that, even without knowing the absolute values of the effects of centration on a figure, the relative distributions of the error can be predicted from a knowledge of the relations determined by the structure of the figure.” (Pg. 109)
He states, “each of the six forms of temporal distribution of errors can be explained in terms of the one principle of the accession of encounters: the observed progression through a maximum derives from differences in the growth rate of encounters and supports the dual nature of the factors involved, encounters on the one hand and couplings between them on the other.” (Pg. 131)
He suggests, “Moreover, since perceptual activities themselves are only varieties of sensory-motor activity, it is likely that they too are subordinated from the beginning to sensory-motor activities as a whole. For example, it is surely of significance for the visual structuring of a figure that its form does or does not correspond to objects which were or were not manipulated at the same time as they were being visually perceived. This is only a hypothesis, of course, and will only be retained if supported by fresh data…” (Pg.. 296-297)
He argues, “It thus becomes obvious that the operational aspect of notions, what they add to perception, can derive only from a mechanism which is tied to action itself. It is at this point that our real problem becomes apparent. [Our] analyses… have all tended to underline the active character of perception and the subordination of field effects to perceptual activities. It might be thought that an interpretation would be preferred which reconciled the operational nature of notions, and the irreducible originality of the systems of transformation on which they are based, with their perceptual origins… However, this solution cannot be adopted for two important reasons … The first is that perceptual activity is never self-sufficient, particularly in those cases where a reasonably detailed analysis is possible… Perceptual activity only functions when integrated with, and directed by, action as a whole, which means by sensory-motor or even, from a certain level of development, by representational intelligence.” (Pg. 353)
He says in the concluding chapter, “A number of fundamental consequences therefore emerge for the respective roles of figurative and operative aspects of knowledge (or of configurational and of transformational structures). To understand these roles, we must again insist on the fact that logico-mathematical knowledge does not detach us from reality or from the world of objects, but only enlarges the world by incorporating into the set of all possible events.” (Pg. 358)
This book may interest those studying Piaget.
Jean Piaget (1896-1980) was a Swiss developmental psychologist known for his epistemological studies with children. His theory of cognitive development and epistemological view are known as "genetic epistemology.”
He wrote in the Foreword to this 1961 book, “This work represents an attempt to synthesize the studies on the development of perception which I started twenty or so years ago, when the Faculté des Sciences de Genève appointed me to the Chair of Experimental Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratory. Most of the studies have already appeared… There are, however, more than fifteen studies which have not been published and which we shall deal with in the course [of the] following pages…
“The need for a synthesis made itself felt primarily for practical reasons: it is forbidding to face forty or fifty separate articles, spread throughout a Review, contributed by different authors and presenting a quantity of not always homogeneous detail. A general survey of the results would facilitate their discussion. In providing this we will, of course, concern ourselves only with major issues, relegating matters of detail concerning techniques and statistical tables to the original publications.”
He states in the Introduction, “studies which we have undertaken … represent an attempt to resolve two general problems to which most specialists in perception … have paid little attention. (I.) The first of these problems is that of the relation between perception and intelligence… Two subsidiary problems of importance are involved. The first is whether notions, as is usually supposed, are abstracted from perception or if they merely make use of the products of perception, incorporating them into more complex systems which then correct and complete them with non-perceptual contributions. The second is to establish the analogies and differences which exist between the functioning of perception and that of intelligence, and between the various resulting structures. The second general problem … is that of the epistemological status of perception compared with that of other forms of knowledge.” (Pg. xv)
He asserts, “It must be understood that the real difference between a healthy psychology and neuro-physiology does not lie in the presence of mentalistic entities in the one and their rejection by the other: it exists, in our opinion, solely in the fact that neuro-physiology is exclusively CAUSAL while psychology is based on IMPLICATION. The reason is that the data of neuro-physiology are concerned within physio-chemical states which can be given purely causal explanations, while states of consciousness and mental behavior cannot be given causal explanations, but constitute only systems of significations or of significant actions which are inter-related by ‘implications’ in the broad sense of the term. A healthy psychology consists, in this case, in the replacement of the imprecise and incomplete implications of consciousness by logico-mathematical implications which constitute a coherent body of knowledge and which are adequate representations of experience.” (Pg. xxiii)
He outlines, “The illusions referred to as primary correspond to most of the optico-geometric illusions… The aim of this chapter is to try to reduce all these perceptual illusions, or deformations, to a single law by reducing each of them to certain constant relations which entail an over-estimation of the greater of two compared segments and an under-estimation of the smaller.” (Pg. 3)
He explains, “We have christened the law ‘the law of relative centrations,’ rather than simply ‘of centrations,’ in order to indicate that, even without knowing the absolute values of the effects of centration on a figure, the relative distributions of the error can be predicted from a knowledge of the relations determined by the structure of the figure.” (Pg. 109)
He states, “each of the six forms of temporal distribution of errors can be explained in terms of the one principle of the accession of encounters: the observed progression through a maximum derives from differences in the growth rate of encounters and supports the dual nature of the factors involved, encounters on the one hand and couplings between them on the other.” (Pg. 131)
He suggests, “Moreover, since perceptual activities themselves are only varieties of sensory-motor activity, it is likely that they too are subordinated from the beginning to sensory-motor activities as a whole. For example, it is surely of significance for the visual structuring of a figure that its form does or does not correspond to objects which were or were not manipulated at the same time as they were being visually perceived. This is only a hypothesis, of course, and will only be retained if supported by fresh data…” (Pg.. 296-297)
He argues, “It thus becomes obvious that the operational aspect of notions, what they add to perception, can derive only from a mechanism which is tied to action itself. It is at this point that our real problem becomes apparent. [Our] analyses… have all tended to underline the active character of perception and the subordination of field effects to perceptual activities. It might be thought that an interpretation would be preferred which reconciled the operational nature of notions, and the irreducible originality of the systems of transformation on which they are based, with their perceptual origins… However, this solution cannot be adopted for two important reasons … The first is that perceptual activity is never self-sufficient, particularly in those cases where a reasonably detailed analysis is possible… Perceptual activity only functions when integrated with, and directed by, action as a whole, which means by sensory-motor or even, from a certain level of development, by representational intelligence.” (Pg. 353)
He says in the concluding chapter, “A number of fundamental consequences therefore emerge for the respective roles of figurative and operative aspects of knowledge (or of configurational and of transformational structures). To understand these roles, we must again insist on the fact that logico-mathematical knowledge does not detach us from reality or from the world of objects, but only enlarges the world by incorporating into the set of all possible events.” (Pg. 358)
This book may interest those studying Piaget.
Displaying 1 of 1 review