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Banksters
1929...On Wall Street, during the worst financial crisis the world had ever seen, the word "Banksters" was coined to describe those ruthless individuals who had gambled away the country's wealth. 2009...The phrase "Banksters" is resurrected as David Murphy and Martina Devlin describe the shocking story of how the Irish banking system was brought to its knees by a corrupt elite driven by profit and greed.Banksters examines the events which triggered the near collapse of Ireland's banking system, when it unfolded that a privileged 'golden circle', caught up in a frenzy of greed and opportunism, had gambled and lost with the deposits and pensions of the Irish people.It charts how an unprecedented orgy of over-borrowing -- fuelled by bankers who threw out the rule book on lending and reckless tax breaks from cavalier politicians --caused a massively over-inflated property bubble. While bank shares climbed to dizzying heights, profits soared and executives earned enormous bonuses, those who cried 'stop!' were shouted down. But there was no promised 'soft landing' when, in September 2008, bankers overnight went from being pillars of society to pariahs. When the word 'Ireland' became synonymous with corruption in the global lending markets. When a generation learned it would pay a high price for the arrogance and greed of its business elite. Banksters is a hard-hitting read that, were it fiction, might not be believed. In describing the key players, their motivations, personalities and lavish lifestyles it poses the all-important who is answerable -- and will all the culprits be called to account?
- GenresBusiness
320 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2009
6 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
February 10, 2018
Largely unimpressed with the book, it read like a school textbook with odd bits of commentary thrown in. It went into detail in all the wrong places, going to great pains to inform of us the schools each and every banker went to and the number of acres on their properties, but skimmed over jargon and processes that could use explanation. Also did not have an index to cross-check all the acronyms, but for this I blame the financial sector. It was comprehensive in a way I suppose, but all the crucial bits probably could have found their way into a lengthy article in the Irish times.
August 9, 2012
In Banksters, RTE business correspondent, David Murphy, and Martina Devlin, columnist with the Irish Independent, seek to chart the rise, collapse and rescuing of the Irish banking system. The story they tell is split into four parts – the origins of the crisis, an overview of each of the banks and the key banking officials, the crisis, and the fallout.
Like Frank McDonald and Kathy Sheridan’s, The Builders, Banksters largely focuses on individual actors (bankers, regulators, and politicians), their careers and their decisions. It is certainly the case that Ireland had some maverick bankers – Sean FitzPatrick at Anglo Irish Bank and Michael Fingleton at Irish Nationwide Building Society – who used their institutions as their own private finance houses and were loose and fast with banking practice. It is also the case that there were many other bankers who lost sight of the long-term as the euro signs clouded their vision and who became much too cosy with developers. It may well have also been the case that the chiefs of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator were not strong enough to take on the bankers. But all that said, whilst individuals did play a role, it was a systemic failure of financial governance that lies at the heart of the banking crisis, and the responsibility for that rests with government. Individuals act within an institutional and legal system which is framed by policy. If the system and policy framing is inadequate or flawed then problems will inevitably arise.
Reading between the lines, and moving beyond the actors, what Banksters ultimately demonstrates is that it is extremely dangerous to use a property bubble as an engine of growth, especially within a neoliberalised economy where regulation is essentially left to the free market. If history has taught us anything, it is that bankers and developers – the arch-capitalists and short term, greed merchants – cannot be trusted to work for the greater good of society. If left to their own devices they line their own pockets. And yet, we chose to ignore history; to be suckered into thinking that this time round it would be different – that banking could be left to the bankers. It may well have been the case that 980 people worked in the Central Bank and Financial Regulator but they didn’t have the mandate or the tools to rein in what the banks were doing, and government policy was one of free-market, pro-growth. The lesson, once again, is that banking is too important to be left to bankers. And while politicians, developers and bankers insist that they were victims of a global financial meltdown, this is highly disingenuous given that were many countries, such as Canada, Spain, and Australia, that weathered the storm reasonably well because they had properly overseen their banks.
Banksters is what I’d call an okay read. It provides an overview of the banking crisis to date in Ireland, but by focusing on individual actors and a day by day account of the crisis it fails to move beyond description to explain in detail why the crisis arose. The narrative is a little uneven in places, with a couple of chapters being noticeably weak, and the ordering of the material seems a little odd at times. The first two and last two chapters are the strongest, providing a coherent summary of the crisis and raising important questions that need to be reflected on and answered. Overall, the book sets out the crisis in an engaging fashion and easy to understand terms, helping to expose in limited terms how Ireland’s Celtic Tiger was a cleverly disguised paper tiger.
Like Frank McDonald and Kathy Sheridan’s, The Builders, Banksters largely focuses on individual actors (bankers, regulators, and politicians), their careers and their decisions. It is certainly the case that Ireland had some maverick bankers – Sean FitzPatrick at Anglo Irish Bank and Michael Fingleton at Irish Nationwide Building Society – who used their institutions as their own private finance houses and were loose and fast with banking practice. It is also the case that there were many other bankers who lost sight of the long-term as the euro signs clouded their vision and who became much too cosy with developers. It may well have also been the case that the chiefs of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator were not strong enough to take on the bankers. But all that said, whilst individuals did play a role, it was a systemic failure of financial governance that lies at the heart of the banking crisis, and the responsibility for that rests with government. Individuals act within an institutional and legal system which is framed by policy. If the system and policy framing is inadequate or flawed then problems will inevitably arise.
Reading between the lines, and moving beyond the actors, what Banksters ultimately demonstrates is that it is extremely dangerous to use a property bubble as an engine of growth, especially within a neoliberalised economy where regulation is essentially left to the free market. If history has taught us anything, it is that bankers and developers – the arch-capitalists and short term, greed merchants – cannot be trusted to work for the greater good of society. If left to their own devices they line their own pockets. And yet, we chose to ignore history; to be suckered into thinking that this time round it would be different – that banking could be left to the bankers. It may well have been the case that 980 people worked in the Central Bank and Financial Regulator but they didn’t have the mandate or the tools to rein in what the banks were doing, and government policy was one of free-market, pro-growth. The lesson, once again, is that banking is too important to be left to bankers. And while politicians, developers and bankers insist that they were victims of a global financial meltdown, this is highly disingenuous given that were many countries, such as Canada, Spain, and Australia, that weathered the storm reasonably well because they had properly overseen their banks.
Banksters is what I’d call an okay read. It provides an overview of the banking crisis to date in Ireland, but by focusing on individual actors and a day by day account of the crisis it fails to move beyond description to explain in detail why the crisis arose. The narrative is a little uneven in places, with a couple of chapters being noticeably weak, and the ordering of the material seems a little odd at times. The first two and last two chapters are the strongest, providing a coherent summary of the crisis and raising important questions that need to be reflected on and answered. Overall, the book sets out the crisis in an engaging fashion and easy to understand terms, helping to expose in limited terms how Ireland’s Celtic Tiger was a cleverly disguised paper tiger.
August 10, 2009
Interesting analysis on the current banking crisis, without being too heavy a read
February 12, 2012
A very readable book that gives a good overview of the run-up to the banking debacle.
January 26, 2013
I registered a book at BookCrossing.com!
http://www.BookCrossing.com/journal/11665803
http://www.BookCrossing.com/journal/11665803
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews