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Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War
Wars are not fought by politicians and generals--they are fought by soldiers. Written by a combat veteran of the Vietnam War, Not a Gentleman's War is about such soldiers--a gritty, against-the-grain defense of the much-maligned junior officer. Conventional wisdom holds that the junior officer in Vietnam was a no-talent, poorly trained, unmotivated soldier typified by Lt. William Calley of My Lai infamy. Drawing on oral histories, after-action reports, diaries, letters, and other archival sources, Ron Milam debunks this view, demonstrating that most of the lieutenants who served in combat performed their duties well and effectively, serving with great skill, dedication, and commitment to the men they led. Milam's narrative provides a vivid, on-the-ground portrait of what the platoon leader training his men, keeping racial tensions at bay, and preventing alcohol and drug abuse, all in a war without fronts. Yet despite these obstacles, junior officers performed admi
256 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
April 3, 2025
The Vietnam War was in many way a platoon and company-level war. Larger units were administrative, a battalion or division smeared across miles of jungle outposts and patrols linked by helicopters. As such, 1st and 2nd Lieutenants were primary leadership of the war. Milam is a Vietnam veteran, one of those tens of thousands of lieutenants, and this book is a serious study of training and leadership in the field during the Vietnam War, an attempt to correct the impression that these officers were poorly trained and not up to the task, and a morally pointed, if logically diffuse, rejection of Lt. Calley and the My Lai massacre.
On the first part, as the United States embarked on an escalation of the Vietnam War, senior leaders knew that more infantry platoons would require more lieutenants to lead them. Officers enter the army in three ways. An influential but decided minority are graduates of West Point, 4 year specialists in the profession of arms. The Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) combined traditional 4-year college with military classes and summer training, creating citizen soldiers. And Officer Candidate School (OCS) picks up the best of the enlisted, and in six months turns them into officers.
As Milam explores, West Point contributed between 500 and 800 lieutenants per year to the Army, but only about 25% of these chose combat arms in Vietnam as their first assignment. ROTC enrollment dropped from a high of 140,000 in 1966 to 42,000 in 1972. OCS had to fill the gap, and could be rapidly scaled. While a man had to volunteer to become an officer, contemporaneous surveys revealed that most candidates choose to do so only under the pressure of being drafted otherwise. And while OCS expanded, Milam argues that quality was maintained: attrition was consistently between 25% and 30%. Personally, I find it easy to believe that the OCS candidate pool in say, 1969, included people who would not be in that pool in 1963. Yet there was not the wholesale abandonment of standards associated with the shameful Project 100000. A majority of OCS graduates had some college education, and I do believe that the system as a whole did a solid job generating competent leaders.
The latter half of the book brings this notion of competence up against the realities of Vietnam. The simple fact is the much combat was on the Viet Cong's terms, ambushes and booby traps as balanced against American firepower. The infantry's job was to locate the enemy so he could be obliterated with air and artillery, and these search-and-destroy tactics were crudely executed. Similarly, the American military comprehensively failed in its "hearts and minds" efforts. In defense of Milam and his fellow veterans, I'm not sure any military force in history could have succeeded in these missions. Jungle warfare is punishingly difficult. There is no kind or easy way to expel an entire village from its home, even if you speak the language and share a culture.
A second matter was one of maintaining discipline, the balance between grunt and gentleman. Lieutenants lead from the front, sharing the exact same conditions as their men. They suffered proportionally higher casualties. Six month combat rotations, as compared to a full year for the enlisted, was the major benefit officers assumed, though this came at the cost of combat efficiency as new lieutenants had to learn the hard lessons repeatedly. Combat leaders were never spit and polish soldiers. Milam argues that much of the breakdown that the army experienced in Vietnam: drugs, race riots, fragging, was a rear echelon problem and that combat troops could and did keep it together in the field.
My Lai and Lt. Calley loom over this book like a phantom. Milam regards Calley's murderous rampage as a personal stain on his honor. Officers are supposed to direct and unleash violence, and it is profoundly unfit to do so on women and children. Yet, as Browning's Ordinary Men demonstrates, massacres are never far away from the soldier. Calley bore ultimate responsibility for his choices, but he was primed by his superiors, thirsty for a body count, confident that My Lai was a VC village, and hungry for blood. Lieutenants were not responsible for the "mere g***" (racial slur) ideology of the war, but neither did they as a group stand against it.
As a dissertation, this book has the weaknesses of junior scholarship, but it also offers a valuable systematic examination of an aspect of the war that I've usually seen treated in individual memoirs.
On the first part, as the United States embarked on an escalation of the Vietnam War, senior leaders knew that more infantry platoons would require more lieutenants to lead them. Officers enter the army in three ways. An influential but decided minority are graduates of West Point, 4 year specialists in the profession of arms. The Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) combined traditional 4-year college with military classes and summer training, creating citizen soldiers. And Officer Candidate School (OCS) picks up the best of the enlisted, and in six months turns them into officers.
As Milam explores, West Point contributed between 500 and 800 lieutenants per year to the Army, but only about 25% of these chose combat arms in Vietnam as their first assignment. ROTC enrollment dropped from a high of 140,000 in 1966 to 42,000 in 1972. OCS had to fill the gap, and could be rapidly scaled. While a man had to volunteer to become an officer, contemporaneous surveys revealed that most candidates choose to do so only under the pressure of being drafted otherwise. And while OCS expanded, Milam argues that quality was maintained: attrition was consistently between 25% and 30%. Personally, I find it easy to believe that the OCS candidate pool in say, 1969, included people who would not be in that pool in 1963. Yet there was not the wholesale abandonment of standards associated with the shameful Project 100000. A majority of OCS graduates had some college education, and I do believe that the system as a whole did a solid job generating competent leaders.
The latter half of the book brings this notion of competence up against the realities of Vietnam. The simple fact is the much combat was on the Viet Cong's terms, ambushes and booby traps as balanced against American firepower. The infantry's job was to locate the enemy so he could be obliterated with air and artillery, and these search-and-destroy tactics were crudely executed. Similarly, the American military comprehensively failed in its "hearts and minds" efforts. In defense of Milam and his fellow veterans, I'm not sure any military force in history could have succeeded in these missions. Jungle warfare is punishingly difficult. There is no kind or easy way to expel an entire village from its home, even if you speak the language and share a culture.
A second matter was one of maintaining discipline, the balance between grunt and gentleman. Lieutenants lead from the front, sharing the exact same conditions as their men. They suffered proportionally higher casualties. Six month combat rotations, as compared to a full year for the enlisted, was the major benefit officers assumed, though this came at the cost of combat efficiency as new lieutenants had to learn the hard lessons repeatedly. Combat leaders were never spit and polish soldiers. Milam argues that much of the breakdown that the army experienced in Vietnam: drugs, race riots, fragging, was a rear echelon problem and that combat troops could and did keep it together in the field.
My Lai and Lt. Calley loom over this book like a phantom. Milam regards Calley's murderous rampage as a personal stain on his honor. Officers are supposed to direct and unleash violence, and it is profoundly unfit to do so on women and children. Yet, as Browning's Ordinary Men demonstrates, massacres are never far away from the soldier. Calley bore ultimate responsibility for his choices, but he was primed by his superiors, thirsty for a body count, confident that My Lai was a VC village, and hungry for blood. Lieutenants were not responsible for the "mere g***" (racial slur) ideology of the war, but neither did they as a group stand against it.
As a dissertation, this book has the weaknesses of junior scholarship, but it also offers a valuable systematic examination of an aspect of the war that I've usually seen treated in individual memoirs.
February 21, 2021
This book was given to me by my father, who was a high school classmate of Ron Milam. Being a junior officer in the Marine Corps, I deeply appreciated this book. Since I have been in the Marine Corps, I have been drawn to books about lieutenants who lead in Vietnam. Their task was not easy and Mr. Milam does a superb job of portraying this. I was fascinated by this book, it instantly went to the top of my favorite books about Vietnam.
The consensus amongst military leaders and the "angry colonels" is that the junior officers were to blame for our failures in Vietnam. Mr. Milam dissects why that is absolutely not the case. He unveils that the young officers, by and large, fought valiantly and did right by the men they lead given the awful hand they were dealt.
Mr. Milam writes extremely well and breaks down how the Army fielded it's junior officers during the war, how they treated them, and what they expected of them. You can obviously tell the man did countless hours of research and studying, aside from being a combat leader in Vietnam himself (although he hardly mentions his own experiences). He explains the strategy of the generals in charge and explains how the enemy "body count" became more prevalent than ever. My favorite topics touched on were the relationships the junior officer had with their men and the challenges they faced leading them in a uniquely brutal war while racism and civil unrest unfolded in the states. It was very engaging start to finish and I highly recommend it. I thank him for defending the brave men who answered their nations call to lead men in combat in what was "not a gentlemen's war". Mr. Milam is the epitome of an officer and a gentleman. Semper Fidelis.
The consensus amongst military leaders and the "angry colonels" is that the junior officers were to blame for our failures in Vietnam. Mr. Milam dissects why that is absolutely not the case. He unveils that the young officers, by and large, fought valiantly and did right by the men they lead given the awful hand they were dealt.
Mr. Milam writes extremely well and breaks down how the Army fielded it's junior officers during the war, how they treated them, and what they expected of them. You can obviously tell the man did countless hours of research and studying, aside from being a combat leader in Vietnam himself (although he hardly mentions his own experiences). He explains the strategy of the generals in charge and explains how the enemy "body count" became more prevalent than ever. My favorite topics touched on were the relationships the junior officer had with their men and the challenges they faced leading them in a uniquely brutal war while racism and civil unrest unfolded in the states. It was very engaging start to finish and I highly recommend it. I thank him for defending the brave men who answered their nations call to lead men in combat in what was "not a gentlemen's war". Mr. Milam is the epitome of an officer and a gentleman. Semper Fidelis.
July 26, 2022
Very good book about a subject neglected by most military historians. Excellent notes indicating tedious research and dedication. I would suggest this book to the multitude of Vietnam historians who blindly look at junior officers as an excuse for the disaster in Vietnam. I would note that I was an OCS graduate who was a MAT Team Leader in the Delta.
February 16, 2025
Read for my Vietnam War class (taught by Dr. Milam himself!). Very interesting book, especially the latter half. For being completely new to the history of the Vietnam War, I have a new appreciation for junior officers.
November 14, 2009
Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War is the story of the 5,069 junior officers who died in Vietnam as well as the ones who survived. We are reminded all officers had volunteered to lead men in battle. Based on Ron Milam’s detailed and thorough research, Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War gives an excellent analysis of these men. The author has the rare combination of scholarly research and with an easy reading text. The book is divided into two main parts.
Part one views the future officers and officers in the United States. It examines their officer training programs: West Point, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The selection, training, and evaluation process of each is explained in detail. We see how the army ramped up for the increased demand in officers. We feel the arrogance of the West Point educated toward the Infantry Officer Basic Course and the slow change of curriculum at the United States Military Academy. We learn that the majority of officers were commissioned through ROTC. We find out the selection standards were not lowered for OCS. We are reminded that changing views on campus impacted the world views of men commissioned through ROTC.
Part two has the young officer in Vietnam. The four chapters in this section examine the junior officer’s performance as combat leaders. We experience the life and death tests they faced. We confront the myths about the men. We experience the different leadership challenges of being on a mission in the field and being in a firebase or in garrison such as preventing alcohol and drug abuse as well as racial tensions.
Myths about the Vietnam War say the junior officer was a no-talent, inadequately trained, and unenthusiastic soldier. Lt. William Calley of My Lai often is held up as the typical junior officer baby killer. Ron Milam debunks this view with detailed research including oral histories, after-action reports, diaries, letters, and other records.
The author has excellent primary resource materials. He clearly shows that most of the lieutenants who served in combat performed their duties well. The junior officers were effective. They served with great skill. While they were not always clean shaven and often had mud on their boots, they were dedicated and committed to the men they led. Ron Milam's story provides a vibrant, you-are-there portrayal of what the platoon leader faced and his ability to meet the challenges as documented by field reports and evaluations of their superior officers.
This is a book that all students of the Vietnam War should read. I encourage all military officers to read the book as well. Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War should be in every college library in the world. Ron Milam has written an excellent book. Dr. Milam is assistant professor of military history at Texas tech University.
On a personal level, the book helped me better understand my own experience as an US Army officer. I received my officer training through the ROTC between 1971 and 1975. Some of the training I received was based on decisions explained in the book.
Part one views the future officers and officers in the United States. It examines their officer training programs: West Point, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The selection, training, and evaluation process of each is explained in detail. We see how the army ramped up for the increased demand in officers. We feel the arrogance of the West Point educated toward the Infantry Officer Basic Course and the slow change of curriculum at the United States Military Academy. We learn that the majority of officers were commissioned through ROTC. We find out the selection standards were not lowered for OCS. We are reminded that changing views on campus impacted the world views of men commissioned through ROTC.
Part two has the young officer in Vietnam. The four chapters in this section examine the junior officer’s performance as combat leaders. We experience the life and death tests they faced. We confront the myths about the men. We experience the different leadership challenges of being on a mission in the field and being in a firebase or in garrison such as preventing alcohol and drug abuse as well as racial tensions.
Myths about the Vietnam War say the junior officer was a no-talent, inadequately trained, and unenthusiastic soldier. Lt. William Calley of My Lai often is held up as the typical junior officer baby killer. Ron Milam debunks this view with detailed research including oral histories, after-action reports, diaries, letters, and other records.
The author has excellent primary resource materials. He clearly shows that most of the lieutenants who served in combat performed their duties well. The junior officers were effective. They served with great skill. While they were not always clean shaven and often had mud on their boots, they were dedicated and committed to the men they led. Ron Milam's story provides a vibrant, you-are-there portrayal of what the platoon leader faced and his ability to meet the challenges as documented by field reports and evaluations of their superior officers.
This is a book that all students of the Vietnam War should read. I encourage all military officers to read the book as well. Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War should be in every college library in the world. Ron Milam has written an excellent book. Dr. Milam is assistant professor of military history at Texas tech University.
On a personal level, the book helped me better understand my own experience as an US Army officer. I received my officer training through the ROTC between 1971 and 1975. Some of the training I received was based on decisions explained in the book.
August 11, 2023
Eye-opening and well done.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews