Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology)

Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology

by Joseph LaPorte

According to the received tradition, the language used to refer to natural kinds in scientific discourse remains stable even as theories about these kinds are refined. Hence, scientists discover, rather than stipulate, that sentences like 'Whales are mammals, not fish' are true. In this illuminating book, Joseph LaPorte argues that scientists do not discover that sentences about natural kinds, like 'Whales are mammals, not fish', are true rather than false. Instead, scientists find that these sentences were vague in the language of earlier speakers, and they refine the meanings of the relevant natural-kind terms to make sentences true. Hence, scientists change the meanings of these terms. This conclusion prompts LaPorte to examine the consequences of this change in meaning for the issue of incommensurability and for the progress of science.

Genres: Philosophy

232 pages, Paperback

First published December 8, 2003

Reviews

[Erin · Rating 5 out of 5]

I wrote a proper review of this, though it may or may not be a terrible review?
I don't believe I got across the point that I loved the book.
It was just this one glaring issue in an otherwise fantastic study...

Anyway:



Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change, Joseph Laporte, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 221p., $80.00. ISBN 0521825997

Joseph LaPorte’s Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change addresses, and subsequently rejects, beliefs he feels are commonly held in the discourses of both the philosophy of science and language.
Central to a substantial portion of his book is LaPorte’s rejection of the idea that scientists discover the essences of natural kinds. Instead, he explicates the view that scientists stipulate a natural kind’s referent; he explicitly focuses on biological and chemical kinds. Scientific theories, as such, hinge on seemingly arbitrary decisions, contingent on a multitude of factors.
LaPorte begins by explicating the concept of natural kinds, as well as their relationship to the Kripkean concept of rigid designation. While the overall views of his book are novel, eloquent, and well-defended, this initial discussion of a natural kind’s relationship to rigid designation lacks a proper logical defense, feeling as though he has assumed his reader will accept his claims before making his arguments. He explains that a natural kind’s definition, such as ‘Water is H2O,’ does not operate in the same respect as “Cicero=Tully”. Rather, that a natural kind’s definition is a description of that kind, instead of a name. These descriptions are subject to revision, though still manage, somehow, to maintain a kind of rigidity for a time. By this, a natural kind term’s rigidity is based on a historical essence. He cites his own arguments as “a generous interpretation of rigidity,” though fails to justify granting such rigidity to a natural kind term without having to abandon his more explicit thesis of scientific stipulation rather than discovery. (pp.37-43)
From here he undergoes a defense of the claim that biological species are natural kinds, rather than individuals. What follows are his discussions of species, in which he demonstrates a refinement of a natural kind term that excludes a previous member of the kind, focusing on whether or not guinea pigs are rodents, as was previously believed. LaPorte explains that the (new) statement, “Guinea pigs are not rodents,” was not discovered by scientists. Instead, the meaning of the kind term ‘rodent’ was changed, though it could have been just as plausible to decide on a more inclusive meaning of the term.
Chapter four’s aim is an illumination of chemical kinds in the same respect that he has treated biological kinds, such as species. Chemical kinds, such as water and gold, are discussed, leading into another demonstration of the arbitrary decisions of scientists through his discussions on jade. Upon discovery of a second chemical compound that nearly mirrors the original jade’s functionality as well as its descriptive parameters, scientists were faced with a decision on how to treat this ‘new’ compound. Unlike the example of the guinea pig, language-users deferring to the expertise of scientists were not directed to alter their usage of the term. Instead, jade became a more complicated term that encompasses an alliance of two natural kinds.
LaPorte’s focus in chapters five and six center on issues in the philosophy of language that are generally associated, and accepted, within discussions of natural kind terms. The first of these issues is the belief, based on Putnam, Kripke and the causal theory of reference, that a natural-kind term’s meaning remains stable throughout changes in scientific theory. LaPorte rejects this supposed promise that meaning change may claim stability even in the face of theoretical change. Based on his examples in his chapters on biological and chemical kinds, I find the argument to be both well-researched and convincing.
The second linguistic issue LaPorte addresses in the later chapters is based on Quine and his attacks on analyticity. For the Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference, statements (regarding natural kinds) may be necessary, though not analytic. Those who agree with the causal theory of reference may commit themselves to a posteriori necessities while denying the much disputed issue of analyticity. LaPorte denies this, believing that necessity implies analyticity, and that to reconcile this, we must dismiss Quine’s attacks on analyticity. Overall, LaPorte’s Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change is thought-provoking as well as convincing. The only ideas I remain skeptical of are that of a natural kind term’s rigidity, and his dismissal of Quine’s attacks on analyticity. However, I would encourage everyone with an interest in language or science, expert and novice alike, to read this work.