The War After The War: Strategic Lessons Of Iraq And Afghanistan

by Anthony H. Cordesman

The United States still has every chance to achieve some form of victory in Iraq and Afghanistan if it persists, commits the necessary resources, and accepts the real-world limits on what it can do. But the United States can also lose the peace in both countries as decisively as it won the wars. No one can predict how the combination of nation building, low-intensity combat, and Iraqi and Afghan efforts to recreate their nations will play out over the short term. Regardless, the United States must reshape much of its approach to both countries if it is to win even a limited form of victory. More generally, it must react to the strategic and grand strategic lessons of both conflicts to reshape its defense and foreign policy, as well as the way the U.S. government is organized to deal with terrorism and asymmetric warfare. Following up on his widely praised 2003 book, The Iraq War, Anthony Cordesman now focuses on the war after the war, the lessons to be learned from the "post-conflict" periods, and how they all fit into the broader context of the continuing war on terrorism.

96 pages, Paperback

First published June 1, 2004

Reviews

[Steven Peterson]

Anthony Cordesman is an expert in strategic studies and Middle East policy. He has served as a national security assistant to Senator John McCain, as director of intelligence assessment for the Department of Defense, and so on. In short, an experienced observer and actor in foreign policy. This short book attempts to derive lessons from American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.

He focuses on a series of topics in his brief analysis: (a) the realities of Iraq, (b) the strategic context of the war in Iraq (e.g., the problems of water and struggling economies in Northern Africa and the Middle East), (c) scenarios for American engagement (from departure, through hanging on as Iraq becomes independent, to Iraq becoming a shining beacon for the region), (d) the strategy and risk of strategic overreach.

Furthermore, he points out that we must be prepared to deal with other potential crises, and not lose sight of such possible flashpoints as Iran, North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, Colombia, and so on.

In the close of the book, he notes that patience is critical if there is to be any chance of success. He says that (page 71) "The image of a quick and decisive victory is almost always an illusion, but it is the image many Americans want and expect." Also, he concludes that bipartisanship is critical if there is to be success, and that neither a neoconservative nor neoliberal perspective is up to the task. Given the situation in 2007, his comments appear almost naive in retrospect. No bipartisanship, no commitment for the long term, no theoretical or ideological perspective that has any consensus from leaders and the public. Success looks even further away, although the future can always hold surprises.