An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry

by Bertrand Russell

An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry was first published in 1897 when Bertrand Russell was 25 years old. It marks his first major foray into analytic philosophy, a movement in which Russell is one of the founding members and figurehead. It provides a brilliant insight into Russell's early philosophical thought and an engaging and authoritative introduction to the philosophical and logical foundations of geometry - a version of which was fundamental to Einstein's theory of relativity. Russell explores and introduces the concepts of geometry and their philosophical implications, including a historical overview of geometrical theory, making it an invaluable resource not only for students of philosophy but anyone interested in the origins of the thought of one of the twentieth century's most important and widely-read philosophers. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new Foreword by Michael Potter.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Mathematics, Essays

222 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1996

About the author

Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell, OM, FRS, was a Welsh philosopher, historian, logician, mathematician, advocate for social reform, pacifist, and prominent rationalist. Although he was usually regarded as English, as he spent the majority of his life in England, he was born in Wales, where he also died.

He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950 "in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought."

Reviews

[Jonathan Hockey · Rating 4 out of 5]

I think this is a really good work, really informative, even if wrong in some of its commitments and details. It also helped me to get a better grip on the real basis of Russell's later view of pluralism, as starts to develop more in his work on Leibniz and then in later works all the way up to and terminating with his lectures on the philosophy of logical atomism. After this he abandons pluralism in doctrine, if not in his own sentimental beliefs, for he moves to a view of empirical reality as not informed fundamentally by logic at all in its ontology, regressing to a Humean sceptical style of empiricism.