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Theism
The book ""Theism"" by John Stuart Mill is an exploration of the concept of God and the arguments for and against the existence of a supreme being. Mill examines various philosophical and theological arguments for the existence of God, including the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments. He also considers objections to these arguments, such as the problem of evil and the limits of human knowledge. Throughout the book, Mill emphasizes the importance of reason and evidence in the search for truth about God. He argues that belief in God should be based on a rational evaluation of the available evidence, rather than blind faith or superstition. In addition to his philosophical arguments, Mill also addresses practical issues related to theism, such as the role of religion in society and the relationship between faith and morality. He advocates for a tolerant and open-minded approach to religious differences, while also emphasizing the importance of critical thinking and rational inquiry. Overall, ""Theism"" is a comprehensive and thought-provoking exploration of one of the most fundamental and enduring questions of human existence.THIS 142 PAGE ARTICLE WAS EXTRACTED FROM THE Nature; The Utility Of Religion; And Theism, by John Stuart Mill. To purchase the entire book, please order ISBN 0766188671.This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the old original and may contain some imperfections such as library marks and notations. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions, that are true to their original work.
- GenresPhilosophyReligion
142 pages, Paperback
First published January 28, 1874
About the author
John Stuart Mill
2,025 books1,976 followersJohn Stuart Mill, English philosopher, political economist, civil servant and Member of Parliament, was an influential liberal thinker of the 19th century. He was an exponent of utilitarianism, an ethical theory developed by Jeremy Bentham, although his conception of it was very different from Bentham's.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
October 7, 2024
ONE OF THE FAMED UTILITARIAN PHILOSOPHER'S POSTHUMOUSLY-PUBLISHED ESSAYS ON RELIGION
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was a British philosopher (known as a Utilitarian), political economist and member of Parliament.
The essay "Theism" was the third of Mill's Three Essays on Religion; it was his last major written work, and was published the year after his death. He stated in the Introduction, "It being granted then that the legitimate conclusions of science are entitled to prevail over all opinions, however widely held, which conflict with them, and that the canons of scientific evidence which the successes and failures of two thousand years have established are applicable to all subjects on which knowledge is attainable, let us proceed to consider that place there is for religious beliefs on the platform of science, what evidences they can appeal to, such as science can recognize, and what foundation there is for the doctrines of religion considered as scientific theorems. In this inquiry we of course begin with natural religion, the doctrine of the existence and attributes of God."
He states in the First Part, "There is one conception of theism which is consistent, another which is radically inconsistent, with the most general truths that have been made known to us by scientific investigation. The one which is inconsistent is the conception of God governing the world by acts of variable will. The one which is consistent is the conception of a God governing the world by invariable laws. The primitive, and even, in our own day, the vulgar, conception of the divine rule is that the one God, like the many gods of antiquity, carries on the government of the world by special decrees... Although supposed to be omniscient and well as omnipotent, he is thought not to make up his mind until the moment of action... this view of the divine government [contradicts] the prescience and the perfect wisdom ascribed to the deity." (Pg. 9)
He rejects the First Cause argument: "The fact of experience... turns out to be, not that everything we know derives its existence from a cause, but only every event or change. There is in nature a permanent element, and also a changeable: the changes are always the effect of previous changes; the permanent existences, so far as we know, are not effects at all... when they begin to exist, their beginning is the effect of a cause. But their beginning to exist is not an object, it is an event... that which in an object begins to exist is that in it which belongs to the changeable element in nature: the outward form and the properties depending on mechanical or chemical combinations of its component parts...
"These are not known to us as beginning to exist: within the range of human knowledge they had no beginning, consequently no cause... Experience therefore affords no evidences, not even analogies, to justify our extending to the apparently immutable a generalization grounded only on our observation of the changeable." (Pg. 12-13)
He rejects the argument of William Paley's Natural Theology: "If I found a watch on an apparently desolate island, I should, indeed, infer that it had been left there by a human being; but... the inference would not be from marks of design, but because I already knew by direct experience that watches are made by men. I should draw the inference no less confidently from a footprint or any relic... which experience has taught me to attribute to man." (Pg. 28)
But he adds about the proposed evolutionary development of the eye, "there is something very startling, and prima facie improbable in this hypothetical history of nature. It would require us... to suppose that the primeval animal ... could not see and had at most slight preparation for seeing... One of the accidental variations... would at some time or other produce a variety that could see in some imperfect manner, and this peculiarity being transmitted by inheritance... a number of races would be produced who, by the power of even imperfect sight, would have a great advantage over all other creatures which could not see... The theory if admitted would be in no way inconsistent with creation... I think it must be allowed that in the present state of our knowledge that adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence." (Pg. 31-32)
He suggests, "there is a preponderance of evidence that the Creator desired the pleasure of his creatures... pleasure, when experienced, seems to result from the normal working of the machinery, while pain arises from some external interference with it and resembles in each particular case the result of an accident. Even in cases where pain results... the appearances do not indicate that contrivance was brought into play purposely to produce pain: what is indicated is rather a clumsiness in the contrivance employed for some other purpose... this may have been a necessary condition of it susceptibility to pleasure: a supposition which ... is an extremely probable one in the case of a contriver working under the limitation of inexorable laws and indestructible properties of matter." (Part Two, pg. 43)
About the idea of immortality, he says, "though we have no evidence, except negative, that the mental consciousness ceases forever when the functions of the brain are at an end, we do know that diseases of the brain disturb the mental functions and that decay or weakness of the brain enfeebles them. We have therefore sufficient evidence that cerebral action is, if not the cause, at least... a condition ... of mental operations; and that assuming the mind to be a distinct substance, its separation from the body would ... simply put a stop to its functions and remand it to unconsciousness unless and until some other set of conditions supervenes, capable of recalling it into activity, but the existence of which experience does not give us the smallest indication." (Part Three, pg. 47)
John Stuart Mill's writings are some of the most important of 19th century philosophy, and---particularly when compared to other 19th century figures such as Hegel, and Kierkegaard---most of his writings still seem pertinent and "contemporary." His writings on religion are of great interest to students of the philosophy of religion
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was a British philosopher (known as a Utilitarian), political economist and member of Parliament.
The essay "Theism" was the third of Mill's Three Essays on Religion; it was his last major written work, and was published the year after his death. He stated in the Introduction, "It being granted then that the legitimate conclusions of science are entitled to prevail over all opinions, however widely held, which conflict with them, and that the canons of scientific evidence which the successes and failures of two thousand years have established are applicable to all subjects on which knowledge is attainable, let us proceed to consider that place there is for religious beliefs on the platform of science, what evidences they can appeal to, such as science can recognize, and what foundation there is for the doctrines of religion considered as scientific theorems. In this inquiry we of course begin with natural religion, the doctrine of the existence and attributes of God."
He states in the First Part, "There is one conception of theism which is consistent, another which is radically inconsistent, with the most general truths that have been made known to us by scientific investigation. The one which is inconsistent is the conception of God governing the world by acts of variable will. The one which is consistent is the conception of a God governing the world by invariable laws. The primitive, and even, in our own day, the vulgar, conception of the divine rule is that the one God, like the many gods of antiquity, carries on the government of the world by special decrees... Although supposed to be omniscient and well as omnipotent, he is thought not to make up his mind until the moment of action... this view of the divine government [contradicts] the prescience and the perfect wisdom ascribed to the deity." (Pg. 9)
He rejects the First Cause argument: "The fact of experience... turns out to be, not that everything we know derives its existence from a cause, but only every event or change. There is in nature a permanent element, and also a changeable: the changes are always the effect of previous changes; the permanent existences, so far as we know, are not effects at all... when they begin to exist, their beginning is the effect of a cause. But their beginning to exist is not an object, it is an event... that which in an object begins to exist is that in it which belongs to the changeable element in nature: the outward form and the properties depending on mechanical or chemical combinations of its component parts...
"These are not known to us as beginning to exist: within the range of human knowledge they had no beginning, consequently no cause... Experience therefore affords no evidences, not even analogies, to justify our extending to the apparently immutable a generalization grounded only on our observation of the changeable." (Pg. 12-13)
He rejects the argument of William Paley's Natural Theology: "If I found a watch on an apparently desolate island, I should, indeed, infer that it had been left there by a human being; but... the inference would not be from marks of design, but because I already knew by direct experience that watches are made by men. I should draw the inference no less confidently from a footprint or any relic... which experience has taught me to attribute to man." (Pg. 28)
But he adds about the proposed evolutionary development of the eye, "there is something very startling, and prima facie improbable in this hypothetical history of nature. It would require us... to suppose that the primeval animal ... could not see and had at most slight preparation for seeing... One of the accidental variations... would at some time or other produce a variety that could see in some imperfect manner, and this peculiarity being transmitted by inheritance... a number of races would be produced who, by the power of even imperfect sight, would have a great advantage over all other creatures which could not see... The theory if admitted would be in no way inconsistent with creation... I think it must be allowed that in the present state of our knowledge that adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence." (Pg. 31-32)
He suggests, "there is a preponderance of evidence that the Creator desired the pleasure of his creatures... pleasure, when experienced, seems to result from the normal working of the machinery, while pain arises from some external interference with it and resembles in each particular case the result of an accident. Even in cases where pain results... the appearances do not indicate that contrivance was brought into play purposely to produce pain: what is indicated is rather a clumsiness in the contrivance employed for some other purpose... this may have been a necessary condition of it susceptibility to pleasure: a supposition which ... is an extremely probable one in the case of a contriver working under the limitation of inexorable laws and indestructible properties of matter." (Part Two, pg. 43)
About the idea of immortality, he says, "though we have no evidence, except negative, that the mental consciousness ceases forever when the functions of the brain are at an end, we do know that diseases of the brain disturb the mental functions and that decay or weakness of the brain enfeebles them. We have therefore sufficient evidence that cerebral action is, if not the cause, at least... a condition ... of mental operations; and that assuming the mind to be a distinct substance, its separation from the body would ... simply put a stop to its functions and remand it to unconsciousness unless and until some other set of conditions supervenes, capable of recalling it into activity, but the existence of which experience does not give us the smallest indication." (Part Three, pg. 47)
John Stuart Mill's writings are some of the most important of 19th century philosophy, and---particularly when compared to other 19th century figures such as Hegel, and Kierkegaard---most of his writings still seem pertinent and "contemporary." His writings on religion are of great interest to students of the philosophy of religion
May 18, 2025
John Stuart Mill has always been a favorite of mine. For a 19th century English gentleman he strikes me as ahead of his time, and his philosophy, while highly influential, remains very accessible and still relevant to the modern day. It helps that Mill seems like he was also generally not a total gremlin, which can't be said for many 19th century philosophers and Englishmen, but that's just me.
Theism is one of Mill's posthumously published essays where he dives into trying to understand what evidence there is for God, what kind of God they would be, and how hope integrates with our natural conclusions about the existence or non-existence of God. While many, if not all, of his arguments will not be new to one decently well-read on the topic and do have some holes, I still feel he takes a really interesting approach to them. Not only that, I find it a fascinating window into the past and how thoughts on theism and God evolved post-Darwin.
The concept of hope is one of the most interesting things he dives into. For, while Mill feels that there is some evidence (but far from proof) for a non-omnipotent God and none for historical miracles, he goes into the discussion of whether or not it is reasonable to have hope that some of these things: God, heaven, etc. are true. In his opinion: yes, absolutely, hope is legitimate and defensible. Dwelling on the evils of life unnecessarily is a waste of time and energy, why not choose hope for things that bring us comfort?
Here are some quotes I enjoyed:
"Experience has abated the ardent hopes once entertained of the regeneration of the human race by merely negative doctrine-by the destruction of superstition."
"Objections which apply equally to all evidence are valid against none. They only prove abstract fallibility."
"The true rule of practical wisdom is not that of making all the aspects of things equally prominent in our habitual contemplations, but of giving the greatest prominence to those of their aspects which depend on, or can be modified by, our own conduct."
Theism is one of Mill's posthumously published essays where he dives into trying to understand what evidence there is for God, what kind of God they would be, and how hope integrates with our natural conclusions about the existence or non-existence of God. While many, if not all, of his arguments will not be new to one decently well-read on the topic and do have some holes, I still feel he takes a really interesting approach to them. Not only that, I find it a fascinating window into the past and how thoughts on theism and God evolved post-Darwin.
The concept of hope is one of the most interesting things he dives into. For, while Mill feels that there is some evidence (but far from proof) for a non-omnipotent God and none for historical miracles, he goes into the discussion of whether or not it is reasonable to have hope that some of these things: God, heaven, etc. are true. In his opinion: yes, absolutely, hope is legitimate and defensible. Dwelling on the evils of life unnecessarily is a waste of time and energy, why not choose hope for things that bring us comfort?
Here are some quotes I enjoyed:
"Experience has abated the ardent hopes once entertained of the regeneration of the human race by merely negative doctrine-by the destruction of superstition."
"Objections which apply equally to all evidence are valid against none. They only prove abstract fallibility."
"The true rule of practical wisdom is not that of making all the aspects of things equally prominent in our habitual contemplations, but of giving the greatest prominence to those of their aspects which depend on, or can be modified by, our own conduct."
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