Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge: Reflections on Objectivist Epistemology

by Allan Gotthelf (editor), James G. Lennox (Editor)

The philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand (1905–1982) is a cultural phenomenon. Her books have sold more than twenty-eight million copies, and countless individuals speak of her writings as having significantly influenced their lives. Despite her popularity, Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism has received little serious attention from academic philosophers. Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge offers scholarly analysis of key elements of Ayn Rand’s radically new approach to epistemology. The four essays, by contributors intimately familiar with this area of her work, discuss Rand’s theory of concepts—including its new account of abstraction and essence—and its central role in her epistemology; how that view leads to a distinctive conception of the justification of knowledge; her realist account of perceptual awareness and its role in the acquisition of knowledge; and finally, the implications of that theory for understanding the growth of scientific knowledge. The volume concludes with critical commentary on the essays by distinguished philosophers with differing philosophical viewpoints and the author’s responses to those commentaries. This is the second book published in Ayn Rand Society Philosophical Studies, which was developed in conjunction with the Ayn Rand Society to offer a fuller scholarly understanding of this highly original and influential thinker. The Ayn Rand Society, an affiliated group of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, seeks to foster scholarly study by philosophers of the philosophical thought and writings of Ayn Rand.

Genres: Philosophy

312 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2013

Reviews

[Rúnar · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a book of academic essays in two parts, on the topic of Ayn Rand's theory of concepts. The first part is an exposition of various aspects of the theory, starting with perception and going towards a detailed discussion of the Objectivist epistemology which centers on concepts and induction. The second part of the book is a discussion which contains various critiques of the theory and answers to those critiques.

The first half is thoroughly enjoyable and thought-provoking. As a computer scientist interested in artificial intelligence, it has helped clarify what processes are necessary to a conceptual consciousness, and in broad strokes how one might go about building one. Of course, this is an epistemology text, not a "cognitive science" text, so the discussion here is at a very high level.

Nearly all the essays are very well written and the authors say what they mean in a clear and concise manner. A couple of the essays in the second half are a little bit all over the place, though. But the replies help distill what is important to the discussion at hand.

The second half devolves at the end into a disagreement about perceptual fallibilism vs infallibilism. This is unfortunate because the perceptual level is the least interesting part of the theory (the conceptual is where the meat is). It's also unfortunate that the fallibilists in the group give only very hand-wavy explanations of their position. The final essay nicely calls out the equivocations and makes a compelling case for infallibilism.

Definitely recommended for anyone interested in modern developments in epistemology.

[Gerardo Herrera · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book starts off amazingly strong but drags at the end. The authors get bogged down in the second half of the book, arguing minutiae rather than explaining how concepts affect our understanding of the world. Still a great and enlightening read.

[Gideon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent and detailed discussion and debate about Objectivist epistemology by academic experts.