This Element examines the main ethical aspects of consciousness It argues that consciousness is not intrinsically valuable but has value or disvalue for individuals depending on its phenomenology (what it is like to be aware) and content (what one is aware of). These two components of awareness shape normative judgments about how ordered, disordered, altered, restored, diminished and suppressed conscious states can benefit or harm individuals. They also influence moral judgments about whether intentionally causing these states is permissible or impermissible and how these states can affect behavior. After describing its neurobiological basis, this Element discusses ethical and legal issues in six categories of phenomenal and access consciousness; intraoperative awareness; prolonged disorders of consciousness, dissociative disorders, the role of consciousness in determining death; and altering and suppressing awareness near the end of life.
This is an introduction (part of Cambridge's Elements series) to some of the ethical aspects of consciousness. It discusses some of the philosophical ideas and sources around traditional questions like the treatment of those with severe damage to the brain and nervous system, the implications for moral responsibility of brain damage and the ethics of managing pain near the end of life. It examines these questions in light of the description yielded by philosophy of mind and the philosophy of neuroscience.
The book certainly deals seriously and in some depth with important issues. However the issues were important but not always conceptually rich as presented. Perhaps this reflects my relative lack of interest or expertise in the area. You may well find some of the issues touched on of interest or use.
The sources were handled as endnotes meaning they did not clutter the text, but also that figuring out what a source is may be somewhat tedious. The pdf I read this in was fine.