"I assume that … the following famous dictum adumbrates a the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meaning of its significant grammatical parts and of the grammatical relations in which these elements are embedded. If this componentialist thesis is to have some flesh on its bones, then we expect that a certain amount of syntactic cum semantic theory will be possible. A theory of … action sentences will include an account of the semantical role that is played by each syntactic unit … and, correlatively, an account of the way in which underlying grammatical relations help to determine a linguistic complex capable of bearing a truth value. "… There is, I think, a growing skepticism about the idea that a close consideration of language can play an important role in leading us to philosophical insight concerning philosophical matters that … do not fall immediately within the purview of the philosophy of language. It is one of the aims of this volume to provide evidence that, in at least one area, this is not so. … "It goes without saying that this work does not purport to offer anything like a complete semantical theory for our discourse about action. … Rather, what I have tried to do is to put forward various suggestions about the way in which I believe that a number of important problem areas should or might be dealt with. On some questions of less importance to my overall argument, I have merely mentioned what seems to me the most promising approach and done little more than glance at the supporting evidence. On other issues, more critical to later developments, I have attempted to assemble enough evidence of various kinds to render it plausible that the contentions I make are superior to other alternatives and are likely to withstand … the challenge of other sources of linguistic data not considered here." —Author's introduction