“Votes, Drugs, and Violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico” (Cambridge University Press, 2020) is an extraordinary book written by Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley (a role model, and someone I deeply admire). This publication is the result of a decade of hard work and research, and contains groundbreaking insights for anyone who studies violence, organized crime, and more generally, rule of law. Reading it was a delightful experience.
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The authors used a multi-method approach to explain three crucial moments in the development of Mexico’s drug wars. First, the outbreak of wars between criminal organizations, which began with party alternation at the state level throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (after decades of PRI hegemony). Second, the intensification of violence after the federal intervention led by Felipe Calderón (president from 2006 to 2012), when criminal groups fragmented (from 5 to 62 groups) and expanded their range of illicit activities beyond drug trafficking, to include new criminal markets, such as the illegal extraction of human wealth and natural resources. The authors claim that Calderón rushed to war, without a proper diagnosis and well-developed strategy, as an attempt to distract people’s attention from AMLO challenging the elections (p. 144). They also suggest that Calderón politicized the intervention, since he collaborated with co-partisan local authorities (PAN), but did not cooperate with leftist governments. Third, the expansion of war and violence to the spheres of local politics and civil society, with criminal organizations targeting municipal presidents and party leaders. This occurred because criminal organizations wanted to subdue local governments “to gain de facto territorial control over clusters of municipalities where they would develop subnational criminal governance regimes” (p. 216).
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Trejo and Ley make the strong assumption that organized crime can only exist in the gray zone of criminality (the area where the spheres of crime and state intersect), in which criminal groups enjoy some level of informal government protection. In addition, the authors suggest that changes in state power “that upsets the terms of engagement between the state and organized criminal groups can destabilize the gray zone, introducing uncertainty and generating incentives for large-scale criminal violence” (p. 10). Of course, this was possible in Mexico because the country experienced a thin democratic transition (electoral democracy), where post-authoritarian elites failed to reform the country’s security and judicial systems. This is why upholding the rule of law is so important!
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This book ends by delineating three policy implications. First, that in combating organized crime, “governments should focus on dismantling these networks through intelligence and judicial action”, rather than through militarized action (p. 293). Second that “policymakers should focus on creating institutional reforms that prevent presidents and executive authorities from making a partisan use of security agencies (…) and the judiciary” (p. 293). Third, that “when new democratic elites fail to reform authoritarian sources of state coercive power and leave a long history of state impunity for gross human rights violations intact –as Mexican political elites did in 2000– democratic institutions are likely to become intimately intertwined with organized crime” (p. 294-295).
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Finally, this book is very well written and structured: the authors outlined their assumptions, definitions, and findings in each section; every claim is well documented; and their methodology and results are clearly explained. FIVE STARS.