Philosophy and A Ruthlessly Reductive Account is the first book-length treatment of philosophical issues and implications in current cellular and molecular neuroscience. John Bickle articulates a philosophical justification for investigating "lower level" neuroscientific research and describes a set of experimental details that have recently yielded the reduction of memory consolidation to the molecular mechanisms of long-term potentiation (LTP). These empirical details suggest answers to recent philosophical disputes over the nature and possibility of psycho-neural scientific reduction, including the multiple realization challenge, mental causation, and relations across explanatory levels. Bickle concludes by examining recent work in cellular neuroscience pertaining to features of conscious experience, including the cellular basis of working memory, the effects of explicit selective attention on single-cell activity in visual cortex, and sensory experiences induced by cortical microstimulation.
While Bickle and Wimsatt appear to be at the diametrical poles regarding reduction and reductionism, fundamentally their projects are the same: Bickle calls his scientific philosophy--new wave metascience and Wimsatt calls his a reductionistic heuristics. Their differences lie merely in a difference of intuition, while Bickle gladly place his philosophy as one branch of science, Wimsatt tries to incorporate scientific attitude in his independent philosophical endeavor.