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What is Philosophy (Polity)
What is Metaphysics?
If we didn't possess certain beliefs about such things as time, appearance and reality, and how effect follows cause, we wouldn't be able to get out of bed in the morning, let alone read a book about metaphysics, which is the study of our experience and those ideas, or presuppositions, which allow us to make sense of it.
Drawing on examples from art, science, and daily life, John Heil shows how metaphysics begins in questioning our everyday assumptions about how the world "works" and ends with speculation on the nature of the universe itself. In chapters that cover the major topics in the academic study of metaphysics, from free will and consciousness to time and objectivity, Heil explains how metaphysical questions underpin everything human beings do.
This accessible book will show you how professional philosophers try to categorize and make sense of our world of perception and experience and explains why everyone should take metaphysics seriously.
Drawing on examples from art, science, and daily life, John Heil shows how metaphysics begins in questioning our everyday assumptions about how the world "works" and ends with speculation on the nature of the universe itself. In chapters that cover the major topics in the academic study of metaphysics, from free will and consciousness to time and objectivity, Heil explains how metaphysical questions underpin everything human beings do.
This accessible book will show you how professional philosophers try to categorize and make sense of our world of perception and experience and explains why everyone should take metaphysics seriously.
- GenresPhilosophy
205 pages, Kindle Edition
Published August 20, 2021
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October 2, 2022
A Major Yet Partial Accomplishment
by Thomas O. Scarborough
‘You might think,’ writes John Heil, ‘that the place to begin would be with a definition of “metaphysics” …’ Heil doesn’t—and there isn’t one. Yet as the book unfolds, it becomes clear that Heil knows exactly what he thinks metaphysics is.
This, however, is one of the strengths of this book. More often than not, metaphysics is what everybody else thinks. Heil not only sketches (some of) what everybody else thinks, but what he himself thinks. This is interesting, and useful, and thought-provoking.
It’s an old-fashioned metaphysics, really. While it is not in all cases easy to distinguish Heil himself from his discussion, it would seem that the following is his philosophy at bedrock. He writes, ‘Relations have been mentioned as an apt category, in addition to substance and property. Not only are there propertied substances, but there are arrangements of these.’ Then, add to this the claim that ‘objects have properties which empower them’. This is classic metaphysics, not far from Aristotle—however with some distinctive features:
1. Heil holds that judgments have truthmakers. This is of central importance to his philosophy. He refers to truthmakers nearly 70 times: ‘When something is true, something makes it true.’ Or does it? Truthmaking can be problematic, and Heil gives his own demonstration of this in section 10.4.
2. He holds that scientific theory is provisional. This is largely unstated in the book, but it is interesting: ‘For all we know, the universe comprises …’ (section 6.5). This is the new view (though not completely new) of science, which lately has become familiar even to ‘the man in the street’.
3. In spite of Heil’s stated, traditional approach, he points several times to a possible new direction. ‘If the universe turned out to be seamless …’ (section 9.4). A seamless universe, he writes, could solve fundamental problems of philosophy. This is a major focus of my own metaphysics.
Thanks to Kindle, I know that 5.4% of Heil’s references to color use blue, while 78.7% use red. He tends to do this with philosophy, too. There are some obvious blind spots. Kant? Kindle reports: ‘0 results found.’ Hegel? ‘0’. Heidegger? ‘0’. Dare we suggest Derrida? ‘0’. At the same time, Heil is warm towards (imported) Australian philosophers: Armstrong, Smart, Chalmers, and so on. Chinese philosophy? Indian? African? These are absent. So are major themes, such as postmodernism, linguistics, and (mostly) ethics.
I put section 1.2 of the book (‘Ontology’) through a grammar and style checker. Heil scored 0.07 for strength of style, which is good for philosophy—and 10.9 for readability, which is excellent. Some of the book, I think, is brilliant. For instance, chapter 5 (‘What Else There Is’), or chapter 10 (‘Free Will’). Some chapters drag a little—which may be inevitable for metaphysics anyway. The book is remarkably well integrated. This means that one sees philosophical subjects in their places, and how they belong to the whole.
I would add that there are two shortcomings of emphasis:
1. Apart from the mind-body problem, there seems to be too little emphasis on mind—and by his own admission, Heil leaves out abstracta. He seems conflicted as to the importance of mind. Yet nothing is without mind. As for reality, he holds that there are ‘mind-independent truthmakers’. That is, he is fairly much a realist—though not enough to dissuade him from philosophy.
2. There is too much emphasis on (fairly) simple objects: a billiard ball, a tomato, a horse. Yet it is not so much objects which are the problem, but the way in which we order them—and leave things out as we do. Consider, for instance, algorithms which perform billions of billions of calculations (which is, bring objects into relation with one another) which leave out the environment.
For what Heil does cover, and for what the book aims for in itself, I give Heil 4/4. 3/4 would not seem to do justice to a book which approaches a monumental work. For what he does not write, however, I give him 0/1—although some might commend him for who and what he leaves out!
--------------------------------------
A review of Kindle Cloud: I chose the Kindle Cloud purchase option. This failed to work on my preferred browser (which is fully up to date). Also, the book cut out when the Internet cut out (I am in Africa). Reloads didn’t present properly, it disabled my touch screen, and at one point disabled my navigation keys. The type was not crisp. Clicking on headings took one sometimes to the wrong sections, and Kindle Cloud apparently searched for lexemes, not words. This complicated specific searches: it failed, for example, to find multiple instances of ‘psychology’. Kindle Cloud gets 3/5.
Merged review:
A Major Though Partial Accomplishment
by Thomas O. Scarborough
‘You might think,’ writes John Heil, ‘that the place to begin would be with a definition of “metaphysics” …’ Heil doesn’t—and there isn’t one. Yet as the book unfolds, it becomes clear that Heil knows exactly what he thinks metaphysics is.
This, however, is one of the strengths of this book. More often than not, metaphysics is what everybody else thinks. Heil not only sketches (some of) what everybody else thinks, but what he himself thinks. This is interesting, and useful, and thought-provoking.
It’s an old-fashioned metaphysics, really. While it is not in all cases easy to distinguish Heil himself from his discussion, it would seem that the following is his philosophy at bedrock. He writes, ‘Relations have been mentioned as an apt category, in addition to substance and property. Not only are there propertied substances, but there are arrangements of these.’ Then, add to this the claim that ‘objects have properties which empower them’. This is classic metaphysics, not far from Aristotle—however with some distinctive features:
1. Heil holds that judgments have truthmakers. This is of central importance to his philosophy. He refers to truthmakers nearly 70 times: ‘When something is true, something makes it true.’ Or does it? Truthmaking can be problematic, and Heil gives his own demonstration of this in section 10.4.
2. He holds that scientific theory is provisional. This is largely unstated in the book, but it is interesting: ‘For all we know, the universe comprises …’ (section 6.5). This is the new view (though not completely new) of science, which lately has become familiar even to ‘the man in the street’.
3. In spite of Heil’s stated, traditional approach, he points several times to a possible new direction. ‘If the universe turned out to be seamless …’ (section 9.4). A seamless universe, he writes, could solve fundamental problems of philosophy. This is a major focus of my own metaphysics.
Thanks to Kindle, I know that 5.4% of Heil’s references to color use blue, while 78.7% use red. He tends to do this with philosophy, too. There are some obvious blind spots. Kant? Kindle reports: ‘0 results found.’ Hegel? ‘0’. Heidegger? ‘0’. Dare we suggest Derrida? ‘0’. At the same time, Heil is warm towards (imported) Australian philosophers: Armstrong, Smart, Chalmers, and so on. Chinese philosophy? Indian? African? These are absent. So are major themes, such as postmodernism, linguistics, and (mostly) ethics.
I put section 1.2 of the book (‘Ontology’) through a grammar and style checker. Heil scored 0.07 for strength of style, which is good for philosophy—and 10.9 for readability, which is excellent. Some of the book, I think, is brilliant. For instance, chapter 5 (‘What Else There Is’), or chapter 10 (‘Free Will’). Some chapters drag a little—which may be inevitable for metaphysics anyway. The book is remarkably well integrated. This means that one sees philosophical subjects in their places, and how they belong to the whole.
I would add that there are two shortcomings of emphasis:
1. Apart from the mind-body problem, there seems to be too little emphasis on mind—and by his own admission, Heil leaves out abstracta. He seems conflicted as to the importance of mind. Yet nothing is without mind. As for reality, he holds that there are ‘mind-independent truthmakers’. That is, he is fairly much a realist—though not enough to dissuade him from philosophy.
2. There is too much emphasis on (fairly) simple objects: a billiard ball, a tomato, a horse. Yet it is not so much objects which are the problem, but the way in which we order them—and leave things out as we do. Consider, for instance, algorithms which perform billions of billions of calculations (which is, bring objects into relation with one another) which leave out the environment.
For what Heil does cover, and for what the book aims for in itself, I give Heil 4/4. 3/4 would not seem to do justice to a book which approaches a monumental work. For what he does not write, however, I give him 0/1—although some might commend him for who and what he leaves out!
by Thomas O. Scarborough
‘You might think,’ writes John Heil, ‘that the place to begin would be with a definition of “metaphysics” …’ Heil doesn’t—and there isn’t one. Yet as the book unfolds, it becomes clear that Heil knows exactly what he thinks metaphysics is.
This, however, is one of the strengths of this book. More often than not, metaphysics is what everybody else thinks. Heil not only sketches (some of) what everybody else thinks, but what he himself thinks. This is interesting, and useful, and thought-provoking.
It’s an old-fashioned metaphysics, really. While it is not in all cases easy to distinguish Heil himself from his discussion, it would seem that the following is his philosophy at bedrock. He writes, ‘Relations have been mentioned as an apt category, in addition to substance and property. Not only are there propertied substances, but there are arrangements of these.’ Then, add to this the claim that ‘objects have properties which empower them’. This is classic metaphysics, not far from Aristotle—however with some distinctive features:
1. Heil holds that judgments have truthmakers. This is of central importance to his philosophy. He refers to truthmakers nearly 70 times: ‘When something is true, something makes it true.’ Or does it? Truthmaking can be problematic, and Heil gives his own demonstration of this in section 10.4.
2. He holds that scientific theory is provisional. This is largely unstated in the book, but it is interesting: ‘For all we know, the universe comprises …’ (section 6.5). This is the new view (though not completely new) of science, which lately has become familiar even to ‘the man in the street’.
3. In spite of Heil’s stated, traditional approach, he points several times to a possible new direction. ‘If the universe turned out to be seamless …’ (section 9.4). A seamless universe, he writes, could solve fundamental problems of philosophy. This is a major focus of my own metaphysics.
Thanks to Kindle, I know that 5.4% of Heil’s references to color use blue, while 78.7% use red. He tends to do this with philosophy, too. There are some obvious blind spots. Kant? Kindle reports: ‘0 results found.’ Hegel? ‘0’. Heidegger? ‘0’. Dare we suggest Derrida? ‘0’. At the same time, Heil is warm towards (imported) Australian philosophers: Armstrong, Smart, Chalmers, and so on. Chinese philosophy? Indian? African? These are absent. So are major themes, such as postmodernism, linguistics, and (mostly) ethics.
I put section 1.2 of the book (‘Ontology’) through a grammar and style checker. Heil scored 0.07 for strength of style, which is good for philosophy—and 10.9 for readability, which is excellent. Some of the book, I think, is brilliant. For instance, chapter 5 (‘What Else There Is’), or chapter 10 (‘Free Will’). Some chapters drag a little—which may be inevitable for metaphysics anyway. The book is remarkably well integrated. This means that one sees philosophical subjects in their places, and how they belong to the whole.
I would add that there are two shortcomings of emphasis:
1. Apart from the mind-body problem, there seems to be too little emphasis on mind—and by his own admission, Heil leaves out abstracta. He seems conflicted as to the importance of mind. Yet nothing is without mind. As for reality, he holds that there are ‘mind-independent truthmakers’. That is, he is fairly much a realist—though not enough to dissuade him from philosophy.
2. There is too much emphasis on (fairly) simple objects: a billiard ball, a tomato, a horse. Yet it is not so much objects which are the problem, but the way in which we order them—and leave things out as we do. Consider, for instance, algorithms which perform billions of billions of calculations (which is, bring objects into relation with one another) which leave out the environment.
For what Heil does cover, and for what the book aims for in itself, I give Heil 4/4. 3/4 would not seem to do justice to a book which approaches a monumental work. For what he does not write, however, I give him 0/1—although some might commend him for who and what he leaves out!
--------------------------------------
A review of Kindle Cloud: I chose the Kindle Cloud purchase option. This failed to work on my preferred browser (which is fully up to date). Also, the book cut out when the Internet cut out (I am in Africa). Reloads didn’t present properly, it disabled my touch screen, and at one point disabled my navigation keys. The type was not crisp. Clicking on headings took one sometimes to the wrong sections, and Kindle Cloud apparently searched for lexemes, not words. This complicated specific searches: it failed, for example, to find multiple instances of ‘psychology’. Kindle Cloud gets 3/5.
Merged review:
A Major Though Partial Accomplishment
by Thomas O. Scarborough
‘You might think,’ writes John Heil, ‘that the place to begin would be with a definition of “metaphysics” …’ Heil doesn’t—and there isn’t one. Yet as the book unfolds, it becomes clear that Heil knows exactly what he thinks metaphysics is.
This, however, is one of the strengths of this book. More often than not, metaphysics is what everybody else thinks. Heil not only sketches (some of) what everybody else thinks, but what he himself thinks. This is interesting, and useful, and thought-provoking.
It’s an old-fashioned metaphysics, really. While it is not in all cases easy to distinguish Heil himself from his discussion, it would seem that the following is his philosophy at bedrock. He writes, ‘Relations have been mentioned as an apt category, in addition to substance and property. Not only are there propertied substances, but there are arrangements of these.’ Then, add to this the claim that ‘objects have properties which empower them’. This is classic metaphysics, not far from Aristotle—however with some distinctive features:
1. Heil holds that judgments have truthmakers. This is of central importance to his philosophy. He refers to truthmakers nearly 70 times: ‘When something is true, something makes it true.’ Or does it? Truthmaking can be problematic, and Heil gives his own demonstration of this in section 10.4.
2. He holds that scientific theory is provisional. This is largely unstated in the book, but it is interesting: ‘For all we know, the universe comprises …’ (section 6.5). This is the new view (though not completely new) of science, which lately has become familiar even to ‘the man in the street’.
3. In spite of Heil’s stated, traditional approach, he points several times to a possible new direction. ‘If the universe turned out to be seamless …’ (section 9.4). A seamless universe, he writes, could solve fundamental problems of philosophy. This is a major focus of my own metaphysics.
Thanks to Kindle, I know that 5.4% of Heil’s references to color use blue, while 78.7% use red. He tends to do this with philosophy, too. There are some obvious blind spots. Kant? Kindle reports: ‘0 results found.’ Hegel? ‘0’. Heidegger? ‘0’. Dare we suggest Derrida? ‘0’. At the same time, Heil is warm towards (imported) Australian philosophers: Armstrong, Smart, Chalmers, and so on. Chinese philosophy? Indian? African? These are absent. So are major themes, such as postmodernism, linguistics, and (mostly) ethics.
I put section 1.2 of the book (‘Ontology’) through a grammar and style checker. Heil scored 0.07 for strength of style, which is good for philosophy—and 10.9 for readability, which is excellent. Some of the book, I think, is brilliant. For instance, chapter 5 (‘What Else There Is’), or chapter 10 (‘Free Will’). Some chapters drag a little—which may be inevitable for metaphysics anyway. The book is remarkably well integrated. This means that one sees philosophical subjects in their places, and how they belong to the whole.
I would add that there are two shortcomings of emphasis:
1. Apart from the mind-body problem, there seems to be too little emphasis on mind—and by his own admission, Heil leaves out abstracta. He seems conflicted as to the importance of mind. Yet nothing is without mind. As for reality, he holds that there are ‘mind-independent truthmakers’. That is, he is fairly much a realist—though not enough to dissuade him from philosophy.
2. There is too much emphasis on (fairly) simple objects: a billiard ball, a tomato, a horse. Yet it is not so much objects which are the problem, but the way in which we order them—and leave things out as we do. Consider, for instance, algorithms which perform billions of billions of calculations (which is, bring objects into relation with one another) which leave out the environment.
For what Heil does cover, and for what the book aims for in itself, I give Heil 4/4. 3/4 would not seem to do justice to a book which approaches a monumental work. For what he does not write, however, I give him 0/1—although some might commend him for who and what he leaves out!
March 21, 2022
Studying Metaphysics With Professor John Heil
The study of metaphysics differs from most other endeavors in that, for example, in the study of introductory chemistry one begins with relatively simple lessons which gradually develop and become more specific and complex. In metaphysics, which is vaguely the study of the most general aspects of reality, one is plunged into difficulty from the beginning. In thinking about metaphysics, one is in the heart of the discipline from the outset.
John Heil's new book "What is Metaphysics" (2021) is one of many books with a similar title (Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics" or Bergson "An Introduction to Metaphysics") Heil's book is short and he writes lucidly and appealingly, a different matter entirely from making metaphysics simple. A professor of philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis, Heil has written extensively on metaphysics and has been listed as among the fifty most influential living philosophers.
Heil's primary aim is not to teach a hodge-podge of metaphysical doctrines but is instead to convince the reader that metaphysics is an important, seriously human endeavor. He wants to show that metaphysicical questions arise from reflections on life rather than from airy abstractions. Metaphysical thinking can help in the understanding of oneself and of the place of humans in the world. This aim in teaching the importance of metaphysics is directed both at those new to metaphysical thought and to other philosophers as well. Many philosophers from the time of Kant, at least, and increasingly in the 20th century have strongly criticized the possibility of doing metaphysics and have pronunced it dead. (The American philosopher Richard Rorty, not mentioned in this book, is a prominent example.) Heil writes from the analytic tradition in American/Anglo philosophy as is evident by the philosophers he sites in his Acknowledgements as influences. For readers with a philosophical background, the influence of the logician Alfred Tarski (also not specificically mentioned) is evident. In many places, Heil follows the analytic tradition by arguing that metaphysical problems arise from early, unexamined assumptions in the use of language. Still, Heil is much more convinced of the importance and inevitability of metaphysical thought than are many philosophers in the analytic tradition. In fact, as Heil's work illustrates, metaphysics has become revitalized in much contemporary thought.
In the short chapters of his book, Heil takes the reader through metaphysical issue to show that they arise from experience rather than from philosophical perversity and to consider different ways that have been offered to deal with these issues. Each chapter concludes with a glossary and a list of suggestions for further reading Heil begins with broad questions about the nature and reality of time, followed by a short but pivotal chapter on "appearance and reality" and on the apparent difference between the scientific and common sense view of reality. Heil gives several chapters to ontology -- the basic metaphysical inquiry into "what there is". He then moves into a more historically oriented discussion into questions of causality, necessity, the relationship of mind and body, and free will in which the insights associated with Aristotle, Hume, and Spinoza come to serve, if loosely, as guides.
Throughout the book, Heil's goal is less to convince the reader of his own approach to these questions than to encourage the reader to engage, to the extent he or she becomes interested, with the issues for oneself. Another goal is to show the reader the inter-relationship of the issues discussed in the book. Although the presentation of issues in piecemeal, Heil endeavors to show the systematic character of metaphysical thought and of how one's thinking about time, say, will necessarily become part of one's thought about the other broad issues about reality and the human place in the world explored in the book. In a chapter about the nature of necessity and of what has become known as the question of possible worlds, Heil writes:
"This excursion into speculative cosmology is meant to illustrate a theme pervading this book, namely that metaphysics is a package deal. I have marched you through the territory in a linear fashion (how else could you march?) but metaphysical theses are not evaluable on their own, in isolation from one another. The question is always, how do they hang together -- and with whatever we think we know about the universe as revealed by everyday experiences and the sciences?"
Some important goals of Heil's study become clear towards the end. Heil writes that with all the broad areas of disagreement among metaphysicians, there are even broader underlying areas of agreeent, referring to the discussion in his book of Hume and Spinoza. Heil writes:
"Philosophical disagreement can mask wide avenues of agreement. My discussion of a surprising convergence of Hume and Spinoza was taken up to illustrate precisely this point. Once you look below the surface, you can see that this is the rule, not the exception."
Finally, Heil wrote his book to teach something of the value of metaphysical inquiry to newcomers but found that, with all his prior study and writing, he had also been teaching himself. The value of teaching others is that it helps the teacher understand. This is particularly true with the difficulty of metaphysics where it is notoriously easy to become lazy and ensnared in words. Heil concludes:
"I was moved to write this book in part because I believe that the best way to ensure that you understand a difficult subject is to explain that subject to someone unfamiliar with it. Too often we think we understand something when really all we have are words, statements of positions, the familiarity of which means we no longer need to think about them."
I have been a student of metaphysical philosophy for many year and learned a great deal from studying it anew with Heil. The book is part of a series by Polity Press titled "What is Philosophy?". Polity kindly sent me a review copy.
Robin Friedman
The study of metaphysics differs from most other endeavors in that, for example, in the study of introductory chemistry one begins with relatively simple lessons which gradually develop and become more specific and complex. In metaphysics, which is vaguely the study of the most general aspects of reality, one is plunged into difficulty from the beginning. In thinking about metaphysics, one is in the heart of the discipline from the outset.
John Heil's new book "What is Metaphysics" (2021) is one of many books with a similar title (Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics" or Bergson "An Introduction to Metaphysics") Heil's book is short and he writes lucidly and appealingly, a different matter entirely from making metaphysics simple. A professor of philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis, Heil has written extensively on metaphysics and has been listed as among the fifty most influential living philosophers.
Heil's primary aim is not to teach a hodge-podge of metaphysical doctrines but is instead to convince the reader that metaphysics is an important, seriously human endeavor. He wants to show that metaphysicical questions arise from reflections on life rather than from airy abstractions. Metaphysical thinking can help in the understanding of oneself and of the place of humans in the world. This aim in teaching the importance of metaphysics is directed both at those new to metaphysical thought and to other philosophers as well. Many philosophers from the time of Kant, at least, and increasingly in the 20th century have strongly criticized the possibility of doing metaphysics and have pronunced it dead. (The American philosopher Richard Rorty, not mentioned in this book, is a prominent example.) Heil writes from the analytic tradition in American/Anglo philosophy as is evident by the philosophers he sites in his Acknowledgements as influences. For readers with a philosophical background, the influence of the logician Alfred Tarski (also not specificically mentioned) is evident. In many places, Heil follows the analytic tradition by arguing that metaphysical problems arise from early, unexamined assumptions in the use of language. Still, Heil is much more convinced of the importance and inevitability of metaphysical thought than are many philosophers in the analytic tradition. In fact, as Heil's work illustrates, metaphysics has become revitalized in much contemporary thought.
In the short chapters of his book, Heil takes the reader through metaphysical issue to show that they arise from experience rather than from philosophical perversity and to consider different ways that have been offered to deal with these issues. Each chapter concludes with a glossary and a list of suggestions for further reading Heil begins with broad questions about the nature and reality of time, followed by a short but pivotal chapter on "appearance and reality" and on the apparent difference between the scientific and common sense view of reality. Heil gives several chapters to ontology -- the basic metaphysical inquiry into "what there is". He then moves into a more historically oriented discussion into questions of causality, necessity, the relationship of mind and body, and free will in which the insights associated with Aristotle, Hume, and Spinoza come to serve, if loosely, as guides.
Throughout the book, Heil's goal is less to convince the reader of his own approach to these questions than to encourage the reader to engage, to the extent he or she becomes interested, with the issues for oneself. Another goal is to show the reader the inter-relationship of the issues discussed in the book. Although the presentation of issues in piecemeal, Heil endeavors to show the systematic character of metaphysical thought and of how one's thinking about time, say, will necessarily become part of one's thought about the other broad issues about reality and the human place in the world explored in the book. In a chapter about the nature of necessity and of what has become known as the question of possible worlds, Heil writes:
"This excursion into speculative cosmology is meant to illustrate a theme pervading this book, namely that metaphysics is a package deal. I have marched you through the territory in a linear fashion (how else could you march?) but metaphysical theses are not evaluable on their own, in isolation from one another. The question is always, how do they hang together -- and with whatever we think we know about the universe as revealed by everyday experiences and the sciences?"
Some important goals of Heil's study become clear towards the end. Heil writes that with all the broad areas of disagreement among metaphysicians, there are even broader underlying areas of agreeent, referring to the discussion in his book of Hume and Spinoza. Heil writes:
"Philosophical disagreement can mask wide avenues of agreement. My discussion of a surprising convergence of Hume and Spinoza was taken up to illustrate precisely this point. Once you look below the surface, you can see that this is the rule, not the exception."
Finally, Heil wrote his book to teach something of the value of metaphysical inquiry to newcomers but found that, with all his prior study and writing, he had also been teaching himself. The value of teaching others is that it helps the teacher understand. This is particularly true with the difficulty of metaphysics where it is notoriously easy to become lazy and ensnared in words. Heil concludes:
"I was moved to write this book in part because I believe that the best way to ensure that you understand a difficult subject is to explain that subject to someone unfamiliar with it. Too often we think we understand something when really all we have are words, statements of positions, the familiarity of which means we no longer need to think about them."
I have been a student of metaphysical philosophy for many year and learned a great deal from studying it anew with Heil. The book is part of a series by Polity Press titled "What is Philosophy?". Polity kindly sent me a review copy.
Robin Friedman
January 26, 2022
At times a bit hard to engage with (something Heil repeatedly acknowledges), and at other times a little frustrating when the topic of discussion moved on without Heil really giving his own view (again he would admit this and it was not his intention to give a full account of all the topics under discussion). It’s a good introduction to a wide range of topics, but Heil definitely is not aiming for the reader to finish with a comprehensive understanding of them, as his goal is more to instill the idea that these topics matter (hence the short chapters and further reading suggestions). In this way Heil is successful, but it does make for slightly tedious reading at times. Sometimes I just wanted to hear him give a full throttled endorsement of a way of thinking or hear him argue for his own ideas. This was why I found the final topic, Free Will, to be the most interesting and the reason I’m rating this a 4 instead of a 3. I’ve read a few books on free will and I found Heill’s comments highly engaging and his argument for an alternative to the hard determinist/libertarian/compatabilist was both thought provoking and quite convincing. I only wish this kind of approach had played a bigger part, or that the Free Will chapter had gone on a bit longer so Heil could delve deeper. He clearly knows an extraordinary amount about the topics at hand, and while I appreciate the survey of ideas and his desire to leave it up to the reader to explore the topics more and come to conclusions, his approach wasn’t quite to my taste (John Searle’s Mind: A Brief Introduction is probably my ideal version of how to both give a sweeping survey of ideas while also not shying away from showing the author’s cards as he argues for his own theories).
November 28, 2024
This review is far more real than any of us could ever hope to be
March 16, 2026
Heil does the impossible and breaks down the most abstract of analytical metaphysics for unsuspecting readers. I wish his own ideas were more in its own book, but nonetheless if this book had an argument, its that metaphysics matters.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews