Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble

by Jonathan Pearson

A reappraisal of Sir Anthony Eden's conduct of foreign relations during the Suez crisis of 1956. This book challenges previous assumptions and demonstrates that Eden was not as bellicose as has been alleged. It traces his conduct of crisis management, from July until his decision to use force on 14 October, focusing on the Prime Minister's personality and influences. It details the confusion and failed attempts at negotiation that eventually culminated in the reluctant gamble.

272 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2002

Reviews

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 2 out of 5]

In this revisionist tome, Jonathan Pearson attempts to convince readers that Anthony Eden's handling of the Suez Crisis was much more levelheaded and rational than he's given credit for. He tries to argue that Eden continually spurned the use of military force, only to be goaded into it by hawkish cabinet members, mealy-mouthed Americans and that dastardly neo-Mussolini Nasser. This explanation holds only if you ignore everything else ever written about Eden and the Crisis: the Prime Minister's savage mood swings and angry rants, fueled by drugs, a lingering bladder illness and an obsession with Nasser as a new-model fascist, which led him to rant to underlings about wanting to murder Nasser while authorizing MI6 assassination plots and, finally, colluding with France and Israel to kick the uppity Arabs to the curb. Pearson's argument is merely a thin and unconvincing effort to burnish the reputation of a man who, whatever his earlier achievements, has been roundly (and rightly) damned by history for the climactic act of his career.