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Summa Theologica, Volume 3 Part II of Part II
Publisher's Summary
Secunda Secundae is the longest part in this immense undertaking by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). His purpose was nothing less than to survey the theological teachings of the Catholic Church, while absorbing, controversially for his time, many other strands of learning and philosophy, varying from ancient Greek (particularly Aristotle) to Muslim writers (Averroes and Avicenna) and the Sephardic Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides.
Secunda Secundae follows the established pattern of presenting topics in terms of Questions divided into Articles which are further divided into clearly considered lines of debate. There are 189 Questions which are grouped into four ‘Treatises’ - focussed areas for discussion: Treatise on the Theological Virtues (Questions 1-46), Treatise on the Cardinal Virtues (Questions 47-70), Treatise on Fortitude and Temperance, (Questions 123-170), Treatise on Gratuitous Graces (Questions 171-182), and the final short section, Treatise on the States of Life (Questions 183-189).
Part II of the Summa Theologica is broadly concerned with ethics, and in this Part II of Part II, Aquinas turns his enquiry towards virtues. It opens with the enquiry into faith, considering the acts of faith, the cause, the effects, hope and their contraries: heresy, apostasy, blasphemy, despair and more.
The four cardinal virtues are then examined, prudence and justice being followed by fortitude and temperance, often with the positive and negative states being juxtaposed: humility and pride; sobriety and drunkenness; fasting and gluttony. Prophecy, rapture, and ‘The Division of Life into the Active and the Contemplative’, are among the topics in Gratuitous Graces, ending with the consideration of man’s various duties and states in general and the state of perfection in general.
As always, Aquinas supports his argument with a wealth of references - notably from St Augustine, of course, but also from a rich and varied list of sources. Throughout this long but sustained work, Aquinas demands continuous attention through his clarity of intellect and expression.
A continuing tribute must be made to Father Laurence Shapcote of the Dominican Order who, while based in South Africa in the first half of the 20th century, made this translation from Latin his life’s work. Martyn Swain continues his impressive reading of this major Western medieval classic of theology and philosophy.
PLEASE NOTE: When you purchase this title, the accompanying PDF will be available in your Audible Library along with the audio.
Public Domain (P)2020 Ukemi Productions Ltd
Secunda Secundae is the longest part in this immense undertaking by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). His purpose was nothing less than to survey the theological teachings of the Catholic Church, while absorbing, controversially for his time, many other strands of learning and philosophy, varying from ancient Greek (particularly Aristotle) to Muslim writers (Averroes and Avicenna) and the Sephardic Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides.
Secunda Secundae follows the established pattern of presenting topics in terms of Questions divided into Articles which are further divided into clearly considered lines of debate. There are 189 Questions which are grouped into four ‘Treatises’ - focussed areas for discussion: Treatise on the Theological Virtues (Questions 1-46), Treatise on the Cardinal Virtues (Questions 47-70), Treatise on Fortitude and Temperance, (Questions 123-170), Treatise on Gratuitous Graces (Questions 171-182), and the final short section, Treatise on the States of Life (Questions 183-189).
Part II of the Summa Theologica is broadly concerned with ethics, and in this Part II of Part II, Aquinas turns his enquiry towards virtues. It opens with the enquiry into faith, considering the acts of faith, the cause, the effects, hope and their contraries: heresy, apostasy, blasphemy, despair and more.
The four cardinal virtues are then examined, prudence and justice being followed by fortitude and temperance, often with the positive and negative states being juxtaposed: humility and pride; sobriety and drunkenness; fasting and gluttony. Prophecy, rapture, and ‘The Division of Life into the Active and the Contemplative’, are among the topics in Gratuitous Graces, ending with the consideration of man’s various duties and states in general and the state of perfection in general.
As always, Aquinas supports his argument with a wealth of references - notably from St Augustine, of course, but also from a rich and varied list of sources. Throughout this long but sustained work, Aquinas demands continuous attention through his clarity of intellect and expression.
A continuing tribute must be made to Father Laurence Shapcote of the Dominican Order who, while based in South Africa in the first half of the 20th century, made this translation from Latin his life’s work. Martyn Swain continues his impressive reading of this major Western medieval classic of theology and philosophy.
PLEASE NOTE: When you purchase this title, the accompanying PDF will be available in your Audible Library along with the audio.
Public Domain (P)2020 Ukemi Productions Ltd
- GenresPhilosophy
Audible Audio
Published November 22, 2020
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About the author
Thomas Aquinas
2,533 books1,099 followersPhilosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican friar and theologian of Italy and the most influential thinker of the medieval period, combined doctrine of Aristotle and elements of Neoplatonism, a system that Plotinus and his successors developed and based on that of Plato, within a context of Christian thought; his works include the
Summa contra gentiles
(1259-1264) and the
Summa theologiae
or theologica (1266-1273).
Saint Albertus Magnus taught Saint Thomas Aquinas.
People ably note this priest, sometimes styled of Aquin or Aquino, as a scholastic. The Roman Catholic tradition honors him as a "doctor of the Church."
Aquinas lived at a critical juncture of western culture when the arrival of the Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation reopened the question of the relation between faith and reason, calling into question the modus vivendi that obtained for centuries. This crisis flared just as people founded universities. Thomas after early studies at Montecassino moved to the University of Naples, where he met members of the new Dominican order. At Naples too, Thomas first extended contact with the new learning. He joined the Dominican order and then went north to study with Albertus Magnus, author of a paraphrase of the Aristotelian corpus. Thomas completed his studies at the University of Paris, formed out the monastic schools on the left bank and the cathedral school at Notre Dame. In two stints as a regent master, Thomas defended the mendicant orders and of greater historical importance countered both the interpretations of Averroës of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result, a new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy, survived until the rise of the new physics. The Catholic Church over the centuries regularly and consistently reaffirmed the central importance of work of Thomas for understanding its teachings concerning the Christian revelation, and his close textual commentaries on Aristotle represent a cultural resource, now receiving increased recognition.
Saint Albertus Magnus taught Saint Thomas Aquinas.
People ably note this priest, sometimes styled of Aquin or Aquino, as a scholastic. The Roman Catholic tradition honors him as a "doctor of the Church."
Aquinas lived at a critical juncture of western culture when the arrival of the Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation reopened the question of the relation between faith and reason, calling into question the modus vivendi that obtained for centuries. This crisis flared just as people founded universities. Thomas after early studies at Montecassino moved to the University of Naples, where he met members of the new Dominican order. At Naples too, Thomas first extended contact with the new learning. He joined the Dominican order and then went north to study with Albertus Magnus, author of a paraphrase of the Aristotelian corpus. Thomas completed his studies at the University of Paris, formed out the monastic schools on the left bank and the cathedral school at Notre Dame. In two stints as a regent master, Thomas defended the mendicant orders and of greater historical importance countered both the interpretations of Averroës of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result, a new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy, survived until the rise of the new physics. The Catholic Church over the centuries regularly and consistently reaffirmed the central importance of work of Thomas for understanding its teachings concerning the Christian revelation, and his close textual commentaries on Aristotle represent a cultural resource, now receiving increased recognition.
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Should anyone wish to see, below are my notes listed in chronological order as they appear in St. Thomas Aquinas' work.
Against the notion of a heretical See:
"As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): 'By no means should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have found the truth,' because, to wit, they do not make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: 'Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other than Peter, as being the source of their name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy doctors defended their opinion.' Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol [Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): 'This, most blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment of your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q11, A2
On hatred of neighbor born of love for God.
"A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke 14:26: 'If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be My disciple.' Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q26, A2.
Against the notion that Charity is simply wishing the good for another:
"Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win.
But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that 'goodwill is a beginning of friendship.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q27, A2
In opposition to the notion that merely a slightly untrue faith may still lead to God:
"For all the virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the passions—such are the virtues that regulate the passions—or at least to the possession of a good conscience—such are the virtues that regulate operations—or to the having of a right faith—such are those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love God. For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience gives man a horror for God's justice, through fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue representation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of that which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in Matthew 22:39."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q44, A1
Against the supreme autonomy of a pious wife:
"A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q88, A8
Concerning evil parents:
"... if the worship of one's parents take one away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.): 'Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter.' Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that 'when we find our parents to be a hindrance in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them.' For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q101, A4
Of what pertains to fatherhood:
"... just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life..."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q102, A1
Definition of honor.
"... honor is nothing but an acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q103, A2
Concerning just vengeance:
"Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Romans 12:21): 'Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.'
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q108, A1
On chastity:
"Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): 'I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q151, A3
On the principles of reason.
"... In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q154, A12
On the four kinds of modesty:
"These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by 'humility.' The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by 'studiousness' which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly [Cf. II-II:145:1], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q160, A2
Degrees of humility:
"... twelve degrees of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict ... The first is to be 'humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground'; the second is 'to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice'; the third is 'not to be easily moved, and disposed to laughter'; the fourth is 'to maintain silence until one is asked'; the fifth is 'to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery'; the sixth is 'to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all'; the seventh is 'to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes'; the eighth is 'to confess one's sin'; the ninth is 'to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances'; the tenth is 'to subject oneself to a superior'; the eleventh is 'not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires'; the twelfth is 'to fear God and to be always mindful of everything that God has commanded.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q161, A6
Degrees of pride:
"For Anselm ... divides the uplifting of pride, saying that there is 'pride of will, pride of speech, and pride of deed.' Bernard ... also reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely 'curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q162, A4
Degrees of humility:
"The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken above (II-II:161:6). For the first degree of humility is to 'be humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground': and to this is opposed 'curiosity,' which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of humility is 'to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice': to this is opposed 'frivolity of mind,' by which a man is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is 'not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter,' to which is opposed 'senseless mirth.' The fourth degree of humility is 'to maintain silence until one is asked,' to which is opposed 'boasting'. The fifth degree of humility is 'to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery,' to which is opposed 'singularity,' whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is 'to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all,' to which is opposed 'arrogance,' whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is 'to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes,' to which is opposed 'presumption,' whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is 'to confess one's sins,' to which is opposed 'defense of one's sins.' The ninth degree is 'to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances,' to which is opposed 'deceitful confession,' whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is 'obedience,' to which is opposed 'rebelliousness.' The eleventh degree of humility is 'not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires'; to this is opposed 'license,' whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is 'fear of God': to this is opposed 'the habit of sinning,' which implies contempt of God."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q162, A4
The subjugation of wife to husband is both in accordance with nature and also a punishment due to sin:
"The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since even before sin the man was the 'head' and governor 'of the woman'), but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her own."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q164, A2
Against the sin of curiosity concerning our neighbors faults:
"Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that 'concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious.' Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1 John 2:16) 'concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults,' and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eyes is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q167, A2
Concerning the distinction between cogitation, meditation, and contemplation:
"According to Richard of St. Victor 'cogitation' would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. 'Meditation' would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and 'consideration' has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called 'consideration.' But 'contemplation' regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that 'contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is prone to wander.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q180, A3
Of those things which pertain to the contemplative life:
"... four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth itself."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q180, A4
Against John XXIII's notion of "throwing open the doors of the Church:"
"The just sin not easily out of contempt; but sometimes they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which they easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of contempt, they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of Jeremiah 2:20: 'Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou hast said: 'I will not serve.' For on every high hill and under every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself.' Hence Augustine says (Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon.): 'From the time I began to serve God, even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress in monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the monastery have fallen.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q186, A10
Against the liberal notion of begging in lieu of working:
"This precept of the divine law does not forbid anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of necessity."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q187, A5
Against the notion of a heretical See:
"As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): 'By no means should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have found the truth,' because, to wit, they do not make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: 'Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other than Peter, as being the source of their name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy doctors defended their opinion.' Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol [Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): 'This, most blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment of your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q11, A2
On hatred of neighbor born of love for God.
"A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke 14:26: 'If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be My disciple.' Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q26, A2.
Against the notion that Charity is simply wishing the good for another:
"Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win.
But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that 'goodwill is a beginning of friendship.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q27, A2
In opposition to the notion that merely a slightly untrue faith may still lead to God:
"For all the virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the passions—such are the virtues that regulate the passions—or at least to the possession of a good conscience—such are the virtues that regulate operations—or to the having of a right faith—such are those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love God. For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience gives man a horror for God's justice, through fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue representation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of that which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in Matthew 22:39."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q44, A1
Against the supreme autonomy of a pious wife:
"A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q88, A8
Concerning evil parents:
"... if the worship of one's parents take one away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.): 'Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter.' Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.
Reply to Objection 1. Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that 'when we find our parents to be a hindrance in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them.' For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q101, A4
Of what pertains to fatherhood:
"... just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life..."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q102, A1
Definition of honor.
"... honor is nothing but an acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q103, A2
Concerning just vengeance:
"Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Romans 12:21): 'Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.'
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q108, A1
On chastity:
"Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): 'I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q151, A3
On the principles of reason.
"... In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q154, A12
On the four kinds of modesty:
"These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by 'humility.' The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by 'studiousness' which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly [Cf. II-II:145:1], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q160, A2
Degrees of humility:
"... twelve degrees of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict ... The first is to be 'humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground'; the second is 'to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice'; the third is 'not to be easily moved, and disposed to laughter'; the fourth is 'to maintain silence until one is asked'; the fifth is 'to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery'; the sixth is 'to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all'; the seventh is 'to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes'; the eighth is 'to confess one's sin'; the ninth is 'to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances'; the tenth is 'to subject oneself to a superior'; the eleventh is 'not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires'; the twelfth is 'to fear God and to be always mindful of everything that God has commanded.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q161, A6
Degrees of pride:
"For Anselm ... divides the uplifting of pride, saying that there is 'pride of will, pride of speech, and pride of deed.' Bernard ... also reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely 'curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q162, A4
Degrees of humility:
"The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken above (II-II:161:6). For the first degree of humility is to 'be humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground': and to this is opposed 'curiosity,' which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of humility is 'to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice': to this is opposed 'frivolity of mind,' by which a man is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is 'not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter,' to which is opposed 'senseless mirth.' The fourth degree of humility is 'to maintain silence until one is asked,' to which is opposed 'boasting'. The fifth degree of humility is 'to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery,' to which is opposed 'singularity,' whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is 'to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all,' to which is opposed 'arrogance,' whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is 'to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes,' to which is opposed 'presumption,' whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is 'to confess one's sins,' to which is opposed 'defense of one's sins.' The ninth degree is 'to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances,' to which is opposed 'deceitful confession,' whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is 'obedience,' to which is opposed 'rebelliousness.' The eleventh degree of humility is 'not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires'; to this is opposed 'license,' whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is 'fear of God': to this is opposed 'the habit of sinning,' which implies contempt of God."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q162, A4
The subjugation of wife to husband is both in accordance with nature and also a punishment due to sin:
"The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since even before sin the man was the 'head' and governor 'of the woman'), but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her own."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q164, A2
Against the sin of curiosity concerning our neighbors faults:
"Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that 'concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious.' Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1 John 2:16) 'concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults,' and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eyes is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q167, A2
Concerning the distinction between cogitation, meditation, and contemplation:
"According to Richard of St. Victor 'cogitation' would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. 'Meditation' would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and 'consideration' has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called 'consideration.' But 'contemplation' regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that 'contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is prone to wander.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q180, A3
Of those things which pertain to the contemplative life:
"... four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth itself."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q180, A4
Against John XXIII's notion of "throwing open the doors of the Church:"
"The just sin not easily out of contempt; but sometimes they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which they easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of contempt, they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of Jeremiah 2:20: 'Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou hast said: 'I will not serve.' For on every high hill and under every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself.' Hence Augustine says (Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon.): 'From the time I began to serve God, even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress in monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the monastery have fallen.'"
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q186, A10
Against the liberal notion of begging in lieu of working:
"This precept of the divine law does not forbid anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of necessity."
Summa Theologica Vol. III, Q187, A5
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