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What We Need To Learn: Lessons From Twenty Years Of Afghanistan Reconstruction
122 pages, Unknown Binding
Published August 16, 2021
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January 1, 2026
The Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) may not be the most stimulating of reads but it should rank high in the annals of the history of After Action Reports of American military operations and serve as a timeless resource for decades to come.
The SIGAR report lays everything out - the good, the bad and the ugly. There are no excuses here. A failure is a failure. Blame is placed legitimately on the agency who the Inspector General believes is responsible in whatever area a failure occurred. Same with success. Praise goes out to whoever the IG believes needs to be praised for success.
This is a fact-based independent analysis that appears free from politics. It is neither Republican nor Democrat; Liberal nor Conservative; nor does it favor the policies of one president over another. This is refreshing. Every administration has had its failures and successes in Afghanistan and they are noted in this report as objectively as possible.
There are a lot of operational lessons that should be learned from U.S. involvement in Afghanistan that can, and should, be applied to other countries if the U.S. finds itself at war elsewhere with a need for reconstruction. Avoiding mistakes from the past comes only from analyzing past operations and asking the right questions. This volume does exactly that and should be a primary source document for historians and future policymakers alike.
The SIGAR report lays everything out - the good, the bad and the ugly. There are no excuses here. A failure is a failure. Blame is placed legitimately on the agency who the Inspector General believes is responsible in whatever area a failure occurred. Same with success. Praise goes out to whoever the IG believes needs to be praised for success.
This is a fact-based independent analysis that appears free from politics. It is neither Republican nor Democrat; Liberal nor Conservative; nor does it favor the policies of one president over another. This is refreshing. Every administration has had its failures and successes in Afghanistan and they are noted in this report as objectively as possible.
There are a lot of operational lessons that should be learned from U.S. involvement in Afghanistan that can, and should, be applied to other countries if the U.S. finds itself at war elsewhere with a need for reconstruction. Avoiding mistakes from the past comes only from analyzing past operations and asking the right questions. This volume does exactly that and should be a primary source document for historians and future policymakers alike.
Displaying 1 of 1 review