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Pragmatic illusions: The Presidential politics of John F. Kennedy
Book by Miroff, Bruce
334 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1976
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August 31, 2014
A. Introduction:
1. Begins by looking at the “revisionist” writings of the failed presidency in the LBJ and Nixon years. The problems are attributed to personality problems (active-negative), presidential isolation (the president lived like a monarch), and the expansion of power during the war paved the way for executive usurpation. But, revisionist authors are still “in love” with the presidency and that the fall from presidential grace is reversible. The revisionists look at FDR, Truman, and JFK as models of progressive change in the political system. The presidential scholars idealization of these three presidents fails to reassess their careers critically and in detail. These scholars have not been progressive. Many have been conservative in their attempts to not to alter but preserve America’s dominant institutions. So as long as these revisionist presidential scholars are uncritical of the “progressive” interpretation of presidential history, until they come to terms with the illusions of the past, their interpretations will be quickly replaced.
2. This book is revisionist “reexamining fully and critically” the Presidency of JFK and the brand of pragmatic liberal politics that he practiced (xv).” The “mode of presidential leadership” will be examined in depth looking at US-USSR relations, Latin American and VN involvement, economic policy, and civil rights. Miroff argues that JFK’s image as a progressive and creative leader remains strong and the temptation remains strong that his leadership represented a break with the past. This temptation must be overcome. WE cannot rely on the Kennedy myths.
B. An existential hero?
1. This chapter examines JFK’s political personality and his conception of leadership. It is not a flattering picture. The purpose is to reveal the relationship between his personality and presidential policy. Other have claimed that much of what JFK did as president was forced upon him from congress, military and the right. This chapter argues that most of JFK’s actions as President were in accord with his deepest beliefs, values, and ambitions.
2. Intellectual limitations: His political personality was shaped above all by his preoccupation with courage. He had a “cool” detachment about him, intent on the facts and objectivity. This was a one dimensional understanding, he did not have an emotional grasp of the depths of problems. His meager domestic efforts were not due to restrictions placed on him by outsiders, but because his domestic dreams really were meager. Kennedy was a “enlightened conservative” or as Miroff says, a “pragmatic liberal.” He was a pragmatist because he rejected all ideology in favor of facts. You could also call him a “corporate liberal” in that even though he fought with the business community he agreed with many of his conservative adversaries.
3. Ambition (ambition finds its outlet in global crisis, courage becomes a substitute for political vision): He wanted to be a hero and a great president. He saw history as shaped by great men. So everything that he did was done with an eye to the historian who would record it. The main problem was that he was not identified with a social movement nor had a political vision to offer to the people. He found his heroes role in standing form against the challenge of the Soviet Union. Every international conflict became a test of America’s courage. The symbol of this toughness was the Green Beret’s which was JFK’s pet project.
C. Creating history
1. Foreign policy was central to JFK. But, before looking at the specific events of world policy, this chapter examines JFK’s conception of world politics. The central theme is the existence of the menacing Soviet offensive aimed at world domination, and the determined American effort to engage and defeat that offensive. This view is important because it provided the context for the politics of the New Frontier, both in foreign and domestic problems. “Examination of this image shows how deeply the pragmatic liberalism of the Kennedy administration was rooted in the dogmas of the Cold War.” The central theme of this chapter is that this world view and the actions that it dictated shaped events far more than any specific Soviet intention or action. Thus, JFK created his own history, forcing events to fit into his world view. This is an example of pragmatic illusions.
2. Example--Sputnik (1957) was seen by JFK as a watershed in the history of the Cold War. The Russians must have a significant missile technology lead and the “missile gap” myth began. Flexible response was the result. In reality USSR sought a détente with the US not global confrontation. Nothing could sway JFK from his world view, not Russian weakness when he learned the missile gap was untrue, nor Russian attempts to negotiate. In this period where he could have reduced nuclear weapons, JFK actually increased them.
3. Another illusion. The Bay of Pigs failed military invasion by the US was twisted in JFK’s mind to be another example of the Communist drive to take over the world.
D. “The hour of maximum damage”
1. This chapter looks at the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. These were the years when the US and USSR governments talked about the possibility of nuclear warfare. Another one of JFK’s illusions was his belief that an apocalypse was eminent. “The events and decisions of the next ten months may well decide the fate of man for the next ten thousand years,” said Kennedy to the UN in 1961 (65). The result was a “crisis mentality” in the White House.
2. Reasons for the crisis mentality.
a) His theory of history: Berlin, Cuba, and VN all became challenges to American nerve, determination, and courage, and each brought a crisis.
b) Theory of presidency: He believed that presidential power was fixed in quantity. It could be spread evenly or saved up for maximum use in a crisis. The later is what he preferred.
c) JFK’s temperament: Crisis stimulated something inside him sharpening his senses while enjoying finding a solution
d) Poverty of his pragmatic liberalism: This was the most important reason. Since he wanted to be a great man, yet he was devoid of vision for improving American society, he believed he could attain greatness through “heroic action in moments of crisis.”
3. The damaging assessment that Miroff makes in this chapter is that “without absolv[ing] the Soviet Union” JFK himself “was primarily responsible for the gravity of the crises that this period witnessed. (68)”
E. Global liberalism
1. Kennedy’s Third World policy was ambivalent. He had compassionate understanding as exemplified through the idealistic Peace Corps, concern for new African nations, and the Alliance for Progress Campaign. Parallel to this was a history of military intervention like Cuba and VN. Ambivalence should not be equated with inconsistency. The main constant theme was counterrevolution--his aim was to banish radical revolution by channeling forces of change into a “democratic revolution.” Liberal reforms as an alternative to a Castroite revolution.
2. This chapter looks at the two most important examples of JFK’s Third World policy--the Alliance for Progress and VN. They may appear to be polar opposites (AFP positive, VN negative), but Miroff argues that they are not that far apart.
3. The Alliance for Progress: It was hailed as a new era in US-Latin America relations. It was to satisfy the basic needs of Latin American people for homes, clothes, food, and work. It was developed in the fear that the Castro type revolution in Cuba would not occur elsewhere. JFK’s goals of material progress linked with reform, military suppression of revolutionary activity, and protection of American property holdings, were fully congruent in his mind. The first did not materialize; the second was mixed; and only the third was effectively accomplished. Reform and growth could not occur in Latin America with repression and imperialist exploitation.
4. Viet Nam: Miroff accepts the view that JFK’s policy towards VN led directly to Johnson’s. But, his main concern is to place VN in the context of his global policy in his approach to the Third World. This is not a comprehensive view of VM. It asks what did VN mean for JFK and what American involvement there reflected about the politics of his administration.
a) To JFK, VN was a “Keystone in the arch of freedom.” Modernization and nation-building theories were employed to counter the poverty and social instability which communist agitation fed. A new military strategy of counterinsurgency was developed. Examples of this are the Navy Seals and the Army’s Green Berets. Thus, VN was a proving ground that JFK willingly entered. This is Miroff’s revision here as other writers note his reluctance to enter the war.
F. Corporate power and the “New economics”
1. Miroff’s interpretation of JFK’s economics is that his program was conservative and his was more sympathetic to business than previously thought. His “New Economics” is most accurately portrayed as pragmatic liberalism in the service of corporate capitalism. Thus, his supposed progressivism in economic affairs was really no more than enlightened conservatism. The Tax Bill of 1963 finally drove that point home to the corporate community. (Tax reduction)
2. What were the results of the New Economics? Generally his economic reforms benefited the prosperous rather than the less fortunate.
G. “Listen Mr. Kennedy”: The Civil Rights Struggle
1. This is the key problem in understanding his political leadership. Some capabilities, but far more of the limitations of his pragmatic liberal leadership are shown. JFK defined the Civil Rights movement in pragmatic terms (the racial problem was conceived of as politically equivalent to other issues such as trade reform and tax reduction.) This approach failed to understand civil rights as a moral issue which affected all of American society. He failed to operate as an educator to white America to help them understand the issues of civil rights. The key to JFK’s involvement in civil rights is the conflict between mass politics (black sit ins, freedom rides) and elite politics (where JFK would deal only with other elite’s). In this sense he criticizes the civil rights movement itself and claiming credit for his administration of elite politicians. This chapter shows how JFK sought to control the civil rights movement through behind the scenes manipulation. This was done to bring this movement back into the channels of traditional politics. But, in the long run he failed because the mass politics of the civil rights movement could not be contained within the bounds of JFK’s pragmatic liberalism.
2. Paradoxically, the one major crisis that was not an illusion in JFK’s tenure was the civil rights struggle. This was the one he chose not to act on quickly.
H. Reassessing the modern presidency
1. Kennedy’s reassessment has been very critical here. His foreign policy has been shown to be neither progressive nor pragmatic. He operated on a gravely distorted theory of soviet aggressiveness, spurring the Cold War during its seemingly process of decline. His domestic politics turned out to have conservative consequences. The reality is not a case of bad faith on Kennedy’s part or that he deceived the American public. “It is a sign that we have misunderstood the nature and functions of the modern Presidency. (272)” Once the notion is set aside that the American Presidency is a Progressive institution, we will find that JFK’s record is not untypical. The modern Presidency even (“perhaps especially”) in liberal hands, is best understood as a chief stabilizer--and not the leading force for change--in American politics.
2. “Obscuring Presidents’ understanding of their own historical role have been, above all, their pragmatic illusions. (283)” Most modern Presidents have claimed the term “pragmatist” for themselves. But, it is mainly the liberal Presidents who choose this title.
3. What is liberal pragmatism? The essential mark of pragmatism is “tough-mindedness.” Pragmatism is “equated with strength, an intellectual and moral strength that can accept a world stripped of illusions and can take the facts unadorned.” The pragmatic liberal “sees himself as grappling with the brute and unpleasant facts of political reality in order to humanize and soften those facts.” Ideology is the enemy of pragmatic liberals who instead favor practical ideas. But, in their eagerness to avoid the illusions of ideology, the pragmatic liberals have fallen prey to illusions of their own. Objectivity is the illusion of the pragmatist. Power is also at the heart of pragmatic politics. “But the belief that power is sought only as a means for producing concrete results is another pragmatic illusion. (288)” The quest for power is rooted in anxiety.
4. “The record of the Kennedy presidency should serve as a warning to those who still believe that major changes in American society can be instituted if only the right liberal makes it to the White House. (295)”
II. Notes, Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of JFK (1976)
A. Overview
1. New leftist critique, revision of the Presidential scholars (they love the presidency)
2. Destroys JFK’s image as a progressive, creative president
3. General thesis: The American presidency is not a progressive institution, and that the presidency, especially in liberal hands is best understood as a chief stabilizer.
B. The personality. An existential hero? (Unique and alone in an uncaring universe)
1. Courage shaped his presidency. Courage substituted for political vision. He was a pragmatist because he rejected all ideology in favor of the facts.
2. Crisis was JFK’s stage. Since he had no political vision he sought crisis to show his courage and greatness as a leader. International conflict was important to him.
C. His conception of world politics--strong illusions
1. The central theme was a menacing USSR attempting world domination, with America attempting to defeat this aggression.
2. His view (illusory) shaped events far more than any specific Soviet action.
3. JFK essentially created his own history.
4. Example of Sputnik. Missile gap illusion, flexible response resulted. Bay of Pigs (US sponsored Cuban exiles to invade Cuba--it failed) was twisted in JFK’s mind to be an example of the USSR attempting to overtake the world.
D. Crisis mentality-- “The hour of maximum damage”
1. His crisis illusion was that he believed that the apocalypse was eminent.
2. Examples are the Berlin crisis (the wall was built) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (concern over Soviet nuclear buildup)
E. Global liberalism
1. The main JFK theme was counterrevolution. This would banish radical revolution by creating a democratic revolution.
2. Examples are the Alliance for Progress and VN.
3. AFP attempted to satisfy Latin American peoples needs for food, clothing, shelter. But the goals of material progress, military suppression of revolutionary activity, and protection of American property were methods of imperialist exploitation.
4. This is not a comprehensive view of VN. It asks what did VN mean to JFK. “IT was the keystone in the arch of freedom.” Miroff’s revision is that VN was a proving ground that JFK willingly entered.
F. New economics
1. Conservative economic policies. Was in service to corporate capitalism.
G. Civil Rights
1. This shows limitations of pragmatic leadership
2. He failed to see Civil Rights in moral terms, failed to educate the public. JFK was afraid of mass politics eroding his elite political power base.
3. Paradoxically, this was a crisis that was not an illusion.
H. Reassessing the modern presidency
1. Foreign policy: Neither progressive nor pragmatic. Centered on illusion
2. Domestic policy: Conservative.
3. What is liberal pragmatism? Intellectual and moral strength that can accept a world stripped of illusion. Objectivity is the illusion of the pragmatist. “The belief that power can produce concrete results” is an illusion.
1. Begins by looking at the “revisionist” writings of the failed presidency in the LBJ and Nixon years. The problems are attributed to personality problems (active-negative), presidential isolation (the president lived like a monarch), and the expansion of power during the war paved the way for executive usurpation. But, revisionist authors are still “in love” with the presidency and that the fall from presidential grace is reversible. The revisionists look at FDR, Truman, and JFK as models of progressive change in the political system. The presidential scholars idealization of these three presidents fails to reassess their careers critically and in detail. These scholars have not been progressive. Many have been conservative in their attempts to not to alter but preserve America’s dominant institutions. So as long as these revisionist presidential scholars are uncritical of the “progressive” interpretation of presidential history, until they come to terms with the illusions of the past, their interpretations will be quickly replaced.
2. This book is revisionist “reexamining fully and critically” the Presidency of JFK and the brand of pragmatic liberal politics that he practiced (xv).” The “mode of presidential leadership” will be examined in depth looking at US-USSR relations, Latin American and VN involvement, economic policy, and civil rights. Miroff argues that JFK’s image as a progressive and creative leader remains strong and the temptation remains strong that his leadership represented a break with the past. This temptation must be overcome. WE cannot rely on the Kennedy myths.
B. An existential hero?
1. This chapter examines JFK’s political personality and his conception of leadership. It is not a flattering picture. The purpose is to reveal the relationship between his personality and presidential policy. Other have claimed that much of what JFK did as president was forced upon him from congress, military and the right. This chapter argues that most of JFK’s actions as President were in accord with his deepest beliefs, values, and ambitions.
2. Intellectual limitations: His political personality was shaped above all by his preoccupation with courage. He had a “cool” detachment about him, intent on the facts and objectivity. This was a one dimensional understanding, he did not have an emotional grasp of the depths of problems. His meager domestic efforts were not due to restrictions placed on him by outsiders, but because his domestic dreams really were meager. Kennedy was a “enlightened conservative” or as Miroff says, a “pragmatic liberal.” He was a pragmatist because he rejected all ideology in favor of facts. You could also call him a “corporate liberal” in that even though he fought with the business community he agreed with many of his conservative adversaries.
3. Ambition (ambition finds its outlet in global crisis, courage becomes a substitute for political vision): He wanted to be a hero and a great president. He saw history as shaped by great men. So everything that he did was done with an eye to the historian who would record it. The main problem was that he was not identified with a social movement nor had a political vision to offer to the people. He found his heroes role in standing form against the challenge of the Soviet Union. Every international conflict became a test of America’s courage. The symbol of this toughness was the Green Beret’s which was JFK’s pet project.
C. Creating history
1. Foreign policy was central to JFK. But, before looking at the specific events of world policy, this chapter examines JFK’s conception of world politics. The central theme is the existence of the menacing Soviet offensive aimed at world domination, and the determined American effort to engage and defeat that offensive. This view is important because it provided the context for the politics of the New Frontier, both in foreign and domestic problems. “Examination of this image shows how deeply the pragmatic liberalism of the Kennedy administration was rooted in the dogmas of the Cold War.” The central theme of this chapter is that this world view and the actions that it dictated shaped events far more than any specific Soviet intention or action. Thus, JFK created his own history, forcing events to fit into his world view. This is an example of pragmatic illusions.
2. Example--Sputnik (1957) was seen by JFK as a watershed in the history of the Cold War. The Russians must have a significant missile technology lead and the “missile gap” myth began. Flexible response was the result. In reality USSR sought a détente with the US not global confrontation. Nothing could sway JFK from his world view, not Russian weakness when he learned the missile gap was untrue, nor Russian attempts to negotiate. In this period where he could have reduced nuclear weapons, JFK actually increased them.
3. Another illusion. The Bay of Pigs failed military invasion by the US was twisted in JFK’s mind to be another example of the Communist drive to take over the world.
D. “The hour of maximum damage”
1. This chapter looks at the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. These were the years when the US and USSR governments talked about the possibility of nuclear warfare. Another one of JFK’s illusions was his belief that an apocalypse was eminent. “The events and decisions of the next ten months may well decide the fate of man for the next ten thousand years,” said Kennedy to the UN in 1961 (65). The result was a “crisis mentality” in the White House.
2. Reasons for the crisis mentality.
a) His theory of history: Berlin, Cuba, and VN all became challenges to American nerve, determination, and courage, and each brought a crisis.
b) Theory of presidency: He believed that presidential power was fixed in quantity. It could be spread evenly or saved up for maximum use in a crisis. The later is what he preferred.
c) JFK’s temperament: Crisis stimulated something inside him sharpening his senses while enjoying finding a solution
d) Poverty of his pragmatic liberalism: This was the most important reason. Since he wanted to be a great man, yet he was devoid of vision for improving American society, he believed he could attain greatness through “heroic action in moments of crisis.”
3. The damaging assessment that Miroff makes in this chapter is that “without absolv[ing] the Soviet Union” JFK himself “was primarily responsible for the gravity of the crises that this period witnessed. (68)”
E. Global liberalism
1. Kennedy’s Third World policy was ambivalent. He had compassionate understanding as exemplified through the idealistic Peace Corps, concern for new African nations, and the Alliance for Progress Campaign. Parallel to this was a history of military intervention like Cuba and VN. Ambivalence should not be equated with inconsistency. The main constant theme was counterrevolution--his aim was to banish radical revolution by channeling forces of change into a “democratic revolution.” Liberal reforms as an alternative to a Castroite revolution.
2. This chapter looks at the two most important examples of JFK’s Third World policy--the Alliance for Progress and VN. They may appear to be polar opposites (AFP positive, VN negative), but Miroff argues that they are not that far apart.
3. The Alliance for Progress: It was hailed as a new era in US-Latin America relations. It was to satisfy the basic needs of Latin American people for homes, clothes, food, and work. It was developed in the fear that the Castro type revolution in Cuba would not occur elsewhere. JFK’s goals of material progress linked with reform, military suppression of revolutionary activity, and protection of American property holdings, were fully congruent in his mind. The first did not materialize; the second was mixed; and only the third was effectively accomplished. Reform and growth could not occur in Latin America with repression and imperialist exploitation.
4. Viet Nam: Miroff accepts the view that JFK’s policy towards VN led directly to Johnson’s. But, his main concern is to place VN in the context of his global policy in his approach to the Third World. This is not a comprehensive view of VM. It asks what did VN mean for JFK and what American involvement there reflected about the politics of his administration.
a) To JFK, VN was a “Keystone in the arch of freedom.” Modernization and nation-building theories were employed to counter the poverty and social instability which communist agitation fed. A new military strategy of counterinsurgency was developed. Examples of this are the Navy Seals and the Army’s Green Berets. Thus, VN was a proving ground that JFK willingly entered. This is Miroff’s revision here as other writers note his reluctance to enter the war.
F. Corporate power and the “New economics”
1. Miroff’s interpretation of JFK’s economics is that his program was conservative and his was more sympathetic to business than previously thought. His “New Economics” is most accurately portrayed as pragmatic liberalism in the service of corporate capitalism. Thus, his supposed progressivism in economic affairs was really no more than enlightened conservatism. The Tax Bill of 1963 finally drove that point home to the corporate community. (Tax reduction)
2. What were the results of the New Economics? Generally his economic reforms benefited the prosperous rather than the less fortunate.
G. “Listen Mr. Kennedy”: The Civil Rights Struggle
1. This is the key problem in understanding his political leadership. Some capabilities, but far more of the limitations of his pragmatic liberal leadership are shown. JFK defined the Civil Rights movement in pragmatic terms (the racial problem was conceived of as politically equivalent to other issues such as trade reform and tax reduction.) This approach failed to understand civil rights as a moral issue which affected all of American society. He failed to operate as an educator to white America to help them understand the issues of civil rights. The key to JFK’s involvement in civil rights is the conflict between mass politics (black sit ins, freedom rides) and elite politics (where JFK would deal only with other elite’s). In this sense he criticizes the civil rights movement itself and claiming credit for his administration of elite politicians. This chapter shows how JFK sought to control the civil rights movement through behind the scenes manipulation. This was done to bring this movement back into the channels of traditional politics. But, in the long run he failed because the mass politics of the civil rights movement could not be contained within the bounds of JFK’s pragmatic liberalism.
2. Paradoxically, the one major crisis that was not an illusion in JFK’s tenure was the civil rights struggle. This was the one he chose not to act on quickly.
H. Reassessing the modern presidency
1. Kennedy’s reassessment has been very critical here. His foreign policy has been shown to be neither progressive nor pragmatic. He operated on a gravely distorted theory of soviet aggressiveness, spurring the Cold War during its seemingly process of decline. His domestic politics turned out to have conservative consequences. The reality is not a case of bad faith on Kennedy’s part or that he deceived the American public. “It is a sign that we have misunderstood the nature and functions of the modern Presidency. (272)” Once the notion is set aside that the American Presidency is a Progressive institution, we will find that JFK’s record is not untypical. The modern Presidency even (“perhaps especially”) in liberal hands, is best understood as a chief stabilizer--and not the leading force for change--in American politics.
2. “Obscuring Presidents’ understanding of their own historical role have been, above all, their pragmatic illusions. (283)” Most modern Presidents have claimed the term “pragmatist” for themselves. But, it is mainly the liberal Presidents who choose this title.
3. What is liberal pragmatism? The essential mark of pragmatism is “tough-mindedness.” Pragmatism is “equated with strength, an intellectual and moral strength that can accept a world stripped of illusions and can take the facts unadorned.” The pragmatic liberal “sees himself as grappling with the brute and unpleasant facts of political reality in order to humanize and soften those facts.” Ideology is the enemy of pragmatic liberals who instead favor practical ideas. But, in their eagerness to avoid the illusions of ideology, the pragmatic liberals have fallen prey to illusions of their own. Objectivity is the illusion of the pragmatist. Power is also at the heart of pragmatic politics. “But the belief that power is sought only as a means for producing concrete results is another pragmatic illusion. (288)” The quest for power is rooted in anxiety.
4. “The record of the Kennedy presidency should serve as a warning to those who still believe that major changes in American society can be instituted if only the right liberal makes it to the White House. (295)”
II. Notes, Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of JFK (1976)
A. Overview
1. New leftist critique, revision of the Presidential scholars (they love the presidency)
2. Destroys JFK’s image as a progressive, creative president
3. General thesis: The American presidency is not a progressive institution, and that the presidency, especially in liberal hands is best understood as a chief stabilizer.
B. The personality. An existential hero? (Unique and alone in an uncaring universe)
1. Courage shaped his presidency. Courage substituted for political vision. He was a pragmatist because he rejected all ideology in favor of the facts.
2. Crisis was JFK’s stage. Since he had no political vision he sought crisis to show his courage and greatness as a leader. International conflict was important to him.
C. His conception of world politics--strong illusions
1. The central theme was a menacing USSR attempting world domination, with America attempting to defeat this aggression.
2. His view (illusory) shaped events far more than any specific Soviet action.
3. JFK essentially created his own history.
4. Example of Sputnik. Missile gap illusion, flexible response resulted. Bay of Pigs (US sponsored Cuban exiles to invade Cuba--it failed) was twisted in JFK’s mind to be an example of the USSR attempting to overtake the world.
D. Crisis mentality-- “The hour of maximum damage”
1. His crisis illusion was that he believed that the apocalypse was eminent.
2. Examples are the Berlin crisis (the wall was built) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (concern over Soviet nuclear buildup)
E. Global liberalism
1. The main JFK theme was counterrevolution. This would banish radical revolution by creating a democratic revolution.
2. Examples are the Alliance for Progress and VN.
3. AFP attempted to satisfy Latin American peoples needs for food, clothing, shelter. But the goals of material progress, military suppression of revolutionary activity, and protection of American property were methods of imperialist exploitation.
4. This is not a comprehensive view of VN. It asks what did VN mean to JFK. “IT was the keystone in the arch of freedom.” Miroff’s revision is that VN was a proving ground that JFK willingly entered.
F. New economics
1. Conservative economic policies. Was in service to corporate capitalism.
G. Civil Rights
1. This shows limitations of pragmatic leadership
2. He failed to see Civil Rights in moral terms, failed to educate the public. JFK was afraid of mass politics eroding his elite political power base.
3. Paradoxically, this was a crisis that was not an illusion.
H. Reassessing the modern presidency
1. Foreign policy: Neither progressive nor pragmatic. Centered on illusion
2. Domestic policy: Conservative.
3. What is liberal pragmatism? Intellectual and moral strength that can accept a world stripped of illusion. Objectivity is the illusion of the pragmatist. “The belief that power can produce concrete results” is an illusion.
July 22, 2013
Excellent read of the Presidency of JFK and how he became better after his presidency with revisionist history.
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