The naval leader has taken centre stage in traditional naval histories. However, while the historical narrative has been fairly consistent the development of various navies has been accompanied by assumptions, challenges and competing visions of the social characteristics of naval leaders and of their function. Whilst leadership has been a constant theme in historical studies, it has not been scrutinised as a phenomenon in its own right. This book examines the critical period in Europe between 1700 -1850, when political, economic and cultural shifts were bringing about a new understanding of the individual and of society. Bringing together context with a focus on naval leadership as a phenomenon is at the heart of this book, a unique collaborative venture between British, French and Spanish scholars. As globalisation develops in the twenty-first century the significance of navies looks set to increase. This volume of essays aims to place naval leadership in its historical context.
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This remarkable collection of essays from international scholars is a must read.
I was particularly grateful to see lesser-known officers in the French and Spanish navies included in the work, though the editor at the end admits that the project is somewhat weakened by the absence of American or Russian officers.
Despite this omission, this is a very illuminating set of papers that goes far to explain the differing approaches of the various navies, their objectives, their views on leadership, and their measure of success.
The French and Spanish admirals did not win such flashy shattering victories as their British counterparts, but the authors here are in line with recent scholarship that suggests this does not mean they were hopeless failures.
As other historians have argued, the objectives were simply pursued differently, and the all-encompassing destruction of the enemy fleet that dominates Mahanian theory was not necessarily the end goal of the French and Spanish strategy.
I had hoped that Gravina would be included but there is no paper specifically dealing with this officer, other notable absences are de Grasse and Guichen, but these are only minor complaints, for the officers who were covered (including the unfairly forgotten Antonio Barcelo) leave one feeling very satisfied.
Read in breaks at work, not sure I have the baseline knowledge to really "get it" but interesting nonetheless. Those 1780s French and Spanish loooooove combining their fleets and then not really doing anything with it.