Why Nations Rise: Narratives and the Path to Great Power

by Manjari Chatterjee Miller

What are rising powers? Do they challenge the international order? Why do some countries but not others become rising powers? In Why Nations Rise , Manjari Chaterjee Miller answers these questions and shows that some countries rise not just because they develop the military and economic power to do so but because they develop particular narratives about how to become a great power in the style of the great power du jour. These active rising powers accept the prevalent norms of the international order in order to become great powers. On the other hand, countries which have military and economic power but not these narratives do not rise enough to become great powers--they stay reticent powers. An examination of the narratives in historical (the United States, the Netherlands, Meiji Japan) and contemporary (Cold War Japan, post-Cold War China and India) cases, Why Nations Rise shows patterns of active and reticent rising powers and presents lessons for how to understand the rising
powers of China and India today.

Genres: International Relations, International Affairs, Politics

208 pages, Hardcover

Published February 12, 2021

Reviews

[Sam Seitz · Rating 2 out of 5]

I recently picked this book up after it was suggested by Paul Poast, and I don’t regret reading it given its bearing on a lot of the research I do. But truthfully I did not find the argument very original, well-developed, or well-substantiated. Miller’s main contention, which I fully buy, is that there is nothing inexorable about rising powers pursuit of global influence. For example, she convincingly highlights how the Dutch Republic in the late 19th century chose to avoid becoming a great power despite its strong economic growth and choice colonial holdings. She makes a similar point in her discussion of India. But of course some countries, such as Wilhelmine Germany or contemporary China, do seek power and status. Miller argues that these countries’ quests for influence and standing are conscious choices, not simply the result of inexorable systemic pressures. This strikes me as a valuable point that presents a bit of trouble for traditional power transition theorists. She also makes an additional claim, which is that rising powers must first work within the existing great power framework before they can significantly alter the system in their image (somewhat similar to arguments by Ikenberry or Edelstein). She discusses this across several cases, but China provides a particularly useful illustration. In the 1990s, China sought to legitimize its position through liberalization and accession to the WTO. It was only after it established itself as a great power in the early 2000s that it headed down the path of the “wolf warrior.” In total, Miller features six cases that are well researched and substantiate her argument. And yet I came away puzzled. For one, she never explains when or why states adopt great power narratives. She simply notes that in some cases they do and in others they don’t. And while I grant there is certainly contingency involved, and a full model of the emergence (or lack thereof) of these narratives would likely be fiendishly complex, I did hope for a more analytical approach. Where is the 2x2!? My other concern is simply that I am not sure I buy the argument that great powers must always work within the existing system first. This is certainly true for the cases she selects, but what about Revolutionary Russia or Napoleonic France? These sorts of revolutionary regimes are founded explicitly in opposition to established norms and orders, and so there is no point at which they deliberately attempt to link their rise to the status quo system. And yet the book completely ignores these types of states. This is fine, as far as it goes, but it needs to be justified. And the underdeveloped theory makes it very difficult to ascertain any scope conditions or other considerations that might warrant the exclusion of these types of states. Still, the book is well-written and full of interesting facts (seriously, who else in IR has dedicated a whole case study to the late 19th century Dutch Republic?), so it’s worth the read if the topic appeals to you.

[Roy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Tightly and compellingly written, this book provides a strong argument for narrative or constructivist elements as critical in the rise of great powers. Much of its history you will know, but I, at least, had never thought of its implications for the rise -- or not -- of great powers.

I also think this is a very useful book for those of us who wondered what exactly happened to those fears of a Japanese take-over of the world in the 1990s, as reflected in novels like Rising Sun. That's not the purpose of the book, but it provides a framework for addressing that story that faded from view with little explanation.

In this fascinating book, Prof Miller makes a powerful argument that the acceptable narratives in a culture have more to do with whether it fulfills the expectations of a rising power than the material capabilities it has and are growing.

She makes her case with cases. She is particularly interested in why India and China went different ways from a similar place in the 1970s as 'rising powers' in the mind of the world. But before tackling that, she explores how the U.S. fulfilled the world's expectations of a rising power in the early 20th Century at a time when the Netherlands essentially chose to stay a reticent power despite all the material power and recognition of other great powers. She addresses as 'mini-cases' the experience of Japan between WWI and WWII, showing how it developed to great power status, and the very different case of Japan in the late Cold War when it's economic power made most of the world concerned about Japan as a returning great power. She makes a powerful argument that the difference between a rising power that joins the great powers and one that remains, in her word of choice, reticent to be great power, is driven by the internal narratives about what the country is about even when the material power is available to be a great power.

A fascinating and important additional point made in the book is that rising powers that want to be great powers are not revisionist, as everyone fears, but accommodational to the great power norms of the day. The U.S., for example, took and ran overseas colonies, at least in part because that was required of a great power in the early 20th century. China has become much more involved in the world of multilateral organizations because that is the standard of the post-war world, even though China ecshewed such involvement as imperialist games until the 1990s. It is only when the formerly rising power is firmly ensconced as a great power that it begins to flex muscles to try to change the system to its benefit.

Well worth reading by any international relations reader, especially by any who suspect that realism doesn't tell the whole story of world affairs.

[Kumar Sharma · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good rising power overview.