In February 1920 the civil war that had ravaged Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik seizure of power was all but over, and with it the attempt of foreign governments to intervene on behalf of the anti-Communist forces. The government most deeply involved n this intervention was that of Great Britain. Yet scarcely a year later Britain was the first major power to come to terms with the new leadership in Moscow.
Richard H. Ullman's account of that cautious coming to terms offers a perspective on the processes by which British foreign policy adjusted to the drastically changed circumstances of the aftermath of World War I. Another important theme is the way in which British policy, and the conceptions of peace and security that underlay it, diverged from that of Britain's closest ally, France. The book is, as well, a contribution to the growing literature on bureaucratic politics and the politics of foreign-policy making, and is a protracted essay on the statecraft and political style of David Lloyd George. It draws on many new sources, among them the intercepted and deciphered telegrams of the Soviet mission in London.
Richard Henry Ullman earned his A.B. from Harvard in 1955, where he served as editorial page editor of The Harvard Crimson. He graduated with a B. Phil. and D. Phil. from Oxford University in 1957 and 1960, respectively. He taught at Harvard before moving to Princeton, where he taught from 1965 until 2001.