Meaning and the moral sciences

by Hilary Putnam

First published in 1978, this reissue presents a seminal philosophical work by professor Putnam, in which he puts forward a conception of knowledge which makes ethics, practical knowledge and non-mathematic parts of the social sciences just as much parts of 'knowledge' as the sciences themselves. He also rejects the idea that knowledge can be demarcated from non-knowledge by the fact that the former alone adheres to 'the scientific method'. The first part of the book consists of Professor Putnam's John Locke lectures, delivered at the University of Oxford in 1976, offering a detailed examination of a 'physicalist' theory of reference against a background of the works of Tarski, Carnap, Popper, Hempel and Kant. The analysis then extends to notions of truth, the character of linguistic enquiry and social scientific enquiry in general, interconnecting with the great metaphysical problem of realism, the nature of language and reference, and the character of ourselves.

Genres: Philosophy

154 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1978

About the author

Hilary Whitehall Putnam was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist who was a central figure in analytic philosophy from the 1960s until his death, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science. He was known for his willingness to apply an equal degree of scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, subjecting each position to rigorous analysis until he exposed its flaws. As a result, he acquired a reputation for frequently changing his own position. Putnam was Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University.

Reviews

[Daniel Hageman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well, if you’re looking for arguments that (1) highlight the point at which metaphysical realism inevitably collapses, but defend internal realism, (2) break down the relationship between language reference and truth value, yet defend language for its utility function over a correspondence theory, (3) maintain there exists an unbridgeable ‘categorical’ gap between various realms of epistemic knowledge, rather than the idea of consilience and the universality of the scientific method, or finally and most importantly (4) emphasize the implications of the idea that word ‘rabbit’ in one language might in fact mean ‘undetached rabbit parts’ in another language, then this is the book for you! But if you want to read something that human beings understand, jump to the next option on your goodreads list ;)

Honestly, though, I exaggerate a fair bit. The latter half of the book, following the first 5 John Locke Lectures, is actually fairly understandable and an interesting read. I disagree with his arguments against consilience, and that there is in principle a categorical gap specifically between the social sciences and the hard sciences (physics as the example used in the book).

He also spends a chunk of a chapter talking about his understanding of morality, taking the subject matter of ‘how to live life’ as necessarily axiomatic. While I think this is understandable, given the religious context in which much of morality has been taught over the millennia, I maintain that a rejection of the ‘practicality requirement’ (namely denying that moral obligations are necessarily normative/prescriptive, and are rather descriptive and potentially divergent from what ‘rational action’ might be considered), would help solidify an understandable view of the topic.

To give just a taste of some of the ideas put across in this text, below are the final two paragraphs (I think I’m allowed to ‘spoil’ nonfiction, right?).

“Let me close with a last philosophical metaphor. Kant’s image was of knowledge as a ‘representation’ – a kind of play. The author is me. But the author also appears as a character in the play (like a Pirandello play). The author in the play is not the ‘real’ author – it is the ‘empirical me’. The ‘real’ author is the ‘transcendental me’.

I would modify Kant’s image in two ways. The authors (in the plural – my image of knowledge is social) don’t write just one story: they write many versions. And the authors in the stories are the real authors. This would be ‘crazy’ if these stories were fictions. A fictitious character can’t also be a real author. But these are true stories.”

[Raymond Lam · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book contains Putnum's John Locke Lectures in 1976 which cover Tarski's deflationary theory of truth, realism and correspondence theory of truth, science and realism, causal theory of reference, indeterminacy of translation, the difference between physical science and social science. The second part of the book contains essays on moral philosophy and literature, reference and understanding, realism and reason.

Putnum's John Locke Lectures shows his usual ability to tie a wide range of difficult topics together in an engaging manner. His discussion in lectures 3 and 4 on indeterminacy of translation shows sometimes truths depends on different levels of description and different functionality and topics of interest is very enlightening.  The essay on morality and literature shows how literature offers depiction of morality as various predicaments man may face as a thought experiment-like examination of morality as a practical science is also insightful.  

[Phillip · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a hard, cruel book to read. It took me a lot of tries to get through it.

I am not familiar with Tarski, except what I have read to get through this. The author's theory is pretty simple though. He is responding to the old question of whether or not there is a world behind the world of our senses.

He says you can assume the real world corresponds to the world of our senses until you bump up against an anomaly that that suggest otherwise.

That is kind of underwhelming for the suffering I did to get through the book.