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Lucretius II: An Ethics of Motion
Human suffering, the fear of death, war, poverty, ecological destruction and social inequality: almost 2,000 ago Lucretius proposed an ethics of motion as simple and stunning solution to these ethical problems. Thomas Nail argues that Lucretius was the first to locate the core of all these ethical ills in our obsession with stasis, our fear of movement and our hatred of matter. Instead of trying to transcend nature with our minds, escape it with our immortal souls and dominate it with our technologies, Lucretius was perhaps the first in the Western tradition to forcefully argue for a completely materialist, immanent and naturalistic ethics based on moving well with and as nature. If we want to survive and live well on this planet, Lucretius taught us, our best chance is not to struggle against nature but to embrace it and facilitate its movement.
- GenresPhilosophy
240 pages, Hardcover
Published April 14, 2020
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
December 14, 2020
This is not for sincere students of Epicurean philosophy who are seeking to become happy with the use of philosophy.
July 7, 2020
This book consists in a line-by-line commentary of Lucretius's De rerum natura, namely books III and IV. As such, it presents many philosophical propositions that are not argumentatively defended, merely suggested (for Lucretius's work is also a poem); and these can grow repetitive. But that is to be expected given the genre of the work.
Nail argues, convincingly, that Lucretius broke from his master Epicurus in several ways, notably in rejecting the latter's ideal of ataraxia and atomist ontology. In lieu of this reading, Nail suggests that Lucretius developed an original ethics, inspired by Epicurus and Empedocles. This ethics predicates itself on a naturalistic foundation; it derives its normative force, apparently, from the ideal of 'metastable equilibrium' in the energy that living beings take from the world without them and share among themselves. By 'living beings', I mean animals and plants no less than human beings, for this ethics departs from the anthropocentrism of traditional ethical systems. Finally, it eschews (like Epicurus) the fear of death, but (beyond Epicurus) understands indeed any desire of stasis as an extension of the fear of death, and so embraces motion; thus, it rejects any deontology that would purport to yield ethical principles valid everywhere and at all times, supposing morality to be relative to the needs and desires of the members of a given ecosystem.
To be sure, Nail's book is stimulating, but one is disappointed at times to find little or no arguments attached to intriguing and controversial claims. That is, again, perhaps inevitable in a commentary. However, at times the author takes an unduly polemical and belittling tone of other thinkers, for instance at one point altogether dismissing Aristotle's virtue ethics, without much justification. It seems to me that the ideal of eudaimonia is not irreconcilable with that of metastable equilibrium, but the matter is addressed only tangentially.
Nail argues, convincingly, that Lucretius broke from his master Epicurus in several ways, notably in rejecting the latter's ideal of ataraxia and atomist ontology. In lieu of this reading, Nail suggests that Lucretius developed an original ethics, inspired by Epicurus and Empedocles. This ethics predicates itself on a naturalistic foundation; it derives its normative force, apparently, from the ideal of 'metastable equilibrium' in the energy that living beings take from the world without them and share among themselves. By 'living beings', I mean animals and plants no less than human beings, for this ethics departs from the anthropocentrism of traditional ethical systems. Finally, it eschews (like Epicurus) the fear of death, but (beyond Epicurus) understands indeed any desire of stasis as an extension of the fear of death, and so embraces motion; thus, it rejects any deontology that would purport to yield ethical principles valid everywhere and at all times, supposing morality to be relative to the needs and desires of the members of a given ecosystem.
To be sure, Nail's book is stimulating, but one is disappointed at times to find little or no arguments attached to intriguing and controversial claims. That is, again, perhaps inevitable in a commentary. However, at times the author takes an unduly polemical and belittling tone of other thinkers, for instance at one point altogether dismissing Aristotle's virtue ethics, without much justification. It seems to me that the ideal of eudaimonia is not irreconcilable with that of metastable equilibrium, but the matter is addressed only tangentially.
June 15, 2022
A good second part for the trilogy.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews