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After the Crash: Financial Crises and Regulatory Responses
The 2008 crash was the worst financial crisis and the most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression. It triggered a complete overhaul of the global regulatory environment, ushering in a stream of new rules and laws to combat the perceived weakness of the financial system. While the global economy came back from the brink, the continuing effects of the crisis include increasing economic inequality and political polarization.
After the Crash is an innovative analysis of the crisis and its ongoing influence on the global regulatory, financial, and political landscape, with timely discussions of the key issues for our economic future. It brings together a range of experts and practitioners, including Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winner; former congressman Barney Frank; former treasury secretary Jacob Lew; Paul Tucker, a former deputy governor of the Bank of England; and Steve Cutler, general counsel of JP Morgan Chase during the financial crisis. Each poses crucial What were the origins of the crisis? How effective were international and domestic regulatory responses? Have we addressed the roots of the crisis through reform and regulation? Are our financial systems and the global economy better able to withstand another crash? After the Crash is vital reading as both a retrospective on the last crisis and an analysis of possible sources of the next one.
After the Crash is an innovative analysis of the crisis and its ongoing influence on the global regulatory, financial, and political landscape, with timely discussions of the key issues for our economic future. It brings together a range of experts and practitioners, including Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winner; former congressman Barney Frank; former treasury secretary Jacob Lew; Paul Tucker, a former deputy governor of the Bank of England; and Steve Cutler, general counsel of JP Morgan Chase during the financial crisis. Each poses crucial What were the origins of the crisis? How effective were international and domestic regulatory responses? Have we addressed the roots of the crisis through reform and regulation? Are our financial systems and the global economy better able to withstand another crash? After the Crash is vital reading as both a retrospective on the last crisis and an analysis of possible sources of the next one.
434 pages, Kindle Edition
Published October 8, 2019
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February 12, 2020
The book is not without merit, but should only be read by those who already know a great deal about the issue because some of the politicians are extremely evasive and some of the academics are just flat wrong on many points of fact.
The good news: the chapters by Glenn Hubbard, Nolan McCarty, Vincent Bouvatier et al, Stephen Cutler and Barney Frank are excellent.
The chapters by Paul Tucker and Jack Lew disavow about any personal responsibility. Lew's bio even omits any mention of his years as a senior executive at Citigroup at a time when the company was making the mistakes that would turn into billions in losses - though not in his area, admittedly.
The bad news: the chapters by the Columbia academics need much more fact-checking. Most egregiously, the introduction (a) misspells "Bear Stearns" repeatedly in various ways (b) misspells its CEO's name (c) misspells BNP Paribas - PNB Paribas! (d) refers to a number dropping "200%", which is not possible (e) refers to Bear Stearns losing its deposits - it was not a bank and so had repos rather than deposits (f) refers to Bear Stearns as one of Wall Street's most prestiguous institutions, when it was anything but prestigious (g) quotes the leverage ratio incorrectly ten times on pages 24-25. Professor John Coffee twice says that the infamous Chuck Prince dancing quote referred to securitization even though his own footnotes clearly indicate that Prince was referring to syndication. This is important because Prof. Coffee believes the motive was incentive pay, which makes sense for securitization, rather than competitive posturing to impress a concentrated client base such as KKR, which was the reason that Citi kept dancing for LBO syndication volume.
All in all, the good chapters add some value if you already know most of the story. If you're coming in cold, the bad information within mean that this book will hurt more than help.
The good news: the chapters by Glenn Hubbard, Nolan McCarty, Vincent Bouvatier et al, Stephen Cutler and Barney Frank are excellent.
The chapters by Paul Tucker and Jack Lew disavow about any personal responsibility. Lew's bio even omits any mention of his years as a senior executive at Citigroup at a time when the company was making the mistakes that would turn into billions in losses - though not in his area, admittedly.
The bad news: the chapters by the Columbia academics need much more fact-checking. Most egregiously, the introduction (a) misspells "Bear Stearns" repeatedly in various ways (b) misspells its CEO's name (c) misspells BNP Paribas - PNB Paribas! (d) refers to a number dropping "200%", which is not possible (e) refers to Bear Stearns losing its deposits - it was not a bank and so had repos rather than deposits (f) refers to Bear Stearns as one of Wall Street's most prestiguous institutions, when it was anything but prestigious (g) quotes the leverage ratio incorrectly ten times on pages 24-25. Professor John Coffee twice says that the infamous Chuck Prince dancing quote referred to securitization even though his own footnotes clearly indicate that Prince was referring to syndication. This is important because Prof. Coffee believes the motive was incentive pay, which makes sense for securitization, rather than competitive posturing to impress a concentrated client base such as KKR, which was the reason that Citi kept dancing for LBO syndication volume.
All in all, the good chapters add some value if you already know most of the story. If you're coming in cold, the bad information within mean that this book will hurt more than help.
Displaying 1 of 1 review