The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process

by D. Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. McCubbins

Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely.

In The Logic of Delegation , however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated.

In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.

Genres: Political Science

299 pages, Paperback

First published June 18, 1991

Reviews

[Tobi ﾄﾋﾞ · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kiewiet and McCubbins apply principal-agent theory to the U.S. Congress, analysing how legislative bodies delegate authority to committees and the executive branch. They identify potential issues such as agency loss and explore mechanisms like oversight and incentives to mitigate these problems. The book provides a detailed examination of the appropriations process, illustrating how Congress balances the need for delegation with the necessity of maintaining control over policy implementation.

This offers interesting insights into the complexities of legislative delegation and the inherent challenges in maintaining accountability. However, its focus on formal mechanisms may understate the informal practices and political negotiations that significantly influence legislative processes. The analysis could benefit from a broader consideration of how factors like partisanship, public opinion, and institutional norms impact delegation and oversight in Congress. I found this to be a difficult read.

[Allison B · Rating 5 out of 5]

my dissertation bible

[Gift]

Kiewiet is one of the names that are still being quoted in literature on delegation. (As the majority of the scholars,) I haven’t read the whole book. I have focused on the first two chapters and then moved on.