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Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority
Cooling
- GenresMilitary History
678 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 1994
1 person is currently reading
11 people want to read
About the author
Benjamin Franklin Cooling III
43 books4 followersAlternate names:
B. Franklin Cooling
Benjamin F. Cooling
Benjamin Franklin Cooling III served as Chief Historian and Research Director with the Department of Energy and as a historian with the Army, Air Force, and National Park Service, and elsewhere. He has taught at numerous universities and is currently a Professor of History at the National Defense University in Washington DC. Cooling has authored or edited 16 books on the Civil War and modern warfare and has written several hundred articles, essays and reviews on aspects of military, naval and other history.
B. Franklin Cooling
Benjamin F. Cooling
Benjamin Franklin Cooling III served as Chief Historian and Research Director with the Department of Energy and as a historian with the Army, Air Force, and National Park Service, and elsewhere. He has taught at numerous universities and is currently a Professor of History at the National Defense University in Washington DC. Cooling has authored or edited 16 books on the Civil War and modern warfare and has written several hundred articles, essays and reviews on aspects of military, naval and other history.
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August 14, 2014
This was a book I had to read for my online history course. It was actually an enjoyable book! It is composed of essays about Air Power, theories about how it should be used, and how it was used in combat situations. There were two different essays about the Pacific Theater of Operations, so it was interesting to read them both as they were not quite the same. It also covers the gamut of the development of air power in WWI through Vietnam [do not remember if it covered the Gulf War or not; don't think it did].
It offered different insights that my other two textbooks did not have to offer; I had the impression the essays were written by military and former military personnel. This book did not sugarcoat things, but also showed the idiocy of the military mindset in focusing on 'heavy bombers' only and ignoring multipurpose aircraft until after Vietnam.
It also discussed the Falkland Islands conflict. I was surprised to learn that if Argentina had waited six more months before invading the Falklands that Britain could not have done anything to repel them. At the time Argentina invaded the British had the largest concentration of its fleet available - ships ready to be retired were intransit from the Mediterranean to the Home Islands and the rest of the fleet was in the Home Islands. Britain was able to send almost its entire fleet to the Falklands to take back the Islands. It was pretty crazy! Both countries feared losing capital ships to submarines and aircraft; the Argentinians lost more heavily than the British and acceded control of the sea to the British. But fears of missile attack kept the British fleet far enough from the islands that for most of the conflict aircraft time over target was measured in seconds and minutes; this conflict also proved the worth of the Harrier jump jet. It also saw the last use of Britain's two major aircraft carriers in use at that time.
It was also interesting to read about the mindsets and attitudes of military leaders during the Second World War. This was quite an eye-opener for me [short of reading biographies and auto-biographies about the different military commanders]. It also discussed the Air Power of other nations; two chapters were devoted to discussing the growth of air power in the various world powers prior to the start of WWII. That was also interesting to read. Like how the British and the French sent nearly 100 pilots, scientists, and engineers to Japan to help them with their aeronautics industry; they obviously never considered how Japan might use this knowledge against them. And we are seeing the same thing happen today - China is using technology and weapons from NATO and Russian to improve their military capabilities.
The discussion about what the Germans learned in the Spanish Civil War and how both Britain and the United States ignored those lessons were also a surprise to me. I had no idea how much the Germans learned! Plus, learning that the Russians allowed the Germans to build airfields and factories on Russian territory so that the Germans could secretly build up their Luftwaffe from prying eyes was also a shocking revelation! Especially considering how little the Communists and Nazis trusted each other in the years before the War. What the Germans did in such a short time with what they had was truly amazing [in military terms and capabilities], but they still lost the war in the end.
Korea was frustrating to read about - lessons learned there had to be relearned all over again in Vietnam! But air power was instrumental in saving the lives of the UN troops as well as insuring air superiority over the battlefields. The Communists in both Korea and Vietnam had the same complaint - how Air Power saved the day! Go Air Power!
It was an interesting book. Lessons learned in one theater of operations in WWII were not necessarily transferable into another theater [i.e. - what was used to success in Africa not necessarily going to work in the Pacific and vice versa]. Each theater of operations had its own unique situations that required unique solutions, and the Allied Forces were able to apply the necessary means to win in each situation.
I might not have picked the book up to read on my own volition, but I actually enjoyed reading it as a textbook for my class. So I am glad I had to read it as I would have missed out on a good book. It had a decent pace, overall. Some sections were a little dry and boring, but many 'articles' [chapters] were fascinating and quite interesting. Overall I felt it was well-written and put together in a readable fashion.
It offered different insights that my other two textbooks did not have to offer; I had the impression the essays were written by military and former military personnel. This book did not sugarcoat things, but also showed the idiocy of the military mindset in focusing on 'heavy bombers' only and ignoring multipurpose aircraft until after Vietnam.
It also discussed the Falkland Islands conflict. I was surprised to learn that if Argentina had waited six more months before invading the Falklands that Britain could not have done anything to repel them. At the time Argentina invaded the British had the largest concentration of its fleet available - ships ready to be retired were intransit from the Mediterranean to the Home Islands and the rest of the fleet was in the Home Islands. Britain was able to send almost its entire fleet to the Falklands to take back the Islands. It was pretty crazy! Both countries feared losing capital ships to submarines and aircraft; the Argentinians lost more heavily than the British and acceded control of the sea to the British. But fears of missile attack kept the British fleet far enough from the islands that for most of the conflict aircraft time over target was measured in seconds and minutes; this conflict also proved the worth of the Harrier jump jet. It also saw the last use of Britain's two major aircraft carriers in use at that time.
It was also interesting to read about the mindsets and attitudes of military leaders during the Second World War. This was quite an eye-opener for me [short of reading biographies and auto-biographies about the different military commanders]. It also discussed the Air Power of other nations; two chapters were devoted to discussing the growth of air power in the various world powers prior to the start of WWII. That was also interesting to read. Like how the British and the French sent nearly 100 pilots, scientists, and engineers to Japan to help them with their aeronautics industry; they obviously never considered how Japan might use this knowledge against them. And we are seeing the same thing happen today - China is using technology and weapons from NATO and Russian to improve their military capabilities.
The discussion about what the Germans learned in the Spanish Civil War and how both Britain and the United States ignored those lessons were also a surprise to me. I had no idea how much the Germans learned! Plus, learning that the Russians allowed the Germans to build airfields and factories on Russian territory so that the Germans could secretly build up their Luftwaffe from prying eyes was also a shocking revelation! Especially considering how little the Communists and Nazis trusted each other in the years before the War. What the Germans did in such a short time with what they had was truly amazing [in military terms and capabilities], but they still lost the war in the end.
Korea was frustrating to read about - lessons learned there had to be relearned all over again in Vietnam! But air power was instrumental in saving the lives of the UN troops as well as insuring air superiority over the battlefields. The Communists in both Korea and Vietnam had the same complaint - how Air Power saved the day! Go Air Power!
It was an interesting book. Lessons learned in one theater of operations in WWII were not necessarily transferable into another theater [i.e. - what was used to success in Africa not necessarily going to work in the Pacific and vice versa]. Each theater of operations had its own unique situations that required unique solutions, and the Allied Forces were able to apply the necessary means to win in each situation.
I might not have picked the book up to read on my own volition, but I actually enjoyed reading it as a textbook for my class. So I am glad I had to read it as I would have missed out on a good book. It had a decent pace, overall. Some sections were a little dry and boring, but many 'articles' [chapters] were fascinating and quite interesting. Overall I felt it was well-written and put together in a readable fashion.
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