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Animal Consciousness
Essays discuss the nature of consiousness, animal communication, and the ethical treatment of animals
1000 pages, Hardcover
First published May 1, 1989
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January 28, 2025
A ‘PHILOSOPHICAL’ PERSPECTIVE ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS QUESTION
Philosophers Daisie Radner and Michael Radner wrote in the Introduction to this 1989 book, “In philosophy past and present, the prevailing attitude has been that any questions having to do with nonhuman animals are of decidedly secondary importance. Human nature poses one of the great problems of philosophy. By contrast, the problem of animal nature is a minor side issue, perhaps useful as an exercise in examining the limits of what it means to be human, but hardly worthy of extended treatment in its own right. Animals may be studied scientifically as part of the natural world, but their philosophical importance lies in what they lack. They are not just nonhuman, but less than human. The time is long past for abandoning the anthropocentric approach to philosophy… This book is about animals. We make no use that they are being studied in order to learn more about human nature. The zoocentric approach to philosophy is very fruitful. Certain issues in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, even history of philosophy, take on new light when animals are given center stage.
“The topic of animal consciousness cuts across disciplinary boundaries from biology to ethology to psychology and on to philosophy… Scientists bring a lot of metaphysical and ideological baggage with them when they embark on this endeavor. The metaphysical baggage includes a theory of mind according to which consciousness is privately unassailable and publicly inaccessible, therefore scientifically useless… The ideological baggage contains the time-honored precept of human uniqueness… The ideology lies not in the search for differences, but in the unwavering belief that humanity is defined by attributes that have absolutely no precedent in the rest of the biological world.
“The metaphysical and ideological doctrines combine to generate a formidable challenge to the study of animal consciousness. How can we possibly know what animals are experiencing, when we have no direct access to their inner lives and the insuperable barrier between us and them undercuts any attempt at analogical reasoning form their behavior? One way to confront the challenge is to question the legitimacy of the doctrines on which it is based. That is what we propose to do.
Debates about animal consciousness fall into two periods: before and after Darwin. Cartesian metaphysics casts its shadow over both periods… The animal without consciousness---the beast-machine---was then preeminently a Cartesian creation… The Cartesian beast-machine breaks down under the weight of analysis within Descartes’s own framework… We advocate a reexamination of what usually passes for the Cartesian concept of consciousness… Far from fostering the denial of consciousness to animals, the distinction makes it easier to talk about animals as having conscious experiences and easier to see how one can learn about them…
“One would think that the doctrine of human uniqueness would have been finally laid to rest in the post-Darwinian era, but such is not the case… Humans still like to think of their species as above the biological turmoil… In a Darwinian universe, the presence of human consciousness makes probable the presence of animal consciousness. A thoroughgoing evolutionary ethology should incorporate this aspect of animal life along with every other.”
They note, “The claim is sometimes made, by philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, that all consciousness is self-consciousness… it is true that everything of which I am conscious is a thought of mine. But in being conscious… of my thinking, I may not realize that these thoughts are mine or that it is I myself who am thinking. This sort of self-knowledge comes only with reflective thinking. One can easily imagine a being who never happens upon this particular thought, either through lack of intellectual development or for want of application.” (Pg. 30-31)
They wonder, “What happens if animals are allowed sentiments of color, pain, and so on? Such mental acts must have objects, for to see nothing is not to see and to feel nothing is not to feel. The objects cannot be material, otherwise animals would have immediate and direct knowledge of bodies---a feat which not even God himself can accomplish. The objects of animal perceptions must either be in the animals’ minds or else outside them but capable of acting upon them. If animals directly perceive ideas in their own minds, then all ideas are not included in the general idea of the infinite, all ideas are not uncreated… Animals, too, would sense nothing but what God makes them sense.” (Pg. 75-76)
Of ‘ape language’ experiments, they argue, “When videotapes of Nim’s utterances were analyzed, it became apparent that most of his signing was prompted by his teachers. The pattern of discourse was quite different from that of a human child. The mean length of Nim’s utterances failed to increase as he learned more words. His longer sequences were usually repetitive… His utterance tended to be more imitative---repeating some of all of the teacher’s prior signs---than those of children at the first stage of language learning… The percentage of novel utterances … was also lower… The various experiments have been the target of criticism both from without and from within the field of ape language research.” (Pg.153)
They summarize, “We have tried in this book to clear away some of the metaphysical and methodological stumbling blocks to the study of animal consciousness. If animal consciousness is indeed open to empirical investigation, then the results of such an inquiry will obviously have some bearing on the morality of our treatment of animals… Our aim is not to advance one ethical theory over another but only to show how information gained from the study of animal consciousness can be put to use in ethics.” (Pg. 209)
They conclude, “Once we grant animals moral status, we must be prepared to take them seriously. Taking animals seriously means considering them as individuals in their own right. It means recognizing them as beings with interests and capacities for satisfaction, some of which are species-specific. In order to appreciate the full range of animal experience, we must be prepared to step beyond the simple dichotomy of human versus nonhuman. Other animals deserve the same careful scrutiny that we have hitherto lavished on our own species.” (Pg. 225)
This book will appeal to those seeking a ‘philosophical’ approach (rather than a ‘scientific’ one) to the question of animal consciousness.
Philosophers Daisie Radner and Michael Radner wrote in the Introduction to this 1989 book, “In philosophy past and present, the prevailing attitude has been that any questions having to do with nonhuman animals are of decidedly secondary importance. Human nature poses one of the great problems of philosophy. By contrast, the problem of animal nature is a minor side issue, perhaps useful as an exercise in examining the limits of what it means to be human, but hardly worthy of extended treatment in its own right. Animals may be studied scientifically as part of the natural world, but their philosophical importance lies in what they lack. They are not just nonhuman, but less than human. The time is long past for abandoning the anthropocentric approach to philosophy… This book is about animals. We make no use that they are being studied in order to learn more about human nature. The zoocentric approach to philosophy is very fruitful. Certain issues in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, even history of philosophy, take on new light when animals are given center stage.
“The topic of animal consciousness cuts across disciplinary boundaries from biology to ethology to psychology and on to philosophy… Scientists bring a lot of metaphysical and ideological baggage with them when they embark on this endeavor. The metaphysical baggage includes a theory of mind according to which consciousness is privately unassailable and publicly inaccessible, therefore scientifically useless… The ideological baggage contains the time-honored precept of human uniqueness… The ideology lies not in the search for differences, but in the unwavering belief that humanity is defined by attributes that have absolutely no precedent in the rest of the biological world.
“The metaphysical and ideological doctrines combine to generate a formidable challenge to the study of animal consciousness. How can we possibly know what animals are experiencing, when we have no direct access to their inner lives and the insuperable barrier between us and them undercuts any attempt at analogical reasoning form their behavior? One way to confront the challenge is to question the legitimacy of the doctrines on which it is based. That is what we propose to do.
Debates about animal consciousness fall into two periods: before and after Darwin. Cartesian metaphysics casts its shadow over both periods… The animal without consciousness---the beast-machine---was then preeminently a Cartesian creation… The Cartesian beast-machine breaks down under the weight of analysis within Descartes’s own framework… We advocate a reexamination of what usually passes for the Cartesian concept of consciousness… Far from fostering the denial of consciousness to animals, the distinction makes it easier to talk about animals as having conscious experiences and easier to see how one can learn about them…
“One would think that the doctrine of human uniqueness would have been finally laid to rest in the post-Darwinian era, but such is not the case… Humans still like to think of their species as above the biological turmoil… In a Darwinian universe, the presence of human consciousness makes probable the presence of animal consciousness. A thoroughgoing evolutionary ethology should incorporate this aspect of animal life along with every other.”
They note, “The claim is sometimes made, by philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, that all consciousness is self-consciousness… it is true that everything of which I am conscious is a thought of mine. But in being conscious… of my thinking, I may not realize that these thoughts are mine or that it is I myself who am thinking. This sort of self-knowledge comes only with reflective thinking. One can easily imagine a being who never happens upon this particular thought, either through lack of intellectual development or for want of application.” (Pg. 30-31)
They wonder, “What happens if animals are allowed sentiments of color, pain, and so on? Such mental acts must have objects, for to see nothing is not to see and to feel nothing is not to feel. The objects cannot be material, otherwise animals would have immediate and direct knowledge of bodies---a feat which not even God himself can accomplish. The objects of animal perceptions must either be in the animals’ minds or else outside them but capable of acting upon them. If animals directly perceive ideas in their own minds, then all ideas are not included in the general idea of the infinite, all ideas are not uncreated… Animals, too, would sense nothing but what God makes them sense.” (Pg. 75-76)
Of ‘ape language’ experiments, they argue, “When videotapes of Nim’s utterances were analyzed, it became apparent that most of his signing was prompted by his teachers. The pattern of discourse was quite different from that of a human child. The mean length of Nim’s utterances failed to increase as he learned more words. His longer sequences were usually repetitive… His utterance tended to be more imitative---repeating some of all of the teacher’s prior signs---than those of children at the first stage of language learning… The percentage of novel utterances … was also lower… The various experiments have been the target of criticism both from without and from within the field of ape language research.” (Pg.153)
They summarize, “We have tried in this book to clear away some of the metaphysical and methodological stumbling blocks to the study of animal consciousness. If animal consciousness is indeed open to empirical investigation, then the results of such an inquiry will obviously have some bearing on the morality of our treatment of animals… Our aim is not to advance one ethical theory over another but only to show how information gained from the study of animal consciousness can be put to use in ethics.” (Pg. 209)
They conclude, “Once we grant animals moral status, we must be prepared to take them seriously. Taking animals seriously means considering them as individuals in their own right. It means recognizing them as beings with interests and capacities for satisfaction, some of which are species-specific. In order to appreciate the full range of animal experience, we must be prepared to step beyond the simple dichotomy of human versus nonhuman. Other animals deserve the same careful scrutiny that we have hitherto lavished on our own species.” (Pg. 225)
This book will appeal to those seeking a ‘philosophical’ approach (rather than a ‘scientific’ one) to the question of animal consciousness.
March 4, 2023
This is philosophy as it should be done. The Radners survey a wide variety of sources (from the XVIIth to the XXth century), carefully rephrase the original arguments, and examine their soundness, refining them when needed and often drawing more rigorous conclusions from them than their original authors did. This is truly a lesson in how to think clearly on this important topic, and on philosophical issues in general. I will definitely be reading more from these two authors.
Other books I have read on the same topic (all of them recommended) include Lars Chittka's The Mind of a Bee; Kristin Andrews' The Animal Mind; and Arthur Reber's The First Minds. I am also impatient to read Walter Veit's upcoming A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness.
Other books I have read on the same topic (all of them recommended) include Lars Chittka's The Mind of a Bee; Kristin Andrews' The Animal Mind; and Arthur Reber's The First Minds. I am also impatient to read Walter Veit's upcoming A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews