Federalism and Democracy in Latin America

by Edward L. Gibson (Editor)

We live in an increasingly federalized world. This fact has generated interest in how federal institutions shape politics, policy-making, and the quality of life of those living in federal systems. In Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, Edward L. Gibson brings together a distinguished group of scholars to examine the Latin American experience with federalism and to advance our theoretical understanding of politics in federal systems. By means of theoretical essays and case studies, the authors address questions of how and when federal institutions matter for politics, policy-making, and democratic practice. They also offer conceptual approaches for studying federal systems, their origins, and their internal dynamics. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America provides case studies on the four existing federal systems in Latin America–Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela–and their experiences in dealing with a variety of issues, including federal system formation, democratization, electoral representation, and economic reform. Edward L. Gibson, Northwestern University; Alfred Stepan, Columbia University; Scott Mainwaring, University of Notre Dame; Ernesto Calvo, University of Houston; Alberto Diaz Cayeros, Stanford University; Tulia Gabriela Falleti, University of Pennsylvania; Enrique Ochoa Reza, Columbia University; Michael Penfold-Becerra, Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración, Venezuela; David J. Samuels, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities; Richard Snyder, Brown University of Illinois.

392 pages, Paperback

First published February 28, 2004

Reviews

[Steven Taylor · Rating 4 out of 5]

A useful contribution to the literature both of Latin American democratic development, but also to the growing lit on comparative federalism.

Case specifically covered in the text are as follows: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. There are also several topical chapters that are more broadly comparative.

Alfred Stepan's article "Electorally Generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems" which builds off of Stepan's recent work on federalism along with George Tsebelis' work on veto players is especially interesting.

Stepan's essay "Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism" is also noteworthy, although it is just a reprint of the same piece that appeared in his 2001 book Arguing Comparative Politics and appeared in an earlier form in 1999 in The Journal of Democracy.