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Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature
Shows how Darwinian biology supports an Aristotelian view of ethics as rooted in human nature.
332 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 1998
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January 23, 2015
Arnhart draws primarily from Aristotle (and supplements Aristotle with Hume and Darwin) to argue for ethical naturalism. In contrast to inanimate nature, humans are goal seeking, teleological beings. We act with ends in mind and we make choices. Arnhart lists twenty universal desires (collectively, “Darwinian natural right"), based on his survey of the literature, with desire being defined as a “propensity toward” or an “aversion against” an object. Knowledge and belief systems are secondary; they provide “information relevant to the goals set by desire.” This, Arnhart believes, reiterates Hume's belief that "reason can direct action but not motivate it."
In making his argument, Arnhart has to dispose of several theoretical objections, the most prominent of which is the reputed* Hume assertion that we cannot draw an “ought” from an “is.” Arnhart states that this distinction comes first from Kant, not Hume, whose “phenomenal” comes from the realm of nature and what “is,” and his ought belongs to the “‘noumenal’ realm of freedom.” While Kant’s “radical” dualist approach separates ought from is in this way, it’s not so clear how this disposes of the commonly understood logical objection to deriving an “ought” from “is,” and we are left only with Arnhart’s argument that, since we have twenty universal desires, we “ought” to desire their goals/objects.
Arnhart might be better off to reformulate the problem on the basis of sound evolutionary principles. If we desire to survive, this brings with it certain rights (freedom to seek, the needs for nurture and security, and to defend against threats) that can be legitimately argued as “natural” as they are central to our survival. If such rights and assertions only promote self-interest, this becomes a problem for the rights of those who restrict self-seeking in deference to the whole. Fortunately, as Darwin observed, we also have a full suite of social values that move us to merge with the group and to restrain ourselves as a result. Yet, given Darwinian variability, many are at the opposite end of the continuum and seek to advance their interest at the expense of others and the group if they can get away with it.
Despite Arnhart’s listing of human universals, it is doubtful that we have a “common human nature” as he argues in this book. This, and his preoccupation with Aristotle, lead him to make statements such as, “All human beings, or at least all those not suffering from some abnormal deformity in their emotional and rational capacities, are naturally inclined to assert their independence as human beings with a moral sense governed by sympathy and reciprocity.” This does not match up with the historical evidence about who we are or I believe with our evolutionary design. Both other-regarding behavior and purely self-seeking behavior (combined with power and deception) are valid survival strategies.
*Arnhart writes: "The common interpretation of Hume as having separated is from ought depends on only one paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature. Some Hume scholars have shown that if one considers carefully both the textual and historical contexts of this paragraph, one sees that the common interpretation is wrong."
In making his argument, Arnhart has to dispose of several theoretical objections, the most prominent of which is the reputed* Hume assertion that we cannot draw an “ought” from an “is.” Arnhart states that this distinction comes first from Kant, not Hume, whose “phenomenal” comes from the realm of nature and what “is,” and his ought belongs to the “‘noumenal’ realm of freedom.” While Kant’s “radical” dualist approach separates ought from is in this way, it’s not so clear how this disposes of the commonly understood logical objection to deriving an “ought” from “is,” and we are left only with Arnhart’s argument that, since we have twenty universal desires, we “ought” to desire their goals/objects.
Arnhart might be better off to reformulate the problem on the basis of sound evolutionary principles. If we desire to survive, this brings with it certain rights (freedom to seek, the needs for nurture and security, and to defend against threats) that can be legitimately argued as “natural” as they are central to our survival. If such rights and assertions only promote self-interest, this becomes a problem for the rights of those who restrict self-seeking in deference to the whole. Fortunately, as Darwin observed, we also have a full suite of social values that move us to merge with the group and to restrain ourselves as a result. Yet, given Darwinian variability, many are at the opposite end of the continuum and seek to advance their interest at the expense of others and the group if they can get away with it.
Despite Arnhart’s listing of human universals, it is doubtful that we have a “common human nature” as he argues in this book. This, and his preoccupation with Aristotle, lead him to make statements such as, “All human beings, or at least all those not suffering from some abnormal deformity in their emotional and rational capacities, are naturally inclined to assert their independence as human beings with a moral sense governed by sympathy and reciprocity.” This does not match up with the historical evidence about who we are or I believe with our evolutionary design. Both other-regarding behavior and purely self-seeking behavior (combined with power and deception) are valid survival strategies.
*Arnhart writes: "The common interpretation of Hume as having separated is from ought depends on only one paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature. Some Hume scholars have shown that if one considers carefully both the textual and historical contexts of this paragraph, one sees that the common interpretation is wrong."
August 19, 2014
This is another attempt to provide a basis for morality on human nature. The author points out several (twenty)features of our human nature, such as our desire to be good parents and raise children, our sexual desires, our desire for social status. His arguments are very persuasive in proving our social nature. They are less persuasive in proving our moral nature.
He appeals to the authority of Aristotle, Hume, and Darwin as early proponents of a humanist ethics grounded on human nature. James Wilson's book, The Moral Sense, is frequently cited.
It is well-written and cites references clearly. I respect the thought. But I feel like such arguments will only ground humanist ethics upon our social nature in a general way. It does not help much when attempting to deal with many of the moral issues of the day.
He appeals to the authority of Aristotle, Hume, and Darwin as early proponents of a humanist ethics grounded on human nature. James Wilson's book, The Moral Sense, is frequently cited.
It is well-written and cites references clearly. I respect the thought. But I feel like such arguments will only ground humanist ethics upon our social nature in a general way. It does not help much when attempting to deal with many of the moral issues of the day.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews